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any book). While a small handful of previous acquisition studies on English any have targeted children’s 
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Chapter 1  
         
Introduction
1.  Background
One of the central undertakings of cognitive science is to understand how we acquire knowledge. Language 
acquisition in particular has been the focus of heated debate, generating a massive amount of research and 
theorization over the past  half century. For all of the productive research that has been carried out, and all the 
progress that we have made in characterizing the child language development process, we are still struggling 
with the so-called logical problem of language acquisition (cf. Chomsky, 1965, 1975). How do children, in 
response to a finite set of input data from the environment, generalize to a complete set  of grammatical 
representations that for all intents and purposes mirrors that of their caregivers? 
 For all of the progress that  researchers have made toward answering the learnability questions for 
specific pockets of linguistic phenomena (e.g., constraints on pronominal interpretation, quantifier scope 
relations, argument structure, question formation, etc.), there remains contentious back-and-forth between 
the so-called nativist  generative approach, which explains a great  deal of children’s success by appealing to 
innate acquisition mechanisms and linguistic knowledge, and domain-general approaches to language 
learning that posit  acquisition on the basis of sensitivity to statistical regularities in the input. Of course these 
labels are overly general, and there are indeed pockets of research that  attempt  to bridge the gap by more 
rigorously investigating the interaction of the input data with the hypotheses that children purportedly must 
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entertain (cf. for example Yang, 2004 and Pinker, 1979); such attempts also more recently include targeted 
investigations of how a learner uses the linguistic input to arrive at the correct generalizations (cf. Lidz and 
Gagliardi, to appear; Gagliardi, 2012; Viau & Lidz, 2011; Omaki, 2010; Pearl & Lidz, 2009). Wherever this 
recent trend will take us, it is clear that  for the moment the ‘nature vs. nurture’ debate is far from settled. In 
fact, in recent  years, the debate has intensified, partly due to discoveries that children can in fact learn certain 
linguistic properties from statistical regularities in the input (cf. Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996).
 Against  this background, I want to tackle two general issues in this dissertation. First, many of the 
developments in the field, including a recent shift  to consider more and more seriously the possibility of 
language acquisition without  innate abstract principles, have generally played out  in the domain of syntax; I 
believe we are missing an important  part of the picture by (relatively) neglecting the semantic component of 
the grammar.1 Second, I will use the acquisition of a semantic phenomenon to address the so-called Poverty 
of the Stimulus (Chomsky, 1965, 1975). I will attempt to show that  when we examine the semantic 
component of the grammar the way that we have the syntactic component, we find compelling evidence for 
a poverty of the stimulus argument. Yet there is a subtle tension here: whatever degree of impoverishment 
we want  to ascribe to the input, the plain fact of the matter is that  the input  cannot be insufficiently rich, for 
the normally developing child inevitably acquires the target  grammar. This tension between an input  that at 
first glance may appear insufficiently rich, and the ultimate success that the child learner achieves, is in very 
broad terms what I will address in this dissertation. 
2
1 Going beyond the word level, i.e. lexical development, semantics/pragmatics is generally understudied 
within generative acquisition work. Notable exceptions include in-depth examinations of: quantifier scope 
interactions (cf. Gualmini, 2004; Lidz & Musolino, 2002; Miller & Schmitt, 2004; Musolino 1998; 
Musolino & Lidz, 2002, 2003, 2006), logical operators (disjunction, negation, conjunction, conditionals) 
(cf. Crain & Thornton, 2006 for a nice overview), scalar implicatures (cf. among many others, Chierchia et 
al., 2001; Gualmini et al., 2001; Guasti et al., 2005; Pouscoulous et al., 2007; Papafragou & Musolino, 
2003), presupposition (Legendre, 2011; Yatsushiro, 2008a,b), and children’s development of Theory of 
Mind (cf. Tager-Flusberg et al., 1997; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Perner, 1988; Fodor, 1992; de Villiers, 
2007). While these few topics have been the subject of intense study, it is generally the case that what 
researchers have relied on to argue for or against innate language-specific knowledge is evidence from 
syntax and syntactic development. While there are studies that target semantic phenomena, these have 
generally focused more on whether children are adult-like, than on how children can acquire the relevant 
phenomena. Perhaps it is because meaning is generally conceived of as much more transparent than 
underlying syntactic structure, and so one tends to take it for granted that children can and will learn ‘all 
the right meanings’ on the basis of evidence in the input.
2.  Outline of the Study   
The semantic phenomenon I will investigate is the semantics of so-called negative polarity items (NPIs). 
What most of the literature on negative polarity has focused on is the observation that NPIs like English any 
need to be “licensed” (compare (1) and (2)). One prominent  account of NPI licensing is the Fauconnier/
Ladusaw hypothesis, according to which NPIs are licensed when they appear in the scope of a downward-
entailing operator, i.e. an operator that licenses subset inferences. 
(1) Alexandre did not attend any lectures.
(2) *Alexandre attended any lectures.
But  adult-like knowledge of any entails knowing much more than its restricted distribution; in particular it 
entails a fair amount  of sophisticated semantic knowledge (i.e. the key semantic mechanisms that underlie 
any’s restricted distribution). This dissertation will present a series of experimental and corpus studies meant 
to probe for this semantic knowledge; moreover these studies will all constitute steps towards a discussion of 
the learning problem that polarity sensitive items (PSIs) like any pose to the child learner. 
 Chapter 2 will start the ball rolling by presenting the object of study, namely the PSI any, and how this 
item is represented in the adult grammar. I’ll present  some prominent accounts of the NPI any from the 
theoretical literature, as well as the ingredients we’ll need to investigate children’s knowledge of NPI any. 
The key is to clearly define the adult grammar, as we take it  to be the target  of acquisition for the child 
learner. With this goal in mind, Chapter 2 will also present an experiment designed to tap into adults’ 
intuitions concerning a particular property of any, namely that  of domain widening. This experiment will 
investigate adults’ sensitivity to the nature of any’s semantic alternatives, how these alternatives are factored 
into meaning, i.e. exhaustified, and how any’s domain of quantification contrasts with more restricted ones 
of plain indefinites like a and bare plurals. 
 Once we have a proper characterization of the adult grammar with respect to any, we’ll move on to a 
discussion of the child data. Chapter 3 will begin by reviewing previous acquisition studies of 3-, 4-, and 5-
year-olds’ knowledge of any. In particular, I will argue that  these studies overlooked the semantics of any, 
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and thus their claims of target performance cannot be equated with a claim that 4-year-olds have (complete) 
target knowledge of any. To rectify this, I will present an experiment that  demonstrates that  most (though not 
all) 4-year-olds have very sophisticated semantic knowledge that allows them to interpret any in an adult-
like manner: they are able to identify the nature of any’s alternatives, generating them from the context; they 
are able to perform an exhaustification operation over these alternatives; moreover, they are sensitive to 
contrastive focus and can contrast  any’s domain of quantification with more restricted domains available in 
the context. 
 In Chapter 4, I continue in the same vein by presenting novel experimental evidence that  4-year-olds are 
also adult-like in their comprehension of any on its so-called “free choice” instantiation (3); children can 
compute “free choice inferences” like that in (3), interpreting any in modal contexts in an adult-like way:
(3) You may write your paper on any topic.
   You may write your paper on topic A, and you may write your paper on topic B, and you may 
  write your paper on topic C, ...
In Chapter 5, I present the learning problem that the child learner faces: on the one hand, we will by that 
point have accumulated a great  deal of evidence that children are target-like both in their production and 
comprehension of any. On the other hand, I will present  an analysis of parental speech samples that reveal 
very little to no direct evidence for the semantic mechanisms and operations that would be required for 
children to display such target-like performance on our experiments. To solve this learning problem, I look 
to Chierchia’s (2013) theory-driven typology of the kinds of PSIs that we can expect  to find within and 
across languages. According to Chierchia, PSIs can differ along two dimensions: the kinds of alternatives 
that they activate, and the modes of exhaustification that  use up those alternatives (and factor them into the 
meaning of the sentence). I argue that these two dimensions must  be innately specified, such that  the child 
only has to consider a restricted space of possible PSI categories; more specifically, these two dimensions 
and their respective range of parametric variation will only generate a restricted set of possible categories. 
The child’s task is to use the unique distribution of any in the input  (for which there is indeed observable 
4
evidence) to map any to the target  PSI within the typology of restricted options. The dissertation will close 
with discussion of some open questions, as well as some predictions of the proposed account. 
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Chapter 2  
         
NPI any in the Adult Grammar
1.  Introduction
In this chapter, we will begin our study in earnest by establishing the target  grammar to be acquired by the 
child; after all, only once we have established an adequate characterization of the target  structures can we 
begin to fully investigate the learning task that faces the child learner. 
 A great deal of literature has focused on the restricted distribution of the negative polarity item (NPI) 
any, attempting to derive appropriate licensing conditions that can capture its restricted distribution. Section 
2 of this chapter will review some previous approaches to any, including a recent compositional 
implementation of any’s semantics. Section 3 will present an experiment designed to resolve some 
controversy surrounding any’s semantic contribution.  
2.  Theories of Negative Polarity Item any
Much of the literature on NPIs has focused on the fact that NPIs like any have a restricted distribution: they 
must be ‘licensed’ where they appear. While I will briefly describe that restricted distribution in this section, 
highlighting one prominent line of proposals concerning any’s licensing condition, the focus of this 
dissertation is on any’s semantics. The key semantic property of any that I will focus on, i.e. domain 
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widening, can, at  least  descriptively, be discussed independently of the particular view of licensing that one 
chooses to adopt; this is because any account of licensing must contend with the domain widening facts. In 
this chapter, I will present  one particular approach to licensing that successfully ties licensing to the domain 
widening semantics of any. But the child data that we will subsequently discuss will not hinge on a 
particular account  of NPI licensing, and any learnability story will ultimately have to contend with how 
children acquire the semantics of any, regardless of the particular account of NPI licensing adopted.    
2.1 NPI Licensing    
Any is licensed in the scope of negation in (1), but is ill-formed in the affirmative declarative sentence in (2).  
(1) Alexandre did not attend any lectures.
(2) *Alexandre attended any lectures.
Given this pattern of behaviour, any is a so-called NPI; its distribution appears restricted to “negative” 
environments, and it  is almost always acceptable under negation. The set  of licensing environments for any 
extends well beyond negation however, as seen in (3)-(8).
(3) Nobody has any idea where Mathieu and Sophie have gone.
(4) Every Bluth Company investor who has any sense will sell their stock.
(5) If anybody wants office space, there is a free room down the hall.
(6) I regret giving Sasha any of my money.
(7) Did anybody survive the zombie apocalypse?
(8) I wonder whether Ron has any eggs.
A great deal of the extensive literature on NPI licensing has therefore been devoted to characterizing those 
environments which do appear to license NPIs like any (see among others, Fauconnier, 1975, 1979; 
Ladusaw, 1979; Linebarger, 1987; Heim, 1984; Horn, 1989; Kadmon & Landman, 1993; Krifka, 1995; 
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Giannakidou, 1998). One very productive line of research is built  upon the Fauconnier-Ladusaw hypothesis, 
according to which NPIs are licensed by downward-entailing (DE) operators such as negation (Ladusaw, 
1979, a.o.). A DE operator is one which has the logical property of validating set-to-subset  inferences (9). 
According to the Fauconnier-Ladusaw proposal (10), NPIs are licensed in the scope of such DE expressions.
(9) A function of type <σ,τ> is downward entailing iff for all x,y of type σ such that x⇒y: 
f(y)⇒f(x). 
(10)An NPI is only grammatical if it is in the scope of an α such that [[α]] is downward-entailing.
(von Fintel, 1999:100)
While the affirmative (11a) entails (11b), the addition of negation, a DE operator, reverses the direction of 
entailment such that truth is preserved when moving from the superset (12a) to the subset (12b).
(11)a. Alexandre is a father 
  b. ⇒ Alexandre is a man
(12)a. Alexandre is not a man 
  b. ⇒ Alexandre is not a father
 
The negative quantifier no NP is DE (13) and licenses any (14), while the existential quantifier some NP is 
not DE (15) and fails to license any (16).  
(13) No students read novels ⇒ No students read fantasy novels
(14) No students saw any movies over the weekend 
(15) Some students read novels  Some students read fantasy novels
(16) *Some students saw any movies over the weekend
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Other examples of licensing environments include the restrictor of universal quantifiers, antecedents of 
conditionals, the scope of adversative predicates such as regret and sorry, the scope of only, superlatives, 
and matrix and embedded polar questions. 
 A number of any’s licensing environments have been shown not  to be strictly DE, and thus have been 
cited as counterevidence to the DE hypothesis (cf. Linebarger, 1987 for extensive discussion of noted 
counterexamples). (17) for example shows that only is not strictly DE, despite licensing any (18). 
(17)a. Only Ethan read a book 
  b.  Only Ethan read a linguistics book
(18) Only Ethan has any linguistics training
von Fintel (1999) argues that  the presuppositional content of the expressions involved interferes with the 
evaluation of the relevant DE inferences. (17b) for example, presupposes that  Ethan read a linguistics book, 
and failure to satisfy this presupposition interferes with our evaluation of the entailment relation in (17). von 
Fintel proposes the modified notion of downward entailment  in (19), according to which DEness is 
evaluated on the assumption that all the conventional implicatures and presuppositions of the premises and 
conclusion are satisfied:
(19) Strawson downward entailment
A function of type <σ,τ> is Strawson-DE iff for all x,y of type σ such that  x⇒y and f(x) is 
defined: f(y)⇒f(x).
(von Fintel, 1999:104)
By adding the definedness condition in (19), von Fintel eliminates the problem of having to judge truth 
values in contexts containing unsatisfied presuppositions. Indeed we see that once we add the premise that 
the conclusion’s presupposition in (17) is satisfied, i.e. that  it is true that  Ethan read a linguistics book (in 
addition to the presupposition that a linguistics book is a book), the entailment goes through without issue:
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(20) A linguistics book is a book
Ethan read a linguistics book
Only Ethan read a book      
∴ Only Ethan read a linguistics book
While debates over adequate licensing conditions are far from definitively settled, von Fintel’s 
(Strawson-)DE account appears to be sufficient  for the purposes of capturing the restricted distribution of 
the English NPI any, and thus we will adopt it  here in our discussion of children’s acquisition of negative 
polarity.1 Any differences among alternative accounts of licensing will not  play a substantive role in the 
discussion (nor will I aim to use the child data to tease apart alternative accounts of licensing). In the coming 
chapters, I will separate children’s acquisition of the licensing condition, i.e. of any’s restricted distribution, 
from their acquisition of any’s semantic contribution, i.e. its meaning. Insofar as these are discussed 
separately, any adequate account of NPI licensing in the adult grammar will suffice for the discussion.  
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1 Rather than modify the relevant notion of DEness, alternative licensing accounts instead attribute 
licensing to properties other than DEness. Giannakidou (1998, 2011) for example, attributes licensing to 
the property of non-veridicality, defined for propositional operators as follows:
 (i) A propositional operator F is veridical iff Fp entails or presupposes that p is true in some 
  individual’s model M(x); p is true in M(x), if M(x)⊂p. 
 (ii)  If (i) is not the case, F is nonveridical.
(Giannakidou, 2011:1676) 
As we obtain more diverse data sets from cross-linguistic investigations of NPIs, it may become apparent 
that different approaches fare better with different languages. In Mandarin Chinese for example, non-
interrogative uses of the wh-indefinite shenme ‘what’ are claimed to be subject to a ‘weaker’ licensing 
condition than any, namely non-veridicality (Lin, Weerman, & Zeijlstra, 2013; cf. also Liao, 2011). I leave 
the issue of cross-linguistic variation aside until Chapter 5, where we discuss how the cross-linguistic 
picture bears on the learnability of polarity sensitivity. There however, focusing on the semantics of 
negative polarity, I will adopt an exhuastification-based framework posited to capture cross-linguistic 
variation in the polarity sensitivity system; thus I will not go any further into non-veridicality here.
2.2 The Semantics of any
2.2.1 Domain Widening   
Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) paper was a hallmark attempt  to explain why NPIs ought  to be sensitive to a 
logical notion such as downward entailment. According to Kadmon and Landman’s influential thesis, we 
can derive the restricted distribution of any by looking at a quirk of its quantificational properties: any 
widens previously restricted domains of quantification along contextually given dimensions, giving rise to 
an apparently reduced tolerance of exceptions. Consider the following example:
(21) [Conversation in a department store]
   A: Do you have a camera?  / Do you have cameras?
   B: No.
   A: Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.  
   B: I don’t have ANY cameras.   
Imagine that  the initial domain of quantification starting with A’s query is set  to cameras of a decent  grade 
that one might  look to purchase in a department store, e.g., one that by contextually determined 
technological standards, includes only digital cameras of a decent  grade, and excludes one-time-use 
disposable cameras. The observation is that  B’s final assertion (containing any) quantifies over a wider 
domain that has in fact  been expanded to include even basic disposable cameras, which were initially treated 
as exceptions to the domain. That is, B’s final assertion “widens” the domain of quantification such that 
disposable cameras no longer count  as exceptions to the claim that B does not have cameras.2  This latter 
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2 Notice that B could also reply with: In that case, yes, I have some. This suggests that the initially 
restricted domain did not include disposable cameras (hence B’s initial negative response), but was 
subsequently expanded to include disposable cameras (hence B’s changing his response to yes).
point exemplifies Kadmon and Landman’s observation that any is somehow less tolerant  of exceptions to 
the domain.3  
 The typical cases of “widening” provided in the literature involve this kind of contrast between the 
wider domain of any and a more restricted initial domain of quantification. Any, however, can be uttered out 
of the blue, and in such contexts, the domain of quantification can be set any which way (Chierchia, 2013). 
In (22) for example, the customer can issue his initial query using any rather than the plain indefinite a; in 
such a case, the initial domain could still exclude disposable cameras (i.e. it might still be restricted to digital 
cameras of a decent  grade that  one might  expect to buy in a department  store); the dialogue could continue 
as it did in (21), with the final use of any still quantifying over a wider domain.
(22) [Conversation in a department store]
   A: Do you have any cameras? 
   B: No.
   A: Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.  
   B: I don’t have ANY cameras.  
   B’: Oh, in that case, yes, I have some. 
According to Kadmon and Landman’s analysis, the key to licensing any is the following: widening must 
yield a stronger assertion. That  is, the statement on the “widened” interpretation (i.e. after domain widening) 
must entail the statement  on the narrower interpretation. Any is licensed under negation because negatively 
quantifying over a larger domain yields a stronger assertion than the same assertion quantifying over a 
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3 Of course it is A’s preceding utterance that first introduces disposable cameras to the domain of discourse; 
the point however is that while any can quantify over the wider domain (which now includes disposable 
cameras), a regular plain indefinite like a cannot (Chierchia, 2013): 
 (i) A:  Do you have a camera? 
  B: No.
  A:  Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.
  B:  #I don’t have A camera!
narrower domain. Notice the contrast  between the direction of entailment in the affirmative, upward-
entailing (UE) (23) and that in the negative, DE (24):
(23)a. I saw a student [D: in the UConn linguistics lounge]
  b. I saw a student [D’: in the UConn linguistics building]
  c. I saw a student [D’’: on the UConn campus]      
(24)a. I didn’t see a student [D’’: on the UConn campus]
  b. I didn’t see a student [D’: in the UConn linguistics building]
  c. I didn’t see a student [D: in the UConn linguistics lounge]    (where D⊂D’⊂D’’)
The direction of entailment  in (23) goes from (23a) through to (23c); the strongest  assertion one can make, 
given these three alternatives, is the one quantifying over the narrowest  domain. If I saw a student where the 
set  of contextually relevant  students are those in the linguistics lounge, then it  is also true that I saw a 
student in the linguistics building, and likewise it  is true that I saw a student where the set  of students I have 
in mind are those on campus. But  negation reverses the direction of entailment  in (24) such that  the 
strongest  assertion of the three alternatives is the one that quantifies over the largest  domain, i.e. it  entails the 
other two alternatives. If I did not see any students on campus, then it  follows that I did not see any students 
in the linguistics building or in the linguistics lounge. 
 Thus under Kadmon and Landman’s story, any widens the domain of quantification, and is licensed 
under negation (and other DE operators) because it  is precisely in these environments that  widening results 
in a stronger assertion. Kadmon and Landman rooted these properties in the lexical semantics of any and did 
not develop a compositional analysis of its behaviour.4 
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4 Lee and Horn (1994) also converge on this characterization of ‘widening’, but induce the widening effect 
through the use of an underlying even. It is this silent even that is responsible for triggering expansion of 
the set to include unlikely and atypical exemplars. Under this account, NPI any denotes a low endpoint on 
a scale of quantities, and under negation triggers a meaning akin to ‘not even a single X’ or ‘not even the 
least bit of X’.
 Krifka (1995), building on similar intuitions regarding the strengthening effect  of any, links domain 
widening to quantity implicatures. He assumes that  NPIs introduce alternatives, and moreover that  these 
alternatives induce an ordering relation of semantic specificity, with the NPI denoting the most specific 
element of these alternatives. Anything yields the assertive content  of thing, but because of its alternatives, 
further triggers an implicature that  the assertion containing any is the strongest of the alternatives.5  In 
positive environments, negating semantically stronger alternatives yields a contradiction, while in scale-
reversing/DE environments, the assertion and the implicature are consistent. In more recent work building 
on the earlier insights behind Kadmon and Landman’s and Krifka’s proposals, Chierchia (2006, 2013) 
provides a compositional implementation of any’s semantics.6 Under this analysis, any is truth-conditionally 
equivalent  to plain indefinites (like some or a) (25), but activates a set  of alternatives corresponding to the 
indefinite associated with more restricted domains of quantification available in the context, i.e. its 
subdomain alternatives (26):
(25) ||any|| = ||some|| = λPλQ∃x∈D[Pw(x)&Qw(x)]
(26) ||any||D-ALT = ||some||D-ALT = {someD’: D’⊆D}       
(Chierchia, 2006; 2013)
  
Crucially, active alternatives must be factored into meaning. This is carried out  through the use of 
exhaustification operators. In the case of NPIs like any, subdomain alternatives are exhaustified via a covert 
only-like operator (27).7  Exhaustification via O eliminates any alternatives that  are not entailed by the 
assertion, yielding the consequence that the assertion is stronger than all of the activated alternatives. 
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5 In a similar vein, Lahiri (1998) proposes that the lexical meaning of any includes a component similar to 
the focus particle even.
6 Chierchia’s account of any is part of a larger proposal that attempts to reconcile different polarity-
sensitive elements (NPIs, free choice items, negative concord items, etc.) within a recursive compositional 
system of scalar implicatures. We will focus here on his implementation of any as an NPI, and turn to free 
choice any in Chapter 4.
7 Covert O and only differ in that O asserts rather than presupposes the truth of its prejacent. This 
difference will not bear on the present discussion.
(27) Oc(p) = p & ∀q∈C [q → p⊆Cq], where C=ALT      
(Chierchia, 2006; 2013)
In Chierchia’s analysis, any bears a [+D(omain)] feature which must be checked by an exhaustifying 
operator that  bears the same feature (i.e. ODA, which operates over domain alternatives). Obligatory 
exhaustification is thusly encoded in the syntax. Semantically, any can only occur in DE environments 
because these are the environments that  satisfy the requirements of the exhaustification operator; in a non-
DE environment, exhaustification will yield a logical contradiction. Take the sentence in (28a), which 
corresponds to the literal meaning in (28b). The alternatives that any activates correspond to all the possible 
ways of dividing up the domain D into smaller subdomains (e.g., smaller subdomains of novels in D, let’s 
say fantasy novels, sci-fi novels, and romance novels), represented schematically in (28c). (28a) essentially 
amounts to saying that John has one or more novels in D (i.e. one or more fantasy, sci-fi, or romance novels) 
(28d). The problem arises when we attempt to exhaustify the alternatives (28e). Negating the stronger 
alternatives amounts to saying that John doesn’t  have any of the specific kinds of novels, which is in 
contradiction to the assertion that he does have one or more of these novels (28f).8 
(28)a. *John has any novels
  b. ∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)]
  c.   {f,s,r}
   {f,s} {s,r}   {f,r}
   {f}  {s}  {r}
  d. [novelw(f)∧hasw(j,f)] ˅ [novelw(s)∧hasw(j,s)] ˅ [novelw(r)∧hasw(j,r)] 
  e. ODA([∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)])
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8 Generalizing, in any UE environment, none of the alternatives will be entailed by the assertion and will 
have to be eliminated, yielding a logical contradiction. While the [+D] feature on any can still be checked 
by the O operator, i.e. satisfying the syntactic requirement, exhaustification will fail to yield a consistent 
semantics, i.e. failing to satisfy the semantic requirement of NPI licensing. It is the latter that makes any 
ungrammatical in UE environments.
  f. [novelw(f)∧hasw(j,f)] ˅ [novelw(s)∧hasw(j,s)] ˅ [novelw(r)∧hasw(j,r)] 
   ∧ ¬([novelw(f)∧hasw(j,f)])  ∧ ¬([novelw(s)∧hasw(j,s)]) ∧ ¬([novelw(r)∧hasw(j,r)])   
(adapted from Chierchia, 2013:166, Ex. 45)
Exhaustification is consistent however, in a DE environment (29a,b). Again, the set of subdomain 
alternatives correspond to the more restricted domains of quantification in the context, yielding the assertion 
in (29c). In this case, as in any DE environment, the relevant alternatives are all entailed, so exhaustification 
does not  yield a logical contradiction (29d). If John doesn’t have any novels, it  follows that he doesn’t  have 
any specific kinds of novels. In other words, (29a) has the effect of a plain negative existential statement.
(29)a. John doesn’t have any novels
  b. ¬∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)]
  c. ¬([novelw(a)∧havew(j,a)] ˅ [novelw(b)∧havew(j,b)] ˅ [novelw(c)∧havew(j,c)])
  d. ODA(¬∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)]) 
   = ¬∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)]      
(adapted from Chierchia, 2013:166, Ex. 47)
To summarize then, any is lexically specified to trigger obligatory exhaustification of its subdomain 
alternatives. This exhaustification succeeds in DE environments but fails in non-DE environments.
 
2.2.2 Problems   
Despite the fairly strong intuitions behind the domain widening thesis, some have objected that domain 
widening can’t be central to any, because it  does not  arise as systematically as claimed. The objection is that 
when we go beyond the clean minimal pair examples in the literature (e.g., I don’t have a potato vs. I don’t 
have ANY potatoes), judgments are not as clearcut  as expected. As Arregui (2008) points out, plain 
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indefinites may not always restrict even when there is a salient restriction in the context  (30), and any may 
not always widen as expected (31).
(30) A friend approaches you at a barbecue with a plate of veggie burgers he has recently finished   
   cooking. They are burnt.
   Your friend: Do you want veggie burgers?
   You: No thanks, I don’t want veggie burgers.      
(Arregui, 2008:48, Ex. 9)
(31) You: Do you know French writers or singers?
   Me: I don’t know any writers, but I know singers. (=I don’t know any French writers)
                   (Arregui, 2008:51, Ex. 17)
In (30), the bare plural veggie burgers in the second utterance seems not to be restricted to the salient set of 
burnt  veggie burgers; in (31), uttering any does not  seem to expand the domain of writers beyond French 
ones.9 
 In her objections, Arregui rightly argues that her data reveal a disconcerting lack of categorical 
difference between regular indefinites and any indefinites. She suggests that  we need more systematically 
collected data that speak to the predicted differences between plain indefinites and any. Under the Kadmon 
and Landman-/Krifka-/Chierchia branch of accounts, and given the objections raised by Arregui, what  we 
can safely say is that any has the potential to quantify over “larger” domains than plain indefinites; that  is, 
any can but  need not always quantify over wider domains. So when we refer to the ‘domain widening’ 
property of any, what  we really mean to refer to is a potential for domain widening. Moreover, the problem 
seems to be that a satisfying explanation of why any is licensed in DE environments, even one that links its 
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9 In a somewhat similar vein of objections, see also Duffley and Larrivée (2010) for an argument that the 
scalar endpoint meaning of any, i.e. the even the least/even a single meaning apparent in the typical 
examples of domain widening, is not a part of any’s core meaning. Rather, these authors argue that the 
scalar meaning arises as a product of the interaction of the NPI with contextual factors.
restricted distribution to its semantics, does not  on its own appear to be sufficient  to systematically capture 
when domain widening does and does not occur.
 It  is difficult  to systematically compare “potential” domain sizes without  controlling for what sets of 
individuals count  as relevant in a particular context. This is where careful semantic/pragmatic 
experimentation that  can systematically control for relevant subdomain alternatives can fill a critical gap. 
What is required is a way to systematically evoke categorically different responses to any compared to plain 
indefinites. Yet there has been relatively little psycholinguistic study investigating domain widening with 
any. One problem is that  it is not a trivial task to get exactly at  domain widening and not  some possibly 
confounding phenomenon (such as the scope of any relative to licensers within the relevant sentences). 
 In the next  section, I describe a study that was designed to meet the need for systematically elicited 
judgments about  domain widening. The experiment  was devised to measure the relative degree to which 
participants could restrict the domain of quantification for different indefinites, namely any, a, and bare 
plurals. What we wanted to know was whether, when provided with clearly defined subdomain alternatives 
in the context, adults would interpret any as quantifying over larger domains than plain indefinites.
3.  Experiment 1: Evidence for Domain Widening
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Subjects
We tested 145 adult native speakers of English (99 females, 46 males). All participants were undergraduate 
linguistics/psychology students at  the University of Connecticut  or the University of Maryland. Participants 
were paid $10 or received course credit  for participating. All were native English speakers according to the 
information filled out on the consent forms. 
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3.1.2 Procedure 
We tested adults’ interpretations of negatively quantified sentences containing different indefinites using the 
Truth Value Judgment  Task (TVJT) methodology (Crain & Thornton, 1998, 2000). The task was carried out 
by a single experimenter using a laptop computer. Stories were told (by the experimenter) using cartoon 
pictures and animations created and displayed in PowerPoint. Pre-recorded video clips of a puppet  created 
the pretense that  the puppet  was participating in the task live via webcam. Participants were told that the 
puppet was not  very good at  paying attention to stories, and were given a scorecard to fill out, with the goal 
of helping the puppet to learn how to pay better attention. At  the end of each story, the puppet was asked a 
question about the story. The participant’s task was to determine whether the puppet’s statement was ‘right’, 
in which case s/he was instructed to put  a stamp under the ‘smiley face’ column of the scorecard. If the 
puppet was ‘wrong’, the participant was instructed to put  a stamp under the ‘sad face’ column of the report 
card. We also elicited follow-up justifications from subjects to ascertain their reasons for providing yes or no 
responses. All subjects were tested individually. Sessions were videorecorded for subsequent  coding and 
analysis. 
 One of the reasons for using this child-friendly (TVJT) method was that we wanted to be able to 
eventually replicate the experiment with young children. Subjects were told of this in advance of starting the 
experiment so that they were not thrown off by the puppet ruse or use of the scorecard. 
3.1.3  Materials
We designed experimental situations that made negatively quantified statements felicitous. The context 
clearly provided different possible (sub)domains of quantification. On the critical test  trials, the context 
would also make one of these possible subdomains highly salient; importantly, the relevant  subdomain was 
not  the largest of the possible domain alternatives but  rather a restricted subdomain. Depending on whether 
subjects accepted the negatively quantified test sentence, we could infer whether they were associating the 
relevant  indefinite with the more restricted subdomain, or whether it had to quantify over a larger domain 
alternative. Acceptances or rejections of the puppet’s statements, along with appropriate follow-up 
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justifications, were taken as a measure of subjects’ ability to restrict the domain of quantification to just  the 
salient subdomain. 
 Each subject received two training items, followed by four test and four control items, which were 
randomized and counterbalanced. The four test trials varied in the dimension along which widening could 
be expected (colour, pattern, size, and texture). An example test story is provided in Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1. Experiment 1: Example test story
(Slide 1/8)
”This story is about Donald and Daisy. They’re  doing 
some puzzles. See, they have to put a wooden star here, a 
metal star here, and a fuzzy star here. 
Oh no! The puzzle box is empty! Where all the pieces?”
(Slide 2/8)
“Silly Goofy! He’s taken all the puzzle pieces and hidden 
them all over the attic! If Donald and Daisy want to finish 
their puzzles, they’re going to have to find some stars!”
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(Slide 3/8)
“Can you find all the wooden stars? Can you find all the 
metal stars? What about the fuzzy stars? They’re all the 
way up on the clock! Good job. Let’s see if Donald and 
Daisy can find them.”
(Slide 4/8)
“Donald and Daisy find all the wooden stars and all the 
metal stars!”
(Slide 5/8)
“They can fit their wooden stars and their metal stars 
perfectly! What they each need to finish their puzzle is a 
fuzzy star.”
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(Slide 6/8)
“But Goofy did a really good job hiding the fuzzy stars up 
on the clock. Donald and Daisy look and look but they 
can’t find the fuzzy stars!”
Slide (7/8) 
“So they can’t finish their puzzles. Let’s ask Froggy 
why.” 
(Slide 8/8)
“EXP: Hey Froggy, why can’t Donald and Daisy finish 
their puzzles?
(i)  ‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars!‘   (ANY condition)
(ii)  ‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find a star!‘    (A condition)
(iii)  ‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find stars!‘    (BARE PLURAL condition)” 
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In this test  story, the domain of quantification consists of a set of nine stars which vary along the 
contextually determined dimension of texture, i.e. there are three wooden stars, three metal stars, and three 
fuzzy stars. The largest domain of quantification in this context is the one containing all nine stars. Possible 
subdomain alternatives in this context include: {wooden stars}, {wooden stars, metal stars}, {metal stars, 
fuzzy stars}, {fuzzy stars}, etc. In the story, Mickey and Minnie have to find the stars in order to finish a 
puzzle; at a critical juncture of the story, it is established that  though they have been successful in finding the 
wooden stars and the metal stars, they cannot finish their puzzles because they cannot find the fuzzy stars. 
Thus what is at  issue revolves around just one particular subdomain alternative (e.g., the fuzzy stars). At  this 
point, a puppet  appears on the screen to answer a question about the story: Why can’t they finish their 
puzzles? with a negatively quantified sentence containing one of the indefinites: “Mickey and Minnie both 
can’t find any stars!”/“Mickey and Minnie both can’t  find a star!”/“Mickey and Minnie both can’t find 
stars!” The participant’s task was to decide if the puppet’s statement was correct (Did he say the right 
thing?). If participants restricted the domain of the relevant  indefinite to a smaller subdomain alternative 
(i.e. the fuzzy stars), they were expected to accept the statement; if the indefinite had to quantify over a 
larger domain, they were expected to reject the statement. 
 The primary comparison of interest is that between any and plain indefinites, as any is argued to 
quantify more widely. Claims that  any widens the domain rely on it doing so in contrast to plain indefinites 
like a or some. First, we chose to compare any to a  for the following reason: we chose to use negative test 
sentences, as negation is the most  frequent  licenser of any. The test  sentences were then designed to be 
identical across conditions save for the indefinite: since some resists the scope of negation, and any is only 
good in the scope of negation, we chose to use a, which allows a narrow scope reading. But  the use of a 
gives rise to a potential scope confound: a wide-scope, specific reading of a above negation yields the same 
23
response as a narrow scope reading of a with a restricted domain of quantification. Bare plurals on the other 
hand, resist wide scope (Carlson, 1977), and thus provide a control for the scope confound.10,11   
 The critical test  sentences from the four test trials, along with the final slides that subjects saw when 
hearing the test sentence, are provided in Table 1. 
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10 For example, the following examples from Carlson (1977) show that the wide scope reading which is 
available with a in (i) is unavailable with the bare plural in (ii). 
 (i) Minnie wishes to talk with a young psychiatrist
   (a) (∃sg x) (young psychiatrist(x) & Minnie wishes Minnie talk with x) 
   (b) Minnie wishes (∃sg x) (young psychiatrist(x) & Minnie talk with x)
 (ii) Minnie wishes to talk with young psychiatrists
   (a) #(∃pl x) (young psychiatrist(x) & Minnie wishes Minnie talk with x)
   (b) Minnie wishes (∃pl x) (young psychiatrist(x) & Minnie talk with x) 
                          (Carlson, 1977:417)
Carlson goes on to show that the unavailability of the wide scope reading cannot lie in the plurality marker, 
since other plurally quantified NPs (many/all/twelve/a few/most psychiatrists) exhibit a similar scope 
ambiguity as that displayed in (i). Similar contrasts can be observed in the following examples:
 (iii)  (a) Max believes a Commie to have robbed Macy’s.
   (b) Max believes Commies to have robbed Macy’s.
 (iv)  (a) A drunk is likely to win the annual potato-sack race.
   (b) Drunks are likely to win the annual potato-sack race.
 (v)  (a) Max is seeking a unicorn.
   (b) Max is seeking unicorns.
 (vi)  (a) Gerald must talk to a congressman before noon today.
   (b) Gerald must talk to congressmen before noon today.      
(Carlson, 1977:418)
11 Initial piloting involved stories that had only one character completing a single puzzle; piloting with the 
addition of a bare plural condition revealed that the bare plural sentences were much more felicitous when 
there was more than one character searching for (multiple) puzzle pieces. Thus for consistency, and 
because it did not affect the felicity of the other two conditions, we had two characters searching for 
multiple copies of the three puzzle pieces across all three conditions. The floated both was then added 
based on pilot feedback suggesting that it made the use of the conjoined NP subject more natural.
Table 1. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for (3) test conditions
ANY condition A condition BARE PLURAL 
condition
Test story 1 ‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find any 
diamonds’
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find a diamond’
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find diamonds'
Test story 2 ‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find any 
triangles’
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find a triangle’
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find triangles’
Test story 3 ‘Donald and 
Daisy both can’t 
find any hearts’
‘Donald and 
Daisy both can’t 
find a heart’
‘Donald and Daisy 
both can’t find 
hearts’
Test story 4 ‘Donald and 
Daisy both can’t 
find any stars’
‘Donald and 
Daisy both can’t 
find a star’
‘Donald and Daisy 
both can’t find 
stars’
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The researcher who played the role of the puppet in the pre-recorded videos was instructed to say the 
sentences as naturally as possible, with neutral intonation, and in particular without stressing the indefinite. 
Having the critical test sentences presented via video files ensured consistency in stimuli across subjects.
 In addition to the four test  stories, each participant  also saw four control trials. Two of the four control 
trials had test  sentences containing negation without any indefinites, and the other two control trials 
involved sentences containing the relevant indefinite without  negation (i.e. some in the ANY condition, a in 
the A condition, and the bare plural in the BARE PLURAL condition). These control items allowed us to ensure 
that subjects were on task, and would later allow us to control for children’s knowledge of the relevant 
indefinites and negation separately from each other. The control items were also presented dynamically: if a 
subject provided a yes response to a given test story, the following control item would have as its target  a no 
response, and vice versa. This allowed us to balance the number of yes and no responses. Any subjects who 
did not correctly answer at least  3 of the 4 control trials were excluded from data analysis. The puppet’s 
statements on the negation control stories are provided in Table 2, and the indefinite controls in Table 3.  
Table 2. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (2) negation control stories
Control story 1 ‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the squares’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the moons’
(target: no)
Control story 2 ‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the circles’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the suns’
(target: no)
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Table 3. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (2) indefinite control stories
ANY condition A condition BARE PLURAL 
condition
Control story 1 ‘Mickey and 
Minnie both found 
some suns’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both found 
some circles’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both 
found a sun’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both 
found a circle’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both found 
suns’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both found 
circles’
(target: no)
Control story 2 ‘Mickey and 
Minnie both found 
some squares’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both found 
some clouds’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both 
found a square’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both 
found a cloud’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both found 
squares’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both found 
clouds’
(target: no)
72 adult  participants were randomly assigned to one of the three test conditions. We treated indefinite type 
as a between-subject  factor to avoid contaminating effects on subsequent trials. If a participant happened to 
interpret an indefinite as associated with a more restricted domain of quantification for example, we wanted 
to ensure that this domain restriction would not influence how they interpreted subsequent sentences 
containing other indefinites. Thus subjects only heard one kind of indefinite across the four test trials.  
 In addition to the three test  conditions described above, we also had three control conditions. The test 
stories in these control conditions were parallel to those in the test  conditions except  that the three puzzle 
shapes in each case did not  vary along the relevant dimensions (colour, pattern, size, or texture); rather they 
were of three completely different  shapes, thus eliminating potential widening of the domain as a factor. 
This allowed us to control for subjects’ ability to simply interpret  the literal, truth conditional meaning of 
negatively quantified existential statements. The target  truth values of these control sentences were the 
opposite of the target values in the test  conditions, i.e. where we expected yes-responses on the plain 
indefinite test  conditions, we expected no-responses on the plain indefinite control conditions, and where we 
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expected no-responses on the any test condition, we expected yes-responses on the any control condition. 
Examples of the test stories from the control conditions are provided in Tables 4 and 5. In these conditions 
as well, subjects received two training items, followed by four test and four control items, which were 
randomized and counterbalanced. The control items were the same as those in the test conditions (two 
negation controls and two indefinite controls), and were also dynamically presented to balance the total 
number of yes and no responses. In all, 73 adult  subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three control 
conditions. 
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Table 4. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for ANY control condition 
Test story 1 ‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any diamonds’
(target: yes)
Test story 2 ‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any triangles’
(target: yes)
Test story 3 ‘Donald and Daisy both can’t find any hearts’
(target: yes)
Test story 4 ‘Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars’
(target: yes)
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Table 5. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for A and BARE PLURAL control 
conditions 
A condition BARE PLURAL condition
Test story 1 ‘Mickey and Minnie both 
can’t find a diamond’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and Minnie both 
can’t find diamonds'
(target: no)
Test story 2 ‘Mickey and Minnie both 
can’t find a triangle’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and Minnie both 
can’t find triangles’
(target: no)
Test story 3 ‘Donald and Daisy both 
can’t find a heart’
(target: no)
‘Donald and Daisy both 
can’t find hearts’
(target: no)
Test story 4 ‘Donald and Daisy both 
can’t find a star’
(target: no)
‘Donald and Daisy both 
can’t find stars’
(target: no)
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3.2 Results
The dependent measure in the following analyses was the proportion of yes-responses to the puppet’s 
statements, taken to indicate domain restriction to a salient subdomain.
3.2.1 Control Conditions
All subjects in the three control conditions gave correct answers to the test  trials 100% of the time. There 
was no effect  of condition (F(2,70)=0.959, p=.388). Subjects were also at  ceiling on the control items in the 
three control conditions; no subjects were excluded from data analysis. 
3.2.2 Test Conditions   
Subjects performed at  ceiling on the control items in the three test  conditions; no subjects were excluded 
from analysis. Subjects performed as expected on the test trials (Fig. 9). A one-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of indefinite type (F(2,69)=54.8, p<.001). Adults rejected the puppet’s statement in 
the any condition 100% of the time, but generally accepted the plain indefinite statements (84% yes in the A 
condition; 72% yes in the BARE PLURAL condition). Adults were significantly more accepting in the A and 
BARE PLURAL conditions than in the ANY condition (Tukey HSD; both p<.001), but  did not  differ 
significantly in their acceptance of a- and bare plural statements (p=.34). 
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Follow-up justifications from the participants also allowed us to ascertain their reasons for accepting or 
rejecting the statements. Justifications for accepting the plain indefinite statements made reference to the 
relevant  restricted subdomain alternative (e.g., Yes, they can’t find the blue diamonds). In contrast, 
justifications for rejecting any-statements made reference to the other two subdomain alternatives, 
suggesting these could not count as exceptions to the domain of quantification (e.g., No, they found the red 
and green diamonds - they just can’t find the blue diamonds).   
  
3.3 Discussion 
Our main finding from Experiment 1 was that  when provided with contextually salient subdomain 
alternatives, adult speakers of English systematically interpreted any as quantifying over larger domains than 
the plain indefinites a and bare plurals. Follow-up justifications suggested that  any-statements were rejected 
for quantifying more widely than was appropriate given the context. Thus we now have systematic evidence 
of categorical differences between any and plain indefinites in terms of the relevant size of domain of 
quantification. Our results thus provide empirical support for the domain widening thesis, according to 
which any is distinct  from plain indefinites in its preference for “wider” domains. The adult  findings here 
will provide a baseline for our discussion in Chapter 3 of a parallel experiment conducted with 4- and 5-
year-old children. Before we move on to the child experiments however, our findings above raise some 
questions, which I address in turn below.  
3.3.1 The Role of Contrastive Focus  
Given the nature of the test  stories, and with 100% rejection in the any-condition, a natural conclusion seems 
to be that  among a set of domain alternatives, any must quantify over the largest. As soon as we’ve 
introduced a possible subdomain alternative, we cannot  exclude it. Importantly, the stories that led up to the 
critical test  sentences in the three test conditions were identical - the only thing that differed was the 
indefinite used in the test sentence. Thus we see that  with plain indefinites, we can harmlessly exclude 
subdomain alternatives that  may no longer be relevant  or salient  by the end of the story; but  these same 
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alternatives cannot be excluded when any is uttered. Thus all of the alternatives that  have been introduced in 
the story must  be exhaustified. On Chierchia’s analysis, exhaustification of these alternatives is obligatory, 
being triggered by a focal feature on any. But what  forces the set  of alternatives to be the largest  one 
available? In other words, what is the source of any’s preference for the widest domain? 
 Consider again the example in (32). A plain indefinite like a can be used out of the blue as in (32-A1), 
and the subsequent  use of any, particularly when stressed, yields the familiar “widening” effect (such that 
even the most basic disposable cameras are no longer exceptions to the domain). Recall that any can also be 
uttered out  of the blue, in which case its domain can also be restricted to exclude disposable cameras, as in 
(33-A1). As we saw however, ending the dialogue with the plain indefinite a, even with stress, fails to 
induce widening (33-B2). 
(32) A1: Do you have a camera?      
   B1: No.        
   A2: Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.  
   B2: I don’t have ANY cameras.     
(33) A1: Do you have any cameras?
   B1: No.
   A2: Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.
   B2: #I don’t have A camera.
Two questions immediately arise. First, what  is behind the widening that  succeeds in (32-B2) but  fails in 
(33-B2)? Second, why does any widen the domain in (32-B2) but  not  in (33-A1)? In other words, we have 
now returned to our initial question of when precisely domain widening does and does not arise. 
 For Chierchia, the answer lies in the nature of contrastive focus on the relevant  indefinites. The 
successful widening in (32-B2) arises from contrastively focusing any; since the focal alternatives of 
stressed any are its domain alternatives, the discourse in (32) satisfies conditions on contrastive focus by 
providing an appropriate antecedent (Rooth, 1992); in other words, the domain of any in (32-B2) is 
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contrasted with the more restricted domain of a in (32-A1). Focal stress on a  fails to widen the domain in 
(33-B2) because the focal alternatives of plain indefinites are not domain alternatives, but  rather functions of 
the same type (I don’t have two cameras, I don’t have every camera, etc.). 
 Thus in the absence of contrastive focus, any should behave like a plain indefinite in terms of its domain 
restriction; but where conditions on contrastive focus are satisfied, we expect domain widening to succeed. 
In light of this, let us reconsider our experimental findings. We saw that  our adult subjects consistently 
interpreted any as quantifying over the widest possible domain. Yet our test  sentences were presented 
without  stress on any; all of the test sentences were pre-recorded with neutral intonation. Thus the finding of 
domain widening in the absence of stress on any provides experimental evidence that stress is not  required 
to derive domain widening.12
 One might question however whether the condition on contrastive focus was satisfied, even without  the 
stress on any. Recall that  the test sentences were not  explicitly contrasted with an immediately preceding 
plain indefinite statement. Given the design of our stories however, there are (at  least) two ways in which the 
contrastive focus condition might  have been satisfied. Participants could have explicitly contrasted the any-
statement with the negative statement that precedes the prompt by a few lines in the story:
(34) EXP: Mickey and Minnie look and look, but they can’t find the blue diamonds. So they can’t 
finish their puzzles. Let’s ask Froggy why. Hey Froggy, why can’t Mickey and Minnie finish their 
puzzles? 
   FROGGY: Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any diamonds.
If subjects could recall the story and retrieve the previous negatively quantified statement, which explicitly 
mentioned the salient subdomain of blue diamonds, then it  would appear conditions are met for contrasting 
the wider domain of the any-sentence with the more restricted domain of the previous negative statement, 
thereby yielding the widening effect.
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12 This is consistent with Kadmon and Landman’s and Chierchia’s claims.
 Alternatively, participants might  have contrasted the any-statement  with their preconceived answer to 
the experimenter’s question to the puppet. Since the question was posed explicitly (Why can’t they finish 
their puzzles?), subjects might have come up with what  they thought  to be the most appropriate (and 
informative) answer, i.e. Because they can’t find the blue diamonds. In this case, again, it  would appear 
conditions are met  for contrasting the any-statement  with an alternative, thereby yielding the widening 
effect. Our findings do not allow us to decide what contrasts (if any) the subjects were performing before 
rejecting the any-statements. They do reveal however that  domain widening can take place even in the 
absence of an explicit contrast between an any-statement  and an immediately preceding antecedent. It 
appears that the presence of salient  subdomain alternatives in the context  is sufficient to yield widening, i.e. 
through implicit contrast between the domain alternatives.
3.3.2 Plain Indefinites   
While adults were significantly more accepting of both kinds of plain indefinite statements than of any-
statements, one might  question why the acceptance rates in the plain indefinites were not  higher than they 
were. In other words, why did the participants, who rejected any-statements 100% of the time, not  accept 
plain indefinite statements 100% of the time? A second question arises from comparing the A and BARE 
PLURAL conditions. These did not differ significantly in acceptance rates (p=.34), but the trend was towards 
greater acceptance in the A condition than in the BARE PLURAL condition. Why should this be the case? I 
consider these two questions in turn below.
 Although adults generally accepted the plain indefinite statements, several of them equivocated and 
reasoned about  the relative informativeness of the plain indefinite statements. While adults did not  hesitate 
to reject  the any-statements, they were often slower to accept  the plain indefinite statements. When asked 
after the experiment  whether they had had difficulty with any of the test  sentences, a number of adults in the 
plain indefinite conditions noted that the puppet could have been more specific by including the relevant 
property of the puzzle pieces (i.e. that  the diamonds were blue, or that  the triangles were striped, etc.). On 
the one hand, this might  be a task effect. Although adults can and ultimately do accept  the plain indefinite 
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statements, they might  initially resist a restricted interpretation because they are in an experimental situation 
in which a puppet  is essentially being tested for whether he can provide the “right” kind of information; in 
particular, the subjects were being asked to fill out  a scorecard for the puppet. It  could very well be that what 
is perfectly acceptable in a spontaneous dialogue is insufficient on such a metalinguistic judgment task. On 
the other hand, although there is a clear preference for accepting the plain indefinite statements on the 
restricted interpretation, there is nothing ungrammatical about the plain indefinite statements on the widened 
interpretation. With plain indefinites, participants are free to set  the domain of quantification however they 
please; thus the 16% rejection rate in the A condition and the 28% rejection rate in the BARE PLURAL 
condition might very well arise from licit interpretations of plain indefinites being associated with a 
relatively wider domain of quantification available in the context. What is crucial for us is the absolute 
rejection of any-statements in the same contexts, compared to the relatively high rates of acceptance in the 
plain indefinite conditions.
 Next, consider the difference between the two plain indefinite conditions. One possible reason that 
adults trended towards being more accepting of a-statements might lie in the possibility of the wide scope, 
specific reading of the indefinite. The reason for including the bare plural condition was to control for this 
scope confound, since bare plurals resist wide scope. While we can be reassured that the two conditions did 
not  differ significantly, it  was indeed crucial to include the BARE PLURAL condition in our experiment, as we 
cannot  rule out that some of the acceptance in the A condition was due not to domain restriction but  to wide 
scope of the indefinite above negation. 
 Another possible explanation for the trend towards greater acceptance in the A condition lies in the 
nature of bare plurals, which are ambiguous between an existential reading (i.e. on the event reading of the 
predicate) and a universal reading (i.e. on the characteristic reading of the predicate), as shown in the 
following examples from Carlson (1977):
(35) Dinosaurs ate kelp.
(36) Maxwell ate kelp.
(37) Lots of conductors ate kelp.
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(38) The old fireman ate kelp.
(39) A few scientists ate kelp.         
The intended target reading of the bare plurals in our test sentences was the existential, event  reading. But 
one possible reason the bare plural statements were accepted 72% rather than 100% of the time might be that 
some subjects were accessing a characteristic or generic interpretation of the bare plural statement. For 
example, some subjects might have interpreted Mickey and Minnie both can’t find diamonds as Mickey and 
Minnie are both incapable of finding diamonds, which is clearly false in the given scenario. 
 On this note, one might think that  the use of the present  tense in the test sentences could have biased 
participants towards the generic interpretation. Contrast  the version used (40) with a version of the prompt 
and test sentences in the past tense (41):
(40) EXP:   Why can’t Mickey and Minnie finish their puzzles?
    PUPPET:  Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both can’t find {any/a/∅} diamond(s).
(41) EXP:   Why couldn’t Mickey and Minnie finish their puzzles?
    PUPPET:  Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both couldn’t find {any/a/∅} diamond(s).
To rule out  an effect of tense, we ran the three test conditions with the prompt and test  sentences in the past 
tense with a new group of 45 adult  subjects (15 per condition), and found virtually no change in the 
responses (Table 6). T-tests revealed no significant differences between rates of acceptance on the present 
tense condition and past tense condition for all three indefinite conditions.
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Table 6. Yes-responses across tense conditions
Indefinite condition
% yes-responses
Present tense
(original data set) Past tense
any 0 0
a 84 87
bare plural 72 70
Thus if some proportion of adults were accessing a generic or characteristic interpretation of the bare plural 
sentence, it cannot be due to the use of the present tense.13 
 Whatever the source of the non-categorical acceptance of the plain indefinite statements however, what 
is crucial for us is that  adults were significantly more accepting in the plain indefinite conditions than in the 
ANY condition.
4. Summary
The experiment described in this chapter provides novel empirical evidence for the domain widening thesis. 
We see that  once we carefully control for the possible subdomain alternatives that any can trigger, adults do 
indeed consistently interpret any as quantifying over wider domains than plain indefinites. In particular, our 
findings suggest that any must quantify over the widest  domain available in the context; once a possible 
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13 Although we’ve ruled out an effect of the present tense, a separate issue worth investigating is the role of 
the modal can in allowing the more restricted reading of the plain indefinites. In the same contexts as those 
presented in our test conditions, switching from can to do appears to make it more difficult to accept the 
plain indefinite statements (compare (i) and (ii)). This apparent contrast between (i) and (ii) does not 
appear to have any clear explanation within the theories of domain widening discussed so far.
 (i)  EXP:    Why couldn’t Mickey and Minnie finish their puzzles?
   (a) PUPPET:  Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both couldn’t find a diamond. 
   (b) PUPPET:  Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both couldn’t find diamonds. 
 (ii)  EXP:    Why didn’t Mickey and Minnie finish their puzzles?
   (a) PUPPET:  Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find a diamond. 
   (b) PUPPET:  Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find diamonds. 
subdomain alternative has been introduced, it  cannot  count  as an exception to the domain, thus resulting in 
any’s observed reduced tolerance of exceptions (Kadmon & Landman, 1993). In contrast, there is no such 
restriction on the interpretation of plain indefinites, which are free to restrict to salient subdomains. 
 Now that  we have clear baseline measures of how adults interpret any and plain indefinites (and their 
associated domains of quantification), we are in a position to evaluate whether young children are sensitive 
to the domain widening property of any.
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Chapter 3  
         
Children’s Knowledge of NPI any
1.   Introduction
Chapter 2 served to establish the nature of any in the adult grammar, and in particular examined its property 
of domain widening. This chapter takes up the question of whether young children acquiring English can 
demonstrate adult-like knowledge of the properties of any.  As such, this chapter has three main goals. We 
will begin in Section 2 by providing as explicit  as possible a description of the target  of acquisition, that is, 
the NPI any along with its relevant syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties. Identifying these target 
properties will crucially set the stage for our subsequent  discussion (in Section 3) of children’s knowledge of 
these properties, and for our later discussion (in Chapter 5) of how children could acquire knowledge of 
these properties. 
 In Section 3, we will examine various measures of children’s knowledge of any. First, I provide evi-
dence of apparent target-like behaviour from an analysis of the spontaneous speech transcripts of 40 children 
acquiring American and British English. The data demonstrate that  children (as young as 2;02) who produce 
any spontaneously and productively, have target-like knowledge of the licensing condition on any. I then 
review previously gathered evidence from elicited production (O’Leary & Crain, 1994) and comprehension 
experiments (Thornton, 1995; Xiang et  al., 2006) suggesting that  children as young as 3;06 (by comprehen-
sion measures) and 4;04 (by elicited production measures) exhibit  target-like production and comprehension 
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of any in the scope of negation. While the spontaneous and experimental data appear to converge however, I 
will then argue that  neither the experimental studies nor the spontaneous production data allow us to con-
clude that the children have target knowledge of all of any’s quantificational properties; in particular I argue 
that the previous studies do not justify any conclusions about children’s knowledge of any’s potential for 
domain widening.
 In Section 4, I address the missing piece of evidence regarding children’s knowledge of any. I present 
the results of a truth value judgment task conducted with 4- and 5-year-old English-speaking children, which 
suggest that many, but not  all, children in this age group interpret any as quantifying over wider domains 
than plain indefinites. After some discussion of the results, we will close the chapter with a summary of what 
we have learned about children’s knowledge of NPI any.   
2.  The Target of Acquisition 
In this section, I lay out  the key properties of any that I take to form part of the target  of acquisition. NPIs 
like any involve an amalgamation of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties, and I will, for ease of 
exposition, try to be as explicit as possible in identifying these different target properties of any.  
 Let us begin with the syntax. First, any usually surfaces as an indefinite determiner; this entails a certain 
syntactic distribution. As shown in (1) and (2), any can take a noun phrase (NP) complement, which can be 
elided. As shown in (3) and (4), any can also occur within an NP as part  of a complex indefinite. Finally, as 
(5) and (6) show, any can also be used as a modifier of the comparative adverb more.
(1) I don’t have any milk.
(2) I don’t have any.
(3) John didn’t see anyone.
(4) Mary didn’t write anything.
(5) I don’t have any more milk.
(6) Don’t do that anymore.
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In addition to the syntactic distribution of any, the child must  figure out  the structural licensing condition on 
any, that  is, the particular structural dependency relation that  holds between any and its licensing operator. 
Any must  be c-commanded by its licensing operator, as shown by the contrast between (7) and (8).1 Moreo-
ver, the dependency relation between any and its licenser is not clausebounded, as shown in (9).2
(7) The student doesn’t have any homework.
(8) *Any student doesn’t have homework.
(9) John didn’t say that Mary would write anything. 
Consider now what  any contributes to the truth-conditional meaning of a sentence in which it  appears. Let  us 
assume that the child has knowledge of general rules of semantic composition which will be among those 
used to compute truth conditions of sentences containing any. What the child must learn specifically about 
any is its existential quantificational force, for its NPI status goes hand in hand with its interpretation as an 
existential within the scope of negation. Finally, in order to properly license any, the child must have knowl-
edge of the logical property that is shared by the set of possible licensers. 
 As we saw in Chapter 2, many contemporary accounts of NPI licensing are predicated on some version 
of the Fauconnier/Ladusaw proposal, according to which NPIs are licensed in the scope of downward-
entailing (DE) operators, i.e. operators that license subset inferences (10). 
(10)  Alexandre is not a man 
   ⇒ Alexandre is not a father
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1 I assume the following definition of c-command: a node A dominates a node B if and only if the lowest 
branching node that dominates A also dominates B, and A and B do not dominate each other.   
2 The particularities of the structural licensing condition vary in systematic ways across languages, so the 
child must learn the English-specific version for any. Korean, for example, allows subject NPIs, and does 
exhibit a clausemate restriction on licensing (unless the NPI is the subject of a state predicate) (cf. Lee, 
1993).
Under the DE account of licensing, the target of acquisition thus includes knowledge of the logical property 
of DEness, such that licensing can be generalized beyond any single operator. Note that  unless the learner 
could generalize to the set  of DE operators, she would have to learn each individual licenser on a case-by-
case basis. In Chapter 5, we will examine the kinds of evidence that  children receive for licensing by DE 
operators. For the moment, it is worth pointing out  a line of research arguing that DEness is innate rather 
than learned from the input. Gualmini and Crain (2002) argue that  data indicating relevant entailment  rela-
tions are unlikely to be available in sufficient  quantity; instead, they propose, entailment  relations displayed 
by certain DE quantifier determiners follow from their meaning, and given a restricted hypothesis space, 
children only have to entertain a small number of the logically possible hypotheses about determiner 
meanings.3  Crain and Thornton (2006) provide further discussion motivating the innate specification of 
downward entailment  as part of Universal Grammar, discussing the universality of key properties of DE ex-
pressions as well as a substantial body of experimental evidence showing that  4-year-olds are sensitive to the 
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3 According to Gualmini and Crain, children are adult-like in classifying linguistic expressions as either 
being DE or not DE, but they are not necessarily fully adult-like in classifying NPIs. This is in part because 
what constitutes an NPI can differ cross-linguistically, whereas natural languages do not differ in their clas-
sifications of DE vs. non-DE expressions.
properties of DE operators.4 While we will eventually examine the input for evidence of DE licensers, we 
will largely adopt these previous claims that DEness is innate.5  
 Consider now the semantics of any. As we saw in Chapter 2, any triggers obligatory exhaustification of 
subdomain alternatives. This means the child must come to have knowledge of the following: (i) the nature 
of any’s alternatives, i.e. that they are subdomain alternatives; (ii) the fact  that these alternatives must  obliga-
torily be exhaustified; (iii) how to carry out this exhaustification operation through the use of a covert  ex-
haustification operator. Moreover, as we saw in Experiment  1, given a set of contextually defined domain 
alternatives, any generally quantifies over the widest possible domain, and is consistently interpreted as 
quantifying over wider domains than plain indefinites such as a or bare plurals. Thus the child must  come to 
know that any is a (potential) domain widener, and in fact that it widens the domain in cases of contrastive 
focus. This will also entail sensitivity to and knowledge of contrastive focus. 
44
4 One of the properties of DE expressions is that they give rise to so-called ‘conjunctive entailments’ of 
disjunction (Chierchia, 2004), as shown in (i)-(iii). 
 (i) The runner did not receive a medal or a cash prize
  ⇒ The runner did not receive a medal and the runner did not receive a cash prize
 (ii) Every runner who received a medal or a cash prize did an interview
  ⇒ Every runner who received a medal did an interview and every runner who received a crash 
  prize did an interview
 (iii) If the runner received a medal or a cash prize, he was obliged to give an interview
  ⇒ If the runner received a medal, he was obliged to give an interview and if the runner received 
  a cash prize, he was obliged to give an interview
A number of experimental studies have shown that 4- to 5-year-olds are sensitive to these conjunctive en-
tailments (Chierchia et al., 2001; Gualmini et al., 2001; Gualmini & Crain, 2002; Crain et al., 2002; 
Gualmini & Crain, 2004); for example, children compute the conjunctive entailment in the restrictor but 
not the scope of the universal quantifier every, suggesting they know the restrictor is DE but the scope is 
not. As Crain and Thornton discuss, the challenge of learning this distinction between the restrictor and the 
scope on the basis of positive evidence is particularly acute, given the distinction doesn’t involve the distri-
bution of lexical material. 
5 Since the focus of our investigation will be on the semantic/quantificational properties of any, I will gen-
erally refer to the existing literature on the acquisition and learnability of DEness without taking a particu-
lar stance on how it is acquired.
 Given the target  set of knowledge just  enumerated, let us now turn to various measures of children’s 
knowledge of NPI any, the goal of all of which is to determine whether (and when) children are target-like 
with respect to any. 
3.   Measures of Children’s Knowledge of NPI any 
3.1 Corpus Study 1: Children’s Spontaneous Production of NPI any 
Certain experimental methods such as the Truth Value Judgment  Task (TVJT) (Crain & McKee, 1985; Crain 
& Thornton, 1998) are notoriously difficult to conduct  with children younger than 3;00 and are typically 
only successful with children who are older than 3;06. But  looking at how children younger than 3;06 be-
have with respect  to NPI licensing can show us whether children’s earliest hypotheses are different from 
those of older children (and of adults). To accomplish this, we can look to spontaneous speech transcripts, a 
prime source of evidence regarding younger children’s knowledge of NPI licensing. I present here data from 
an analysis of the spontaneous speech transcripts of 40 children acquiring American and British English as a 
first language. In determining whether children are target-like in their knowledge of any from the point  at 
which they begin to produce it spontaneously and productively, I discuss two aspects of the children’s spon-
taneous production data: (i) quantitatively, I discuss their rates of licensed vs. unlicensed any, which provide 
an indication of, among other things, whether the children are target-like in their knowledge of the licensing 
conditions on any; (ii) qualitatively, I examine the environments in which any appears, and in particular, the 
diversity of licensers, which can tell us whether children genuinely have productive knowledge of any (and 
its licensing condition). The data come from 18 American children, covering the age range 0;11,04-5;02,12, 
and 22 British children aged 1;08,22-4;11,20. These spontaneous corpora are available on the CHILDES 
database (MacWhinney, 2000), and are listed in Tables 1 and 2.
 Using the kwal and combo programs available on CLAN, the corpus analysis program associated with 
the CHILDES database, we can find all child utterances containing any, and check for utterances containing 
negation and other potential NPI licensers, discounting imitations, repetitions, routine utterances, unclear 
utterances (symbolized in the transcripts with “xxx” or “yyy”), and single-word utterances (or utterances 
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consisting solely of any+NP). Charting out the development  of NPI any over the entirety of the transcripts 
for each child, we can take note of the proportion of licensed and unlicensed any, as well as the operators 
that license any. 
Table 1. American English: Corpora under study
CORPUS CHILD AGE RANGE NO. OF TRANSCRIPTS NO. OF UTTERANCES
Bloom Peter 1;09,07 – 3;01,21 20 23,000
Brown
Adam 2;03,04 – 5;02,12 55 45,371
Sarah 2;03,05 – 5;01,06 139 31,195
Eve 1;06,00 – 2;03,00 20 10,856
Demetras Trevor 2;00,27 – 3;11,27 28 6,568
Kuczaj Abe 2;04,24 – 5;00,11 210 22,684
Providence
Alex 1;11,16 – 3;03,21 56 31,423
Ethan 0;11,04 – 2;11,01 50 21,898
Lily 1;01,02 – 4;00,02 80 39,852
Naima 0;11,28 – 3;10,10 83 43,542
Violet 1;02,00 – 3;11,24 54 17,274
William 1;04,10 – 3;04,15 44 21,220
Sachs Naomi 1;02,29 – 4;09,03 93 15,542
Suppes Nina 1;11,16 – 3;03,21 56 31,423
Weist Emily 2;06,06 – 4;05,19 23 7,264
Emma 2;07,08 – 4;08,04 28 6,669
Mat 2;03,10 – 5;00,05 56 10,157
Roman 2;02,20 – 4;07,20 42 11,064
TOTAL 1,137 397,002
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Table 2. British English: Corpora under study
CORPUS CHILD AGE RANGE NO. OF TRANSCRIPTS NO. OF UTTERANCES
Belfast
Barbara 2;04,09 – 4;01,18 14 2503
Conor 3;08,14 – 4;06,05 14 3045
Courtney 3;04,00 – 4;00,11 7 2021
David 2;00,03 – 4;02,03 14 2472
Johnny 3;06,00 – 4;04,01 7 1678
Michelle 2;04,28 – 4;04,19 14 3075
Rachel 2;05,25 – 2;09,16 8 1184
Stuart 3;05,12 – 4;05,04 11 3369
Lara Lara 1;09,13 – 3;03,25 120 47,876
Manchester
Anne 1;10,07 – 2;09,10 68 19,866
Aran 1;11,12 – 2;10,28 66 17,111
Becky 2;00,07 – 2;11,15 68 23,300
Carl 1;08,22 – 2;08,15 65 24,857
Dominic 1;10,25 – 2;10,16 68 21,097
Gail 1;11,27 – 2;11,12 68 16,947
Joel 1;11,01 – 2;10,11 68 17,862
John 1;11,15 – 2;10,24 64 13,303
Liz 1;11,09 – 2;10,18 68 16,545
Nicole 2;00,25 – 3;00,10 68 16,937
Ruth 1;11,15 – 2;11,21 66 20,295
Warren 1;10,06 – 2;09,20 67 16,587
Thomas Thomas 2;00,12 – 4;11,20 379 198,647
TOTAL 1,392 490,577
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NPI any is not a particularly high-frequency construction. To avoid distortion due to low denominators (i.e. 
low numbers of total NPI any), in analyzing the error rates, I focus here on the results for the 26 children 
who produced a minimum of 15 instances of NPI any over the entirety of their transcripts.
 The main finding was that both the American and British groups of children made very few NPI licens-
ing errors; moreover, these errors were interspersed among adult-like usage of the NPI. Of the 1724 total 
instances of NPI any across the 26 children, 41 were categorized as errors (to be described further below). 
This represents an error rate of only 2.38%.6,7 ,8  Thus the children appeared to be quite target-like in their 
knowledge of the licensing condition on any; they were able to limit the distribution of any to appropriately 
licensed environments. (11) is an example of licensed any from Abe’s speech (Kuczaj corpus).
(11) Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 133 (age 3;09,12), Lines 461, 469
   *CHI: can you find any scissors ?
   *FAT: I’ll look I don’t think paper wings are a good idea (.) Abe .
   *CHI: come on I can’t find anything else .
Before moving on, it’s worth considering the nature of the 2.38% error rate. Taking first  the total number of 
apparently unlicensed NPI any (i.e. instances of NPI any where a licenser seemed to be missing), I classified 
the environments of these apparently unlicensed any into four categories: (i) plausibly negative (declarative), 
(ii) plausibly positive (declarative), (iii) plausibly interrogative, and (iv) indeterminate. The plausibly nega-
tive cases were instances where the child clearly intended a negative meaning, but simply omitted sentential 
negation. The plausibly positive cases involved positive environments in which the child used any but essen-
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6 This is strikingly low, particularly if we wish to consider 5% as an arbitrary baseline error rate (to ac-
commodate speech and transcription errors). 
7 I have chosen to collapse the American and British data here. The American and British children did not 
differ significantly from each other in their mean error rates (t(24)=-0.95, p=0.35). 
8 It is worth mentioning here van der Wal’s (1996) corpus study of Dutch-speaking children’s spontaneous 
production of NPIs, in which van der Wal reported error rates up to 14%. Her error rates however encom-
passed all non-adult-like utterances, including both commission and omission errors. As I detail below, I 
further classified potential licensing errors into different categories, e.g., commission vs. omission errors. 
tially intended some (these constitute the true commission errors). The plausibly interrogative cases involved 
sentences which would be classified as grammatical if they were questions; these would initially be counted 
as apparent errors because of the lack of a question mark in the transcription. It  was sometimes possible 
however to determine the interrogative status of an utterance, using the surrounding context.9  Finally, the 
fourth category was for occurrences of any that might  or might  not have been grammatical; the surrounding 
context  of these utterances was simply not sufficient to yield a confident judgment. To be conservative, the 
error rate was based on the sum of the plausibly positive and the indeterminate cases. Some examples of 
cases involving omission of negation and cases of true commission errors follow:
(12) Omission of Negation
   Sarah (Brown corpus), Transcript 33 (age 2;10,11), Line 410
   *MOT: that’s to make orange juice (.) squeeze the oranges for orange juice for babies .
   *CHI: me ?
   *MOT:  yeah .
   *CHI: I want any .
   %com: negative meaning
   *MOT:  you don’t want any !
   %par: laughs
   *CHI: no .
   *CHI: xxx baby .
   %alt: I not baby .
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9 CLAN allows us to specify a number of preceding and following lines that surround the utterance con-
taining the search string. In determining how to classify the apparent errors into the four categories, I ex-
amined the transcripts and looked at as much of the preceding and following discourse context as was rele-
vant to the utterance at hand.
(13)a. True Commission Errors10
   Ruth (Manchester corpus), Transcript 23b (age 2;07,10), Line 809
   *MOT:  there you go .
   *CHI: want anymore, Mummy .
   *MOT:  I think there only is three darling .
   *MOT:  I don’t think there’s anymore . 
  b. Liz (Manchester corpus), Transcript 15b (age 2;04,03), Line 1018
   *CHI: there’s giraffe .
   *MOT:  yes that’s the giraffe .
   *CHI: and get any more .
   *CHI: get any more .
   *MOT:  I think there’s only one giraffe love .
The numbers of apparent errors, true commission errors, and error rates for the 26 children are given in Ta-
ble 3.
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10 The two examples I have given of commission errors show quite clearly that any is being used in a posi-
tive environment. Note that there are dialects of English where positive anymore has a meaning similar to 
nowadays or these days (see Haycock, 2000 and references therein for a characterization of the phenome-
non and its geographical distribution). As far as I can tell, there is no evidence suggesting that any of the 
children spoke such a dialect, although two of Ruth’s four errors did involve anymore in a positive envi-
ronment. In any event, if the children who produced anymore in positive environments were actually 
speakers of the positive-anymore dialect, these instances ought to count as grammatical (or rather be ex-
cluded as instances of a different lexical item), further reducing the number of commission errors. To be 
conservative, I assumed that none of the children spoke such a dialect, and therefore counted all positive 
instances of NPI any as ungrammatical. 
Table 3. Qualitative error analysis
(— = Plausibly negative; + = Plausibly positive; Q = Plausibly interrogative; Ind. = Indeterminate)
CORPUS CHILD
APPARENT ERRORS / 
TOTAL NPI ANY
— + Q IND.
TRUE COMMIS-
SION ERRORS
ERROR RATE 
(%)
Bloom (US) Peter 4 / 75 2 1 0 1 2 / 75 2.67
Brown (US)
Adam 4 / 53 0 2 0 2 4 / 53 7.55
Sarah 8 / 53 4 0 0 4 4 / 53 7.55
Demetras (US) Trevor 1 / 18 1 0 0 0 0 / 18 0.00
Kuczaj (US) Abe 6 / 288 4 0 1 1 1 / 288 0.35
Providence (US)
Lily 2 / 32 1 0 1 0 0 / 32 0.00
Naima 0 / 59 0 0 0 0 0 / 59 0.00
Sachs (US) Naomi 1 / 24 0 0 0 1 1 / 24 4.17
Suppes (US) Nina 3 / 53 1 0 1 1 1 / 53 1.89
Weist (US)
Emily 4 / 37 3 0 0 1 1 / 37 2.70
Emma 2 / 29 2 0 0 0 0 / 29 0.00
Mat 0 / 55 0 0 0 0 0 / 55 0.00
Roman 3 / 48 2 0 0 1 1 / 48 2.08
Belfast (UK)
Conor 0 / 19 0 0 0 0 0 / 19 0.00
Michelle 0 / 23 0 0 0 0 0 / 23 0.00
Stuart 0 / 21 0 0 0 0 0 / 21 0.00
Lara (UK) Lara 1 / 172 1 0 0 0 0 / 172 0.00
Manchester (UK)
Anne 0 / 18 0 0 0 0 0 / 18 0.00
Aran 0 / 25 0 0 0 0 0 / 25 0.00
Carl 2 / 16 2 0 0 0 0 / 16 0.00
Dominic 6 / 20 1 5 0 0 6 / 20 30.00
Gail 1 / 23 0 0 0 1 1 / 23 4.35
Joel 1 / 18 0 1 0 0 1 / 18 5.56
Nicole 1 / 26 0 1 0 0 1 / 26 3.85
Ruth 7 / 43 1 4 0 2 6 / 43 13.95
Thomas (UK) Thomas 18 / 476 2 7 5 4 11 / 476 2.31
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Errors of commission were interspersed among adult-like usage of the NPI; no child appeared to exhibit  a 
developmental stage characterized by lack of the licensing condition.11
 Let us now briefly switch gears to a more qualitative examination of the data and consider the kinds of 
licensers observed in the children’s spontaneous production. In attempting to determine whether children 
have target-like knowledge of the DE licensing condition on any, one might  wish to verify that  the children 
have not simply memorized any as forming a lexicalized chunk with sentential negation. One way to do this 
is to consider other classes of potential licensers. In particular, two other classes of operators (distinguished 
by their logical properties) have been identified as NPI licensers. According to Zwarts (1998) for example, 
there are at  least  three classes of NPIs, licensed accordingly by three classes of licensers that differ in their 
“negative strength”, i.e. by the number of De Morgan’s laws that  they validate. While DE operators satisfy 
the De Morgan’s laws in (14i-ii), anti-additive operators satisfy (14i-iii), and anti-morphic operators satisfy 
(14i-iv):
(14) (i) f(x)  f(y) → f(x ˄ y)           
   (ii)  f(x ˅ y) → f(x) ˄ f(y)      Downward-entailing operators (license weak NPIs)
   (iii) f(x) ˄ f(y) → f(x ˅ y)       Anti-additive operators (license strong NPIs)
              (iv) f(x ˄ y) → f(x) ˅ f(y)           Anti-morphic operators (license superstrong NPIs)    
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11 The reader may notice that Dominic’s production (Manchester corpus) exhibited a particularly high error 
rate (30%). It is worth pointing out that 5 of his 6 errors appear to arise from the same discourse context, 
within a single transcript. It is difficult to argue that Dominic went through a stage of unlicensed any when 
the bulk of his errors are isolatable to one discourse:
 (i) Transcript 21a (age 2;05,22)
  *CHI: Gordon [* 0has] got any [/] any passengers on .  (line 673)
  *CHI: he’s got any [/] any [/] any +...    (line 700)
  *CHI: Gordon [* 0has] got any [/] any .    (line 764)
  *CHI: Gordon [* 0has] got any [/] any passengers .  (line 822)
  *CHI: Toby got any [/] any passengers on .   (line 1005)
The next instance of any was produced seven days later (i.e. two transcripts later); from that instance 
through to the end of the transcripts, all instances of any were appropriately licensed. Prior to the utterances 
in (i), Dominic produced three instances of any, two of which were licensed.
Some examples from each of the three classes of NPI licensers follow:
 (15) a.  Anti-morphic, anti-additive, and downward-entailing: sentential negation not
   b. Anti-additive and downward-entailing: no, nothing, never, no one, nowhere, without, 
    before, nobody…
   c. Downward-entailing: less than n, not every, hardly, rarely, only, at most, few, not many…
Anti-additive operators are also DE, and anti-morphic operators are also anti-additive and DE. For our pur-
poses, we won’t  need to go any further into the details of Zwarts’ account, because any is considered a weak 
NPI. This means that it minimally requires a DE licenser, a condition that is satisfied by all three classes of 
potential NPI licensers. I point out  the classes of licensers here to demonstrate the diversity of operators that 
can license any; for us, diversity in the children’s production can provide an indication of whether children 
genuinely have productive knowledge of any.12  Let us consider as an example the data for Abe (Kuczaj cor-
pus), who produced a sizeable sample of any. Abe produced a total of 228 instances of NPI any in declara-
tive environments, 217 of which involved licensing by sentential negation. Other licensers included negative 
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12 Given that the licensers stand in a subset-superset relation (anti-morphic operators are also anti-additive 
and DE, while anti-additive operators are also DE but not anti-morphic), one question that might arise is 
whether children resort to a conservative widening strategy, according to which they would start off with 
the conservative hypothesis that only anti-morphic operators (i.e. sentential negation in English) license 
any; they would then widen the set of licensers to include anti-additive and DE operators on the basis of 
positive evidence. One way to test whether children follow such a widening strategy is to determine 
whether there is a significant chronological gap between the onset of licensing by anti-morphic operators 
and the onset of licensing by non-anti-morphic operators. Only three of the 40 children examined here pro-
duced more than a couple isolates of non-anti-morphic licensers, and for these three children (Abe, Mat, 
and Thomas) we did not find a significant chronological gap between the onset of anti-morphic and non-
anti-morphic licensing (by Binomial Test). On the basis of such data, I argued in Tieu (2010) that English-
speaking children appear not to resort to a conservative widening strategy in the acquisition of NPI licens-
ing. See Lin, Weerman, and Zeijlstra (2013) however, for arguments of conservative widening in languages 
such as Mandarin Chinese. Also relevant is van der Wal (1996), who postulated a hypothesis of conserva-
tive widening in Dutch children’s acquisition of NPIs. van der Wal found that children went through a pro-
gression of stages, first producing NPIs only with niet ‘not’, then producing illicit forms of licensing by 
anaphoric, deictic, and contextual negation, followed by non-adult-like NPIs in affirmative constructions. 
van der Ziel however ultimately tied this progression to children’s development of negative expressions, 
rather than a widening of the set of possible licensers for NPIs.   
quantifiers, never (which is anti-additive in addition to being DE), without (also anti-additive and DE), if-
conditionals, in case-conditionals, and comparatives. The distribution of licensers in Abe’s production of any 
is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Abe: Distribution of licensers in declaratives
TOTAL NPI 
ANY IN DE-
CLARATIVES 
LICENSERS
NEG NO- NEVER WITHOUT
CONDITIONAL 
IF
IN CASE
COMPARATIVE 
-ER
228
217 
(95.18%)
2 
(0.88%)
2 
(0.88%)
2 
(0.88%)
3 
(1.32%)
1 
(0.44%)
1
(0.44%)
In other words, 95.18% of Abe’s production of any involved licensing by sentential negation, while 4.82% 
involved licensing by (six different) non-anti-morphic licensers. Note that the low proportion of licensing by 
an operator other than sentential negation cannot be taken as evidence that  Abe did not have productive 
knowledge of licensing by various DE operators. In fact, the large proportion of licensing by sentential nega-
tion was also observed in the parental speech. Abe’s father was an active conversational partner in 209 of the 
210 transcripts in the corpus, producing a total of 87 NPI any in declaratives, 81 of which involved licensing 
by sentential negation. That is, 93.10% of his uses of any involved licensing by sentential negation, and 
roughly 6.90% involved licensing by (three different) non-anti-morphic licensers. The precise distribution of 
licensers is given below:
Table 5. Abe’s father: Distribution of licensers in declaratives
TOTAL NPI ANY IN 
DECLARATIVES
LICENSERS
NEGATION CONDITIONAL IF DOUBT FORGET
87 81 (93.10%) 4 (4.60%) 1 (1.15%) 1 (1.15%)
The pervasiveness of licensing by sentential negation is thus reflected in both the parent’s speech and the 
child’s speech. Qualitatively, it  appears that  Abe was indeed adult-like in his knowledge that  licit licensers of 
54
any included operators other than sentential negation. In other words, he was able to generalize to the class 
of DE operators as NPI licensers.
 To summarize this section, the children under study demonstrated a target-like distribution of any in 
their spontaneous production. That  is, wherever the children produced any spontaneously, they produced it 
(at least  superficially) in a target-like manner. Moreover, some children were able to use any with DE opera-
tors beyond sentential negation, i.e. with operators that are not merely DE. The surface distribution of any 
thus suggests productive knowledge that any must occur in the scope of a DE operator. 
3.2 Elicited Production (O’Leary & Crain, 1994)
Conclusions from the single reported elicited production study of any converge with the conclusions that can 
be drawn from the spontaneous production data: children know how to restrict any to the scope of licensers 
in their production. The experimental evidence comes from O’Leary and Crain’s (1994) study (reported in 
Gualmini, 2004), which used an elicited production paradigm to elicit  DE and non-DE environments from 
11 children (4;04-5;04). In the condition shown in (15), the authors found that  children never produced any 
outside the scope of negation, i.e. in a positive declarative, even when any appeared in the prompt. In con-
trast, children had no problem producing any when it could appear in the scope of negation, as in (16).
(15)a. Situation: Some dogs were hungry, and every dog eventually ate some food.
  b.  Test sentence:    Only one dog got any food.
  c.  Experimenter prompt:  What really happened?
  d.  Children’s responses:  No, every dog got some food! / *No, every dog got any food!
(16)a.  Situation: Some dogs are hungry; only one dog decides not to eat.
  b.  Test sentence:    Every dog got some food.
  c.  Experimenter prompt:  What really happened?
  d.  Children’s responses: No, this dog did not get any food! / No, this dog did not get some food!
(Gualmini, 2004:960)
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In sum, children can restrict any to the scope of a licenser in both spontaneous and elicited production.
3.3 Comprehension in Questions (Thornton, 1995)
Other experimental evidence of children’s target-like knowledge of any comes from studies of children’s 
comprehension of any, using versions of the TVJT. Thornton (1995) showed that children as young as 3;06 
have knowledge of entailment relations. She tested children’s comprehension of questions containing NPI 
any and negation such as the following:
 
(17)a. Did any of the turtles not buy an apple?
  b. Didn’t any of the turtles buy an apple?
Thornton conducted the test with 10 children (3;06-4;11) and found that these children had no problem in-
terpreting any with respect  to negation, pointing to the turtle that  hadn’t bought an apple 93% of the time in 
response to (17a), and to the turtle(s) that had bought an apple 85% of the time in response to (17b). Such 
findings suggest that by 3;06, children can correctly interpret any as an existential in questions and under 
negation. 
3.4 Comprehension in Declaratives (Xiang, Conroy, Lidz, & Zukowski, 2006)
Using a TVJT design, Xiang et al. (2006) provided evidence that children between the ages of 4;05-5;05 
correctly interpret  any as taking narrow scope with respect  to negation. These authors compared children’s 
comprehension of negative declaratives containing a, some, and any. While all three are interpreted as exis-
tential indefinites, the three differ in their possible scope interpretations (relative to negation). Xiang et al. 
set  out to test  whether young children understand the scope properties of these indefinites. They designed 
contexts that  biased towards wide scope readings of the indefinites, and tested whether children would scope 
each of the indefinites out above negation. An example item is provided in (18).
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(18)Hi, my name is Joe. I am eating dinner. My mom said I have to eat all my dinner before I can have 
dessert. I really don’t like peas. But  I guess they are healthy. Ok, I will try and eat  them. There, I did 
a pretty good job. There are only a few peas left, and those ones are mushy. I don’t think I am sup-
posed to eat the mush peas. I will probably get my dessert!   
I was listening to the story, and I know what happened!
   Condition 1: Joe didn’t eat a pea.
   Condition 2: Joe didn’t eat some peas.
   Condition 3: Joe didn’t eat any peas.
Given that the character in the story ate all but a singleton pea (in Condition 1) or all but  a few peas (in Con-
ditions 2 and 3), participants were expected to accept  the test sentences if the indefinites were allowed to 
take wide scope with respect  to negation (i.e. There is a pea that Joe didn’t eat / There are peas that Joe 
didn’t eat), and to reject the test  sentences if the indefinites took narrow scope (i.e. It is not the case that Joe 
ate a pea / It is not the case that Joe ate (some) peas). Xiang et al. found that  like adults, the 17 children 
tested (4;05-5;05, M=4;10) consistently interpreted any narrowly.13 The authors thus concluded that children 
between 4-5 years of age understand any’s status as an NPI.
 To summarize, measures of elicited production and comprehension suggest that  by 3 to 4 years of age, 
children correctly restrict any to the scope of negation in both production and comprehension.
3.5 A Problem: Target Performance vs. Target Representation
Based on the spontaneous production and experimental data discussed so far, it  would appear that 4-year-
olds know the licensing condition on any. Moreover we can tell from the experimental data that children 
differentiate any and some in production (O’Leary and Crain, 1994). But we cannot  conclude from the data 
presented thus far whether children also know that  any, unlike some or a, has a particular semantics that  in-
volves obligatory exhaustification of subdomain alternatives and potential for domain widening. It is con-
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13 The children were non-adult-like however in the a condition, where they interpreted a with wide scope 
only some of the time. 
ceivable that  young children might treat any as simply a “negative counterpart” of existential indefinites like 
some. Thus the previous studies do not probe children’s sensitivity to any semantic differences that might 
exist between any and non-polarity-sensitive/plain indefinites. A possible scenario that must  be ruled out is 
one in which the child (perhaps in an initial stage of development) hypothesizes a single categorial represen-
tation of an existential indefinite that  must be realized as some in positive environments and any in negative 
environments.14 On the surface, the child would appear to have target-like knowledge of any. Such a sce-
nario however would involve a substantive gap in the child’s knowledge of the target  grammar; put differ-
ently, a child in such a scenario would have yet to acquire the target semantics of any.
  In summary then, children’s target-like performance involving any might  reflect target-like knowledge 
of the distributional requirements of any (perhaps in relation to some), but may not  necessarily reflect target-
like knowledge of the semantics of any. In the next section, we will discuss the results of an experiment de-
signed to address this gap in empirical coverage.
4.  Experiment 2: Children’s Knowledge of any as a Domain Widener
In Section 2, we considered the target of acquisition with respect to any, and in Section 3, determined that 
previous studies could not  justify any conclusions about 4-year-olds’ knowledge of the semantics of any; in 
fact, all of the previous studies generally neglected the semantics of any, focusing exclusively on its licens-
ing condition (or put  differently, its restricted distribution in the scope of an appropriate licenser). Given the 
experimental results from Chapter 2 however, we know that  the target  must include the potential for domain 
widening. This section presents an experiment that specifically tests children’s sensitivity to the domain 
widening property of any. The research question in this study was whether children could interpret any as 
quantifying over wider domains than plain indefinites like a or bare plurals. In other words, we wanted to 
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14 See among others Klima (1964) and Lakoff (1969) for original discussion of the idea (and subsequent 
arguments against the idea) that any and some are alternative forms, the former of which surfaces in so-
called ‘affective’ contexts. My point is not to endorse or argue against this kind of theoretical proposal con-
cerning the state of the any/some dichotomy in the adult grammar; rather, I wish to point out that if a child 
learner hypothesized a superficial relationship of complementary distribution between the two, without 
postulating any deeper semantic differences, s/he could nevertheless perform on target in the previous ex-
perimental studies.  
determine whether children would treat  any as more intolerant of exceptions than non-polarity-sensitive in-
definites, as originally observed by Kadmon and Landman (1993).
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Subjects
The experiment  described below was tested with 92 English-speaking children (3;05-5;08, M=4;03) re-
cruited in Connecticut  and Maryland daycares. 20 of the children were excluded from the analysis, as they 
failed to correctly answer at  least  3 of the 4 control trials.15 I will discuss the results from the remaining 72 
children (3;06-5;08, M=4;03), 42 of whom were randomly assigned to three test  conditions, and 30 of whom 
were randomly assigned to three control conditions, to be described in greater detail below. 
4.1.2 Procedure 
This experiment was a replication of Experiment  1, with children. We used the TVJT  to test  children’s inter-
pretation of negatively quantified sentences containing any, a, and bare plurals. A single experimenter told a 
series of short stories using cartoon pictures and animations created and displayed in PowerPoint. Pre-
recorded video clips of a puppet  created the pretense that the puppet  was participating in the task live via 
webcam. Children were told that the puppet (‘Froggy’) was still very little and not very good at  paying at-
tention to stories; they were asked to fill out  a report  card for him, with the goal of helping him to learn how 
to pay better attention. At the end of each story, the puppet was asked a question about  the story. The child’s 
task was to determine whether the puppet’s statement was ‘right’, in which case s/he was instructed to put a 
stamp under the ‘smiley face’ column of the scorecard. If the puppet  was ‘wrong’, the child was instructed 
to put a stamp under the ‘sad face’ column of the report  card. We also elicited follow-up justifications from 
children to ascertain their reasons for providing yes or no responses. All children were tested individually, 
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15 12 of the excluded children were younger than 4 years of age; some of these children were inattentive 
and could not complete the task. 
usually in a quiet  room away from the classroom. Sessions were videorecorded for subsequent coding and 
analysis. 
 
4.1.3  Materials
The stories used in the experiment made negatively quantified statements felicitous. Each context  clearly 
provided different possible (sub)domains of quantification. On the critical test  trials, the context  would also 
make one of these possible subdomains highly salient; importantly, the relevant subdomain was not the larg-
est  of the possible domain alternatives but  rather a smaller subdomain. Depending on whether children ac-
cepted the negatively quantified test sentence, we could infer whether they were associating the relevant 
indefinite with the more restricted subdomain, or whether it  had to quantify over a larger domain alternative. 
Yes- and no-responses, along with appropriate follow-up justifications, were taken as a measure of children’s 
ability to restrict the domain of quantification to one of the domain alternatives. 
 Each child received two training items, followed by four test and four control items, which were ran-
domized and counterbalanced. The four test  trials varied in the dimension along which widening could be 
expected (colour, pattern, size, and texture). An example test story is provided in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1. Experiment 2: Example test story
(Slide 1/8)
”This story is about Donald and Daisy. They’re  doing 
some puzzles. See, they have to put a wooden star here, a 
metal star here, and a fuzzy star here. 
Oh no! The puzzle box is empty! Where all the pieces?”
(Slide 2/8)
“Silly Goofy! He’s taken all the puzzle pieces and hidden 
them all over the attic! If Donald and Daisy want to finish 
their puzzles, they’re going to have to find some stars!”
(Slide 3/8)
“Can you find all the wooden stars? Can you find all the 
metal stars? What about the fuzzy stars? They’re all the 
way up on the clock! Good job. Let’s see if Donald and 
Daisy can find them.”
61
(Slide 4/8)
“Donald and Daisy find all the wooden stars and all the 
metal stars!”
(Slide 5/8)
“They can fit their wooden stars and their metal stars per-
fectly! What they each need to finish their puzzle is a 
fuzzy star.”
(Slide 6/8)
“But Goofy did a really good job hiding the fuzzy stars up 
on the clock. Donald and Daisy look and look but they 
can’t find the fuzzy stars!”
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Slide (7/8) 
“So they can’t finish their puzzles. Let’s ask Froggy 
why.” 
(Slide 8/8)
“EXP: Hey Froggy, why can’t Donald and Daisy finish 
their puzzles?
(i)  ‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars!‘   (ANY condition)
(ii)  ‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find a star!‘    (A condition)
(iii)  ‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find stars!‘    (BARE PLURAL condition)” 
In this test  story, the domain of quantification consists of a set of nine stars which vary along the contextu-
ally determined dimension of texture, i.e. there are three wooden stars, three metal stars, and three fuzzy 
stars. The largest  domain of quantification in this context is the one containing all nine stars. Possible sub-
domain alternatives in this context  include: {wooden stars}, {wooden stars, metal stars}, {metal stars, fuzzy 
stars}, {fuzzy stars}, etc. In the story, Mickey and Minnie have to find the stars in order to finish a puzzle; at 
a critical juncture of the story, it is established that though they have been successful in finding the wooden 
stars and the metal stars, they cannot finish their puzzles because they cannot  find the fuzzy stars. Thus what 
is at issue revolves around just  one particular subdomain alternative (e.g., the fuzzy stars). At this point, a 
puppet appears on the screen to answer a question about  the story: Why can’t they finish their puzzles? with 
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a negatively quantified sentence containing one of the indefinites: “Mickey and Minnie both can’t  find any 
stars!”/“Mickey and Minnie both can’t find a star!”/“Mickey and Minnie both can’t  find stars!” The child’s 
task was to decide if the puppet’s statement  was correct (Did he say the right thing?). If the child restricted 
the domain of the relevant indefinite to a smaller subdomain alternative (i.e. the fuzzy stars), s/he was ex-
pected to accept  the statement; if the indefinite had to quantify over a larger domain, s/he was expected to 
reject the statement.   
 The critical test  sentences from the four test  trials, along with the final slides that  children saw when 
presented with the test sentence, are provided in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for (3) test conditions
ANY condition A condition BARE PLURAL 
condition
Test story 1 ‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find any dia-
monds’
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find a diamond’
‘Mickey and Min-
nie both can’t find 
diamonds'
Test story 2 ‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find any trian-
gles’
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both can’t 
find a triangle’
‘Mickey and Min-
nie both can’t find 
triangles’
Test story 3 ‘Donald and 
Daisy both can’t 
find any hearts’
‘Donald and 
Daisy both can’t 
find a heart’
‘Donald and Daisy 
both can’t find 
hearts’
Test story 4 ‘Donald and 
Daisy both can’t 
find any stars’
‘Donald and 
Daisy both can’t 
find a star’
‘Donald and Daisy 
both can’t find 
stars’
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The test  sentences were pre-recorded with neutral intonation, and in particular without stress on the indefi-
nite. Pre-recording the critical test sentences ensured consistency in stimuli across participants.
 In addition to the four test  stories, each child also saw four control trials. Two of the four control trials 
had test sentences containing negation without any indefinites, and the other two control trials involved sen-
tences containing the relevant indefinite without  negation (i.e. some in the ANY  condition, a in the A condi-
tion, and the bare plural in the BARE PLURAL  condition). These control items ensured that children had no 
problems comprehending negation and the relevant indefinites separately from each other. Test sentences in 
the control trials could be associated with a yes- or a no-target; depending on how the child was responding 
on the test  trials, the experimenter selected the appropriate control sentences that would ensure a balance of 
yes- and no- responses overall. Any child who did not  answer correctly on at  least  3 of the 4 control trials 
was excluded from data analysis. The puppet’s statements on the negation control stories are provided in 
Table 7, and the indefinite controls in Table 8.  
Table 7. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (2) negation control stories
Control story 1 ‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the squares’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the moons’
(target: no)
Control story 2 ‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the circles’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the suns’
(target: no)
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Table 8. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (2) indefinite control stories
ANY condition A condition BARE PLURAL 
condition
Control story 1 ‘Mickey and Min-
nie both found 
some suns’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Min-
nie both found 
some circles’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both 
found a sun’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both 
found a circle’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and Min-
nie both found 
suns’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Min-
nie both found cir-
cles’
(target: no)
Control story 2 ‘Mickey and Min-
nie both found 
some squares’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Min-
nie both found 
some clouds’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both 
found a square’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and 
Minnie both 
found a cloud’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and Min-
nie both found 
squares’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Min-
nie both found 
clouds’
(target: no)
42 children were randomly assigned to one of the three test conditions. We treated indefinite type as a 
between-subject  factor to avoid contaminating effects on subsequent trials. If a child happened to associate 
an indefinite with a more restricted domain of quantification for example, we wanted to ensure that this do-
main restriction would not influence how they interpreted subsequent sentences containing other indefinites. 
Thus children only heard one kind of indefinite across the four test trials.  
 In addition to the three test  conditions described above, we also had three control conditions. The test 
stories in these control conditions were parallel to those in the test  conditions except  that the three puzzle 
shapes in each case did not  vary along the relevant dimensions (colour, pattern, size, or texture); rather they 
were of three completely different  shapes, thus eliminating potential widening of the domain as a factor. 
This allowed us to control for children’s ability to simply interpret the literal truth conditional meaning of 
negatively quantified existential statements. The target  truth values of these control sentences were the op-
posite of the target values in the test  conditions, i.e. where we expected yes-responses on the plain indefinite 
test  conditions, we expected no-responses on the plain indefinite control conditions, and where we expected 
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no-responses on the any test condition, we expected yes-responses on the any control condition. Examples 
of the test  stories from the control conditions are provided in Tables 9 and 10. In these conditions as well, 
children received two training items, followed by four test  and four control items, which were randomized 
and counterbalanced. The control items were the same as those in the test  conditions (two negation controls 
and two indefinite controls), and were also dynamically presented to balance the total number of yes- and 
no- responses. In all, 30 children participated across the three control conditions. 
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Table 9. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for ANY control condition 
Test story 1 ‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any diamonds’
(target: yes)
Test story 2 ‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any triangles’
(target: yes)
Test story 3 ‘Donald and Daisy both can’t find any hearts’
(target: yes)
Test story 4 ‘Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars’
(target: yes)
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Table 10. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for A and BARE PLURAL control 
conditions 
A condition BARE PLURAL condition
Test story 1 ‘Mickey and Minnie both 
can’t find a diamond’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and Minnie both 
can’t find diamonds'
(target: no)
Test story 2 ‘Mickey and Minnie both 
can’t find a triangle’
(target: no)
‘Mickey and Minnie both 
can’t find triangles’
(target: no)
Test story 3 ‘Donald and Daisy both 
can’t find a heart’
(target: no)
‘Donald and Daisy both 
can’t find hearts’
(target: no)
Test story 4 ‘Donald and Daisy both 
can’t find a star’
(target: no)
‘Donald and Daisy both 
can’t find stars’
(target: no)
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4.2 Results
4.2.1 Control Conditions
The results from the three control conditions are provided in Table 11. Children performed at  or near ceiling 
on all three conditions. In other words, when domain widening was not at  issue, children appeared target-
like in their comprehension of sentences containing any, a, and bare plurals.
Table 11. Control results from child experiment (n=30)
Condition
Target 
response N Observations
# target 
responses
% target 
responses
ANY control T 10 40 40 100
A control F 10 40 39 98
BARE PLURAL control F 10 40 40 100
4.2.2 Test Conditions
The results from the three test  conditions are provided in Figure 2. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of indefinite type (F(2,39)=7.74, p<.01). Children were significantly more accepting in the A-
condition than in the ANY-condition (Tukey HSD, p<.05), and likewise were significantly more accepting in 
the BARE PLURAL condition than in the ANY-condition (Tukey HSD, p<.01). There were no significant dif-
ferences between children’s performance on the two plain indefinite conditions. 
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Let us now compare the children’s performance to that of the adults in Experiment  1. A 2x3 ANOVA re-
vealed a main effect of indefinite (F(2,108)=51.74, p<.001), a main effect of group (F(1,108)=4.35, p<.05), 
and a significant  interaction (F(2,108)=3.82, p<.05) (Fig. 3). While children were adult-like in both plain 
indefinite conditions, they were more accepting of any than adults (Tukey HSD, p<.05). This asymmetry 
was driven primarily by four children who accepted any on at least 3 of the 4 trials, providing justifications 
consistent with domain restriction to the salient subdomain. 
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Figure 4 presents the distribution of children in the ANY-condition across three response-type categories: 
those who rejected at  least  3 out of 4 test  sentences, those who provided an equal number of yes- and no-
responses, and those who accepted at least 3 out of 4 test sentences. 
The individual responses thus reveal that  the children were generally consistent  in their responses, whether 
they interpreted any with a wider domain or a more restricted domain.
4.2.3 Follow-Up Justifications
We elicited follow-up justifications to ensure that  children were accepting or rejecting the test sentences for 
the expected reasons. For example, following a yes-response, children were asked, “How do you know 
(Froggy’s right)?” Following a no-response, they might  hear, “How do you know (Froggy’s wrong)?” or 
“What really happened in the story?”16  
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16 Justifications were elicited following both positive and negative responses, so as not to bias the child 
towards one or the other. For example, we did not want the child to think that they would have to back up 
their answers only if they rejected the puppet’s statement, potentially discouraging the child from providing 
no-responses. Consistent elicitation of justifications thus ensured that the experimenter was not responding 
differently to the children’s yes and no responses.
 Children’s follow-up justifications for their responses were generally adult-like. In accepting the plain 
indefinite statements, children made reference to the salient subdomains:
(19) [CHI-44 (age 4;04),  A condition]
   PUPPET:  Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find a heart.
   CHI:   Donald and Daisy both can’t find a heart.
   EXP:   Was he right?
   CHI:   Yes!
   EXP:   Yes? How do you know?
   CHI:   Because they can’t find these hearts. [gesturing to the small hearts]
(20) [CHI-07 (age 4;07), BARE PLURAL condition]
   a. PUPPET: Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both can’t find diamonds.
    EXP:   Was he right? 
    CHI:   Yes! 
    EXP:   Yes, good job!
    CHI:  They couldn’t find the- 
    EXP:   The...
    CHI:  The blue diamonds.
    EXP:  So did he say the right thing?
    CHI:   Yes.
   b.  PUPPET: Hmm... Minnie and Mickey both can’t find triangles.
    EXP:   Was he right?
    CHI:  Yes! Striped ones.
Children who were adult-like in rejecting any statements were also adult-like in their justifications. Some 
made reference to the backgrounded subdomains, suggesting these could not count as exceptions to the do-
main of quantification:
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(21) [CHI-03 (age 4;05), ANY condition]
   PUPPET: Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars.
   EXP:  Was he right?
   CHI:  [shakes head]
   EXP:   No? Was he paying attention or was he being silly?
   CHI:  No!
   EXP:   [laugh] Was he being silly?
   CHI:   Yeah!
   EXP:  Okay. Why- what should he have said? Did he say the wrong thing?
   CHI:  Yeah!
   EXP:  What should he have said? What do you think? 
   CHI:  They couldn’t find the fuzzy stars, but he said they couldn’t find ANY stars.
(22) [CHI-14 (age 4;01), ANY condition]
   PUPPET: Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars.
   EXP:  Was he right?
   CHI:  [shakes head]
   EXP:  No? What should he have said?
   CHI:   They found two stars!
   EXP:  What did they find? They found...
   CHI:  Two woodens and two of the ...
   EXP:  Metal?
   CHI:   Yeah, the metal ones.
The children who were non-adult-like in accepting any-statements provided follow-up justifications that  re-
sembled those provided by children who accepted the plain indefinite statements. These made reference to 
the salient subdomain, suggesting the domain of any could be restricted to that alternative. 
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(23) [CHI-51 (age 5;01), ANY condition]
   PUPPET: Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars.
   EXP:  Was he right?
   CHI:  Mmhmm.
   EXP:  How do you know?
   CHI:  ‘Cause (.) they’re all the way up here. [gesturing to set of fuzzy stars]
 
Note also that CHI-51 was able to repeat  the test sentence containing any, ruling out  the possibility that he 
had simply misheard or ignored the any: 
(24) [CHI-51 (age 5;01), ANY condition]
   PUPPET: Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any diamonds.
   CHI:  He was right.
   EXP:  He was right? How do you know?
   CHI:  Because.
   EXP:   Because what. What did he say?
   CHI:  He said Minnie and Minnie (.) Minnie and Mickey can’t find any diamonds.
   EXP:  Is that what happened in the story?
   CHI:  Mmhmm.
Finally, one child (who passed all the control trials) appeared to question the use of any (25i,iii) and had 
great difficulty deciding whether the puppet’s statement  was right or wrong. Her follow-up justifications 
suggested she was indeed focusing on the salient  subdomain (25ii), but could not  decide whether any was 
being used appropriately. She ultimately accepted the puppet’s any statements (25iv), perhaps behaving 
charitably since the common noun phrase the puppet had used was correct.
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(25) [CHI-55 (age 4;09), ANY condition]
   PUPPET:  Minnie and Mickey both can’t find any triangles.
   EXP:   Was he right?
  (i)  CHI:   Any triangle?
   EXP:   Yeah. Is that right or is that silly?
   CHI:   Hm... I don’t know.
   EXP:   You don’t know. It’s kinda hard?
   CHI:   Yeah.
  (ii) EXP:   What happened in the story?
   CHI:   The striped triangles are up the light.
   EXP:   Yeah. So did he say the right thing or did he say something not so good?
   CHI:  I don’t know anyway[?]
   EXP:   Hm?
   CHI:   I don’t know anyways...
   EXP:   You don’t really know? 
   CHI:   Yeah...
   [The experimenter asks the puppet to repeat himself.]
   PUPPET:  Minnie and Mickey both can’t find any triangles.
  (iii) CHI:   Any?
   EXP:   Yeah.
   CHI:   Hm, I don’t know... 
   EXP:   You don’t know?
   CHI:   I think...
   EXP:   What do you think?
   CHI:   xxx
   EXP:   This one’s kinda hard, huh? Do you think we should give him a smiley or do you  
      think he should say it better next time?
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  (iv) CHI:   I think... the smiley.
In sum, regardless of whether the children’s responses was target-like or not, the justifications were gener-
ally consistent  with a particular interpretation of the indefinite, allowing us to ascertain how widely the rele-
vant indefinite was quantifying. 
4.3 Discussion
The widening analysis of any predicts a difference between any and plain indefinites in terms of their re-
spective tolerance for exceptions. The 4-year-olds in our study indeed appeared to interpret  the plain indefi-
nites a and bare plurals as being more tolerant  of exceptions; they interpreted these as quantifying over nar-
rower domains compared to any. Moreover, for most  of the children, any appeared to quantify over the wid-
est  domain alternative available in the context. Previous studies on any did not target  this particular differ-
ence between any and plain indefinites. Experiment 2 thus provides novel evidence that most  4-year-olds are 
adult-like with respect  to any’s domain widening property. Chapter 5 will examine the learnability of domain 
widening, i.e. how children arrive at the target knowledge of any’s semantics.
 While the majority of our 4-year-olds were adult-like in rejecting any (and providing appropriate justifi-
cations), four children failed to widen the domain. This is a useful finding because it reveals that  testing only 
for narrow scope is insufficient to fully assess knowledge of any. After all, we tested children in the same 
age range as those who were shown in previous studies to have adult-like knowledge of the licensing condi-
tion on any. It  would be reasonable to assume that  our child participants would also know the licensing con-
dition on any. Yet we are left  with a bit  of a puzzle: our children appeared to interpret  any as they would any 
plain indefinite (at least in terms of domain widening). What could be behind this non-adult-like behaviour?
 One possible explanation is that these children were illicitly wide-scoping any above negation, assign-
ing a specific, wide scope reading to the indefinite not available in the adult  grammar. While logically possi-
ble, this scenario is unlikely, given that  all other measures of children’s sensitivity to the scope properties of 
any and plain indefinites suggest  that they are able to restrict any to the scope of negation. Moreover, it is 
generally difficult  to elicit  the inverse, wide scope reading of indefinites above negation. Experimenters 
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have succeeded, but not  without concerted effort  to bias towards the wide scope reading (cf. Miller & 
Schmitt, 2004). One of the studies we reviewed in Section 3 specifically created contexts that would bias 
towards a wide scope reading, and found that children wide-scoped a and some significantly less often than 
adults did (Xiang et al., 2006). Given that  we did not  set  out to target the wide scope reading of indefinites, 
it  would be somewhat  surprising if the children we tested happened to allow illicit wide scope of any.17 But 
perhaps the clearest  reason to reject  this explanation is that  the non-adult-like children were not  among the 
youngest  of the child participants; in fact, one was among the oldest, at  5;01. If by this age, these children 
have not  yet  acquired the licensing condition on any, let alone its semantics, it is not  clear how or when they 
could. Moreover, spontaneous production data suggest  that any can surface as early as around 2 years of 
age, and once productive enough to be observable in the transcripts, is virtually error-free. 
 Alternatively, the observed non-adult-like behaviour may lie in the semantics of any. On Kadmon and 
Landman’s (1993) analysis, it  is specified in any’s lexical semantics that it  must  widen the domain and con-
sequently strengthen the assertion. Under such an analysis, our non-adult-like children would appear to lack 
this requirement, and thus would not  interpret any as quantifying over ‘wide’ domains. This explanation 
would work a bit  differently under Chierchia (2006), wherein any bears a focal feature [+F] that triggers 
obligatory exhaustification of subdomain alternatives, but  widens the domain only when conditions on con-
trastive focus are met. On this analysis of any, one potential problem could lie in the focal feature specifica-
tion on any, or the exhaustification process that should follow from the focal feature. In this case, a child 
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17 If the domain of quantification of an indefinite were restricted to a singleton set, it would be impossible 
to tease apart the narrow scope and wide scope readings of the indefinite. This is in fact at the heart of 
Schwarzschild’s (2002) analysis of so-called singleton indefinites. He argues that when a quantifier’s do-
main restriction is reduced to a singleton set, the quantifier is effectively scopeless. On the one hand, if this 
is the case, then the potential scope confound in the a- condition is less pertinent; we would assume that the 
any, a, and bare plurals all took narrow scope, and any differences in interpretation arose from the respec-
tive choice of domain alternative (i.e. the size of the domain of quantification). On the other hand, if wide 
scope/specific readings of indefinites are truly indistinguishable from narrow scope ‘singleton set domain’ 
readings, then it can be argued that Experiment 2 did indeed involve contexts that biased towards a wide 
scope reading of the indefinites; each test story involved one of the subdomains being more salient than the 
others at the end of the story. Nevertheless, an explanation that says that the children were wide-scoping 
any is an explanation that says they did not know the licensing condition on any, which is difficult to rec-
oncile with the findings of previous studies that very young children are adult-like with respect to NPI li-
censing.  
might correctly assign an existential meaning to any, but  without  obligatory exhaustification, or without  an 
adult-like ability to exhaustify, they would treat  any like any other plain indefinite; that  is, the non-adult-like 
children would merely interpret any as a. This might mean that they are free to restrict the domain of any to 
any salient  domain in the context, just  as they would with a plain indefinite. This story would explain why 
these children’s justifications for accepting the any-statements resembled exactly those justifications from 
children who accepted plain indefinite statements. This explanation nevertheless runs into the same problem 
as the scope explanation: given the relatively late age of the non-adult-like children, it  begs the question of 
when and how such children would cue in to the right  feature specification for any. There is presumably no 
abrupt change in the kind of evidence for any that  children receive after 5 years; what  would then trigger the 
child to zero in on any’s [+F] feature? Moreover, this account would predict  that the non-adult-like children 
would allow any to appear in non-licensing environments. If it  is obligatory exhaustification that rules out 
any in non-DE environments and rules it  in in DE environments, a child who lacks knowledge of obligatory 
exhaustification should not  exhibit the target restricted distribution of any. While we did not specifically test 
for knowledge of NPI licensing (nor do we have spontaneous speech samples from the children tested in 
Experiment 2), the data from previous studies (particularly those from children younger than the ones we 
tested) are highly suggestive that  children by 3 or 4 years of age are quite adept at  restricting the distribution 
of any to the scope of appropriate licensers.   
 A final, more plausible explanation might lie in performance factors, which may underlie one of two 
problems. First, part of the exhaustification process involves identifying any’s (subdomain) alternatives, re-
taining them in memory throughout  the story (until the critical test  sentence is presented), and then exhausti-
fying all alternatives at that point. The observed non-adult-like performance may lie in difficulty identifying 
or storing relevant subdomain alternatives in memory.18 If at  the end of the story, one has only the salient 
subdomain and no other alternatives to consider, exhaustification is vacuous, and the any-statement  essen-
tially amounts to a plain negative existential statement quantifying over the salient subdomain. Thus these 
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18 This could be because restrictions on memory prohibit storing the subdomain alternatives in memory, or 
because limitations on attention span lead to the exclusion of the previously mentioned alternatives as ir-
relevant, i.e. the child pays attention only to a limited set of objects in the story at a time, and disregards the 
previous subdomains as irrelevant to the outcome of the story.
children may very well have knowledge that any triggers obligatory exhaustification of subdomain alterna-
tives, but  may nonetheless fail to store the relevant alternatives, and thus appear to fail to “widen”. Finally, 
somewhat  relatedly, the same memory/attention limitations could yield a problem with contrastive focus, 
which is required to generate the “widening” effect. In order to satisfy conditions on contrastive focus, the 
domain of any has to be contrasted with smaller domains in the context. If the non-adult-like child has diffi-
culty identifying or storing domain alternatives in memory, and by the end of the story is considering only 
the salient subdomain (e.g., of fuzzy stars, or blue diamonds), there is no antecedent  domain with which to 
contrast that subdomain; in fact, since it  is one of the more narrow domains, it itself does not have subdo-
main alternatives (only what would be referred to as superdomain alternatives). Without satisfying the con-
ditions on contrastive focus, there can be no widening.
 Most plausibly then, the subset  of children who failed to widen the domain, for reasons of limited mem-
ory or attention span, disregarded the previously mentioned domain alternatives, thus appearing, on the sur-
face, to allow exceptions to the domain of quantification for any.19 
 
5.  Summary
In this chapter, we identified the target  set  of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic knowledge that  children 
must acquire with respect  to any. We saw that children as young as 2;06 exhibit  what appears to be a target-
like distribution of any, with extremely low rates of commission errors. We saw clear evidence from both 
naturalistic and experimental data that children have target-like knowledge of the syntax and structural li-
censing conditions on any, as well as the narrow-scope existential semantics of any. Finally, the TVJT  re-
sults presented in this chapter provide novel experimental evidence that at least  some 4- and 5-year-olds are 
sensitive to the domain widening property of any. 
 This naturally leads to the question of how children get to this adult-like state. In Chapter 5, we will dis-
cuss the nature of the evidence for NPI any in the parental input, and see that  the evidence appears to be 
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19 A follow-up study could attempt to reduce the required memory/attention load by reducing the complex-
ity of the domain alternatives, for example by presenting only two kinds of objects rather than three (e.g., 
red and green diamonds). 
asymmetrically more helpful for pointing the child to the more structural aspects of any (i.e. its licensing in 
the scope of negation) than to its semantics (i.e. domain widening). Chapter 5 will describe the puzzling 
learning problem that the semantics of any raises. Before moving to that discussion however, the next chap-
ter will be devoted to a discussion of the other half of the any-puzzle, which I have thus far neglected, 
namely any’s free choice instantiation. We will see that despite producing free choice any rather infrequently 
in their spontaneous production, 4-year-olds are surprisingly adult-like in their interpretation of modalized 
sentences containing free choice any. Putting children’s knowledge of NPI any and their knowledge of free 
choice any together as two halves of the same learning problem, Chapter 5 will then attempt  an explanation 
of how children arrive at the full set of target knowledge regarding polarity-sensitive any. 
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Chapter 4  
         
Children’s Knowledge of Free Choice any
1.  Introduction to Free Choice any
We have so far in our discussion largely neglected one dimension of any, namely its so-called ‘free 
choice’ (FC) instantiation. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the question of whether children are 
target-like with respect  to (i) the distribution of FC any, and (ii) any’s semantic contribution to modal 
statements such as You may choose any card. The first  we will determine by examining the same samples of 
children’s spontaneous production from the CHILDES corpora that  we reported on in Chapter 3. The second 
we will determine by experimentally investigating 4-year-olds’ comprehension of sentences containing FC 
any. Along the way, I will introduce the relevant properties of FC any. 
 FC any is so-called because it generally expresses freedom of choice, as in the examples in (1)-(3); these 
examples give rise to so-called ‘free choice inferences’ (FCIs):
(1) You may write your paper on any topic.
   You may write your paper on topic A, and you may write your paper on topic B, and you may 
  write your paper on topic C, ...
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(2) You can have any flower you like.
 You can have flower A, and you can have flower B, and you can have flower C, ...
(3) Choose any card.
 You can choose card A, and you can choose card B, and you can choose card C, ...
While NPI any is interpreted as a narrow-scope existential with respect  to its licenser, FC any is usually 
interpreted as a wide-scope universal in modal statements (Horn, 1972; Ladusaw, 1979; Carlson, 1981; 
Dayal, 1998); it is generally compatible with a variety of modal bases, including epistemic, circumstantial, 
and deontic.
(4) Alexandre will read any book you give him. 
(5) Ethan would do anything to help. 
(6) Mathieu might take any of the trains. 
(7) Sophie could take any bus to Storrs. 
(8) Nicholas is allowed to attend any party.
(9) Press any key to continue.
FC any can be acceptable in episodic statements, but only with ‘subtrigging’, a phenomenon whereby post-
nominal modification of an any-NP in an episodic sentence rescues it  from ungrammaticality (LeGrand, 
1975):1 
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1 According to Dayal (1998), FC any must quantify over the widest possible domain that includes all 
possible individuals. A non-subtrigged, episodic sentence containing any would thus be unacceptable 
because it is impossible to quantify over the widest possible domain that includes all possible individuals, 
and to predicate something that is purely episodic of those individuals. Relative clauses or modifiers can 
provide a temporal or spatial bound that restricts the domain appropriately, and thus these forms of 
‘subtrigging’ ameliorate the grammaticality of the sentence. 
(10)a. *During her office hours yesterday, Sophie met with any student.      
b. During her office hours yesterday, Sophie met with any student who dropped by.
FC any is also acceptable in generic statements:
(11) Any dog chases sticks.
(12) Any chef knows how to make pasta sauce from scratch.
As observed by Dayal (1998) however, FC any is not subject to quantificational variability effects: while the 
regular indefinite statement in (13a) typically acquires the quantificational force of the adverb usually, 
resulting in a meaning like (13b), the any-statement  in (13c) only has a frequency reading (e.g., any given 
owl usually hunts mice). 
(13)a. An owl usually hunts mice. 
  b. Most owls hunt mice.    
c. Any owl usually hunts mice.
(Dayal, 2004:04)
FC any also appears in imperatives, but seems to carry existential force in such statements (Chierchia, 2013, 
among others). (13) and (14) for example do not require that all buttons be pushed. 
(14) To proceed, push any button.
(15) For assistance, press any number and an operator will assist you.
 
The distribution of FC any thus differs from that  of NPI any, and much debate has centered on the 
apparently distinct  quantificational force of the two. This has led to two main camps: a uniformity camp that 
treats the two as a single lexical item, and a universal approach that treats FC any as a universal quantifier. In 
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many respects, FC any patterns with universals. For example, while NPI any patterns with existentials in its 
incompatibility with  almost-modification (16)-(17), FC any patterns with universals  (18)-(19) (Carlson, 
1981; Kadmon & Landman 1993):
(16) *Almost some lawyer could answer that question.
(17) *I don’t have almost any potatoes. 
(18) Almost every lawyer could answer that question.  
(19) Almost any lawyer could answer that question.
(Carlson, 1981; Kadmon & Landman, 1993:354,355) 
According to Chierchia (2006, 2013), a uniformity approach better captures the observation that  the polarity-
sensitive/FC ambiguity is not  restricted to English; in fact, any has parallels in many other languages, 
suggesting the apparent ambiguity is likely not coincidental.2  Haspelmath’s (1997) typological study of 
indefinite pronouns for example yields the observation that  languages split roughly equally into two groups: 
those that, like English, use the same morphemes for FC and polarity-sensitive elements, and those that use 
separate ones, such as Italian. Among languages that  pattern like English are the typologically unrelated 
Tagalog and Mandarin. The historical evolution of any also provides evidence of a strong relatedness 
between polarity-sensitive and FC items. Chierchia reports that  the Proto-Indo-European word oinos ‘one’ 
evolved into a restricted number of possible indefinite types across languages: for example, it  evolved into a 
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2 Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) analysis of any, which we introduced in Chapter 2 in our discussion of 
domain widening, is one example of a unified approach to NPI/FC any. Recall that under their analysis, 
any-NPs are existential indefinites, but contribute an additional semantic component: they widen the 
domain of quantification along a contextually given dimension. Regarding FC uses, Kadmon and Landman 
propose that any acquires its universal flavour in combination with a generic operator, the latter being what 
actually supplies the universal quantificational force. Thus the difference in quantificational force is 
essentially reduced to the difference between a non-generic and a generic indefinite. In contrast to this 
view, Dayal (1998) (see also Dayal, 2004 and discussion in Chierchia, 2013) treats FC any as a universal 
quantifier ranging over possible individuals. The difference between any and an ordinary universal 
quantifier like every lies in their respective domains of quantification: while every quantifies over a precise 
extensional domain, any quantifies over the widest possible domain consistent with its property denoting 
argument, making it essentially modal in nature. While some of the child data presented in this chapter will 
touch on the NPI/FC debate, the primary aim of the chapter will not be to contribute to the ongoing debate.
plain indefinite in German, NPI/FC any in English, and in Italian, a plain indefinite in the plural form but a 
pure NPI in the singular form.3 Chierchia suggests that such items (e.g., plain indefinites, polarity-sensitive 
indefinites, items that oscillate between NPI and FC uses) form contiguous grammatical classes that  easily 
transition from one to another. He provides a theoretically driven typology of possible polarity-sensitive 
indefinites one might expect  to find across languages. This system assumes a deep, systematic connection 
between polarity sensitivity and free choice. In Chapter 5, we will turn to the question of how children 
acquire such a system of polarity-sensitive items, at  which point  we will examine Chierchia’s typology in 
further detail, in particular considering how it  might  restrict  the hypothesis space of the language learner. For 
now, our main aim is to determine whether 4- and 5-year-old English-speaking children are target-like with 
respect to the distribution and semantics of FC any.
2.  Corpus Study 2: Children’s Spontaneous Production of FC any 
In this section I investigate children’s knowledge of FC any by examining their spontaneous production of 
any. We have already seen that children are quite target-like in their spontaneous production of NPI any, 
producing it  almost exclusively in well-licensed environments. Are they likewise aware of the distributional 
restrictions on FC any? 
 In addition, we will also consider the age at which FC any emerges, relative to when NPI any emerges. 
Just  as there are two main camps in the theoretical debate over the lexical status of any, the child learner 
might similarly entertain two hypotheses: either NPI and FC any are distinct  lexical items, or they are a 
single item. If children treat  the two as a single lexical item, we might  expect NPI and FC uses to emerge 
concurrently. On the other hand, if the children treat  them as distinct lexical items, all else being equal, there 
is no particular expectation as to a relative order of acquisition.  
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3 Citing a personal communication with G. Carlson, Chierchia reports that uses of English any were 
restricted to purely negative polarity uses in Old/Middle English, up until the early 16th century.
2.1 Method
I examined the spontaneous speech transcripts from the same 40 English-speaking children whose 
spontaneous speech transcripts were examined in Chapter 3. There were 18 American children, covering the 
age range 0;11,04-5;02,12, and 22 British children covering the age range 1;08,22-4;11,20; these corpora are 
available on the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000), and are listed again in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1. American English: Corpora under study
CORPUS CHILD AGE RANGE NO. OF TRANSCRIPTS NO. OF UTTERANCES
Bloom Peter 1;09,07 – 3;01,21 20 23,000
Brown
Adam 2;03,04 – 5;02,12 55 45,371
Sarah 2;03,05 – 5;01,06 139 31,195
Eve 1;06,00 – 2;03,00 20 10,856
Demetras Trevor 2;00,27 – 3;11,27 28 6,568
Kuczaj Abe 2;04,24 – 5;00,11 210 22,684
Providence
Alex 1;11,16 – 3;03,21 56 31,423
Ethan 0;11,04 – 2;11,01 50 21,898
Lily 1;01,02 – 4;00,02 80 39,852
Naima 0;11,28 – 3;10,10 83 43,542
Violet 1;02,00 – 3;11,24 54 17,274
William 1;04,10 – 3;04,15 44 21,220
Sachs Naomi 1;02,29 – 4;09,03 93 15,542
Suppes Nina 1;11,16 – 3;03,21 56 31,423
Weist Emily 2;06,06 – 4;05,19 23 7,264
Emma 2;07,08 – 4;08,04 28 6,669
Mat 2;03,10 – 5;00,05 56 10,157
Roman 2;02,20 – 4;07,20 42 11,064
TOTAL 1,137 397,002
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Table 2. British English: Corpora under study
CORPUS CHILD AGE RANGE NO. OF TRANSCRIPTS NO. OF UTTERANCES
Belfast
Barbara 2;04,09 – 4;01,18 14 2503
Conor 3;08,14 – 4;06,05 14 3045
Courtney 3;04,00 – 4;00,11 7 2021
David 2;00,03 – 4;02,03 14 2472
Johnny 3;06,00 – 4;04,01 7 1678
Michelle 2;04,28 – 4;04,19 14 3075
Rachel 2;05,25 – 2;09,16 8 1184
Stuart 3;05,12 – 4;05,04 11 3369
Lara Lara 1;09,13 – 3;03,25 120 47,876
Manchester
Anne 1;10,07 – 2;09,10 68 19,866
Aran 1;11,12 – 2;10,28 66 17,111
Becky 2;00,07 – 2;11,15 68 23,300
Carl 1;08,22 – 2;08,15 65 24,857
Dominic 1;10,25 – 2;10,16 68 21,097
Gail 1;11,27 – 2;11,12 68 16,947
Joel 1;11,01 – 2;10,11 68 17,862
John 1;11,15 – 2;10,24 64 13,303
Liz 1;11,09 – 2;10,18 68 16,545
Nicole 2;00,25 – 3;00,10 68 16,937
Ruth 1;11,15 – 2;11,21 66 20,295
Warren 1;10,06 – 2;09,20 67 16,587
Thomas Thomas 2;00,12 – 4;11,20 379 198,647
TOTAL 1,392 490,577
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The analysis in Chapter 3 made use of the kwal and combo programs available on CLAN to extract all child 
utterances containing any. I discounted imitations, repetitions, routine utterances, single-word utterances 
(including those consisting solely of any+NounPhrase), and unclear utterances where “xxx” or “yyy” 
preceded any in the utterance, such that a potential licenser might be occluded. I then sorted out the FC 
occurrences from the NPI occurrences,4  using as much preceding and following discourse context in the 
transcripts as necessary to interpret the children’s uses. I then determined whether these were grammatical 
occurrences of any. 
 Next, to examine the question of whether both NPI and FC uses of any emerge concurrently, I 
determined whether there were statistically significant chronological gaps between the onset of each kind of 
any. If there is a high enough frequency of the two kinds of any, the Binomial Test  (Snyder, 2007: Ch. 5) can 
be used to help judge whether the observed chronological gap between the two is simply due to a lower 
frequency of use of the construction emerging later. The rationale behind the Binomial Test is that if the 
grammatical knowledge for one construction is identical to the grammatical knowledge required for another 
construction, the two constructions ought to emerge around the same time. We thus adopt the null hypothesis 
that the polarity-sensitive and FC instantiations of any become available to the child concurrently. Of course, 
it  is impossible for the first  single occurrence of any to be simultaneously polarity-sensitive and FC, such 
that one will naturally surface ‘before’ the other;5 the Binomial Test allows us to determine whether the gap 
that we find between the two is statistically significant. Assuming that  the two kinds of any maintain the 
same relative frequency once they are available, non-significance of the Binomial Test based on relative 
frequency indicates that  the observed chronological gap is fully consistent  with concurrent emergence, given 
the lower probability of sampling the less frequent construction (Snyder, 2007).  
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4 In theory one can do this by separating those instances of any appearing in downward-entailing 
environments and questions from those appearing in modal or subtrigged sentences. In practice, separating 
the two kinds of uses was relatively straightforward, as most NPI uses involved sentential negation, and 
most FC occurrences involved overt modals. 
5 A distinct but unlikely possibility is that the first utterance containing any would contain two any’s, one 
polarity-sensitive and one FC. This was not observed in any of the corpora.
2.2 Results
As a group, the American children only produced 38 instances of FC any, 18 of them from Adam (Brown 
corpus). The British children as a group only produced 29 instances of FC any, 25 of them from Thomas 
(Thomas corpus). Collapsing the two groups, we find a total of 66 instances of FC any, 64 of which look 
unquestionably adult-like, occurring either in a dispositional statement or with some other overt modal. Of 
the 64 grammatical occurrences of FC any, 57 involved modal statements, 10 of which also involved a 
dispositional/characterizing meaning. Some examples are provided below:
(20) Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 192 (4;08,07), Line 285
   *CHI: you can bring it anywhere you want to .      
(21) Adam (Brown corpus), Transcript 52 (5;02,12), Line 3485
   *CHI: you can paste it on anything .        
(22) Emma (Weist corpus), Transcript 26 (4;04,18), Line 364
   *CHI: I can eat anything I want to .        
(23) Thomas (Thomas corpus), Transcript 351 (4;05,09), Line 1809
   *CHI: it does anything your car does .        
(24) Thomas (Thomas corpus), Transcript 351 (4;05,09), Line 1440
   *INV: and she carries everyone’s rubbish (.) out to the front .
   *INV:  and she collects everyone’s recycling as well .
   *CHI: ahh .
   *INV:  what do you recycle ?
   *CHI: I recycle anything .    
(25) Emily (Weist corpus), Transcript 4 (2;07,18), Line 638
   *CHI: I can make him do anything .
(26) Emily (Weist corpus), Transcript 23 (4;05,19), Line 469
  *CHI:  she can hold her, and I can do anything I want, like jump .      
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Apart  from the 64 relatively unquestionable adult-like occurrences of any, there were two instances of any 
that were less adult-like; while there appeared to be a universal meaning intended, these were cases where an 
adult would likely have produced every rather than any:
 
(27) Emily (Weist corpus), Transcript 6 (2;08,13), Line 380
   *CHI:  I saw my Uncle Dave .
   *CAR:  what’d he talk about with you ?
   *CHI: he talked anything with me .6        
   *CHI:  he talked and talked .
   *CHI:  like he knowded [: knew] how to build my puzzles .    
(28) Joel (Manchester corpus), Transcript 33b (2;10,04), Line 1860
   *CHI: I like pineapple .
   *CHI: and this .
   *CHI: and ready salted crisps .
   *MOT: ready salted crisps .
   *CHI: and salt .
   *CHI: I [* 0have] got anything in my cupboard .7
   *MOT: oh .
   *CHI:  got lots in my cupboard .
   *CHI: in here .
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6 FC any is generally not licensed in episodic sentences, unless there is post-nominal modification of any, 
i.e. subtrigging. One could imagine an adult conveying (what is likely the intended meaning of) (27) with 
something like, He talked about anything and everything with me. ‘Anything and everything’ seems to 
introduce a modal dimension to the utterance, i.e. he talked about (or was capable of talking about) a wide 
array of possible topics. It may be a fixed expression (reversing the two conjuncts seems less natural to my 
ear). In any event, without the universal quantifier everything or subtrigging, (27) is ungrammatical. 
7 Given the discourse context, one could imagine the child is trying to say something like, I’ve got anything 
(you could imagine) in my cupboard. If there were sub-trigging, i.e. post-nominal modification of anything, 
the sentence would be grammatical. ‘Covert sub-trigging’ however, is not possible in the adult grammar, so 
despite the intended widened/universal meaning in (28), I’ve counted it as an error. 
It  is impossible to look at  individual error rates, since only two children produced more than a few isolates 
of FC any. Emily produced only five instances of FC any, while Joel produced only one instance of FC any. 
The overall error rate however (2/66) is quite low; thus the children who produced FC any were quite target-
like in their distribution of any.
 Next, we consider the relative age of acquisition of NPI and FC any. 28 of the 40 children did not 
produce any FC any at all. For those who did however, the age of onset  of FC any varied from 2;07,18 
(Emily) to 4;02,13 (Mat). Note that the Binomial Test is based on First of Repeated Uses, i.e. the first  clear 
use that  is followed soon after by repeated uses (cf. Stromswold, 1996; Snyder & Stromswold, 1997); this 
excludes isolated uses in early stages where a construction is likely not yet productive.8 As such, running the 
Binomial Test on a child’s data requires that  the child demonstrate repeated use of the two items. In this case, 
we require a sufficient frequency of NPI any and FC any. I chose 15 as an arbitrary cut-off for applying the 
Binomial Test. Using this conservative measure meant that  only two children could be considered: excluding 
repetitions, imitations, and isolates, Adam (Brown corpus) produced 18 instances of FC any, and Thomas 
(Thomas corpus) produced 25 instances of FC any. The Binomial Test  results for Adam and Thomas are 
given in Table 3.
Table 3. Binomial tests (NPI any vs. FC any)
Child
# of earlier type of 
any (NPI or FC) 
during gap
# of earlier type of 
any after gap
# of later type of 
any after gap p-value
Adam (AE) 32 (NPI) 14 (NPI) 15 (FC) <.001**
Thomas (UK) 229 (NPI) 227 (NPI) 24 (FC) <.001**
Both children’s p-values were highly significant, and remained so after a Bonferroni correction was applied. 
For both children, FC any came in significantly later than NPI any. Figures 1 and 2 below show Adam’s and 
Thomas’s use of NPI and FC any over time.
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8 For example, the first occurrence of FC any in Adam’s transcripts appeared at 3;05,15. The next instance 
did not appear until 15 transcripts later, at age 4;03,13, after which point it appears repeatedly (with no 
larger than a three-transcript/three-month gap at most between consecutive uses). I therefore excluded the 
first instance as an isolate, and took 4;03,13 as the onset of productive use of FC any.
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Onset of NPI any 
(3;02,09)
Onset of FC any 
(4;03,13)
Onset of FC any 
(3;06,00)
Onset of NPI any 
(2;07,22)
Alongside these results from Adam and Thomas is the observation that 28 of the 40 children did not  produce 
any FC any at all, despite producing a number of NPI any. If these children treated NPI and FC any as a 
single lexical item, it  might  be somewhat  surprising that so many of them produced as many NPI any as they 
did without producing a single occurrence of FC any. 
2.3 Discussion
Summarizing the corpus study then, we see that the American and British English-speaking children who 
demonstrated productive use of FC any were quite target-like in their spontaneous production. They rarely 
produced commission errors, with FC any occurring extensively with overt  modals. Although we must be 
very cautious about drawing conclusions on the basis of two children’s data, we have also seen some form of 
evidence that FC any emerges later than NPI any. This may suggest that (whatever the representation of any 
in the adult grammar), children initially treat  NPI and FC any as two different  lexical items. If they are 
encoded with different lexical semantics, there is no reason to expect a particular order of acquisition. 
 One possible objection to the idea that NPI and FC any are distinct categories for the children is the 
following: two items that are really the same should surface concurrently only if all else is equal; in this 
case, all else might be argued not to be equal. The FC use of any might  be viewed as more complex, as it 
involves either co-occurring (c)overt  modals or subtrigged sentence structures. Thus even if there were only 
a single any, we might see the FC use emerge later because it  typically involves modals, which themselves 
might emerge later. Consider Adam, for example, who produced 18 FC any, 11 of which occurred with the 
overt modal can. One might object  that  perhaps Adam produced FC any significantly later because only later 
did he develop productive use of the modal can. But  if we compare Adam’s production of the modal can in 
the period during which he produced NPI any but  not FC any, to his production of can in the period 
following the onset of FC any, i.e. when he had both uses of any available to him, we see that he in fact 
produced more occurrences of can per 1000 utterances before the onset of FC any (roughly 48 occurrences 
per 1000 utterances), than after (roughly 36 occurrences per 1000 utterances). Of course, we are using can as 
a stand-in for modals in general; but  given that  more than half of his eventual FC utterances involved can, it 
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seems unreasonable to hypothesize that  Adam was initially prohibited from FC production due to a deficit  in 
his ability to produce an accompanying modal. 
 In sum, we do not have a clear argument  for or against a unified approach to NPI/FC any in the 
children’s language. What we know is that  FC any either does not  show up at  all in the children’s 
spontaneous production, or shows up virtually error-free, if productive. One drawback to trying to derive 
generalizations from the spontaneous corpora is that FC any is generally not frequent in spontaneous 
production; in Chapter 5 we will see that FC any corresponds to roughly 1-4% of all occurrences of any in 
parental speech (according to three samples of parental spontaneous production). It is therefore difficult to 
make any generalizations about children’s knowledge on the basis of spontaneous production. We will 
therefore turn next to an experimental investigation of children’s knowledge of FC any.
3.  Deriving Free Choice Inferences9
This section examines comprehension of FC any. Let’s begin by considering a particular kind of inference 
that arises when FC any is used in a modal statement.
 The use of a modal statement  invites certain inferences, for example the “not-required-to” inference in 
(29).10  Plain disjunctions give rise to so-called exclusivity inferences, as in (30). Putting a modal and 
disjunction together, as in (31), also invites an exclusivity inference. But  in addition to this exclusivity 
inference, the utterance typically also invites a further ‘conjunctive’ inference, namely the so-called free 
choice inference (FCI) in (32). The existence of this inference is not expected under modal logic, and 
moreover is absent from the plain disjunctive statement  (33) (which in fact  typically conveys the negation of 
the conjunctive inference).
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9 Much of the material presented in this and the next section draws heavily on Zhou, Romoli, and Crain (to 
appear); see also Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain (2013) for further details.
10 Following terminology used in Zhou, Romoli, and Crain (2013).
(29) Jack may have tea
    Jack does not have to have tea          not-required-to inference
(30) Jack had tea or coffee
    Jack did not have both tea and coffee       exclusivity inference
(31) Jack may have tea or coffee
    Jack may not have both tea and coffee       exclusivity inference
(32) Jack may have tea or coffee
    Jack may have tea and Jack may have coffee     free choice inference
(33) Jack had tea or coffee
    Jack had tea and Jack had coffee       
Now consider a typical scalar implicature of the kind in (34), where the use of the weaker existential term 
some invites the inference that the stronger statement containing the universal all is false. 
(34) Jack ate some of the fries
    Jack did not eat all of the fries
Notice that  the inferences in (29) through (32), like the scalar implicature in (34), are all defeasible; they can 
be suspended without yielding a contradiction with the assertion:
(35) Jack ate some of the fries 
   ...and in fact he ate all of the fries         scalar implicature
(36) Jack may have tea
   ...and in fact he might even have to have tea      not-required-to inference
(37) Jack had tea or coffee
   ...and in fact he might even have had both      exclusivity inference
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(38) Jack may have tea or coffee
   ...and in fact he might even be allowed to have both    exclusivity inference
(39) Jack may have tea or coffee
   ...but I don‘t remember which          free choice inference
Given this similarity, a recent approach to FCIs is to derive them as a kind of recursive scalar implicature. 
For the purposes of setting up the acquisition study that  follows, I will briefly sketch the basic idea behind 
an analysis like Fox (2007) (for specific details and alternative implementations, see Schulz, 2005; 
Klinedinst, 2007; Chemla, 2010; Alonso-Ovalle, 2005; Franke, 2011). 
 Scalar terms typically invite so-called scalar implicatures. The basic Gricean reasoning is the following. 
When we hear an utterance A, we compare it  with stronger alternatives that  the speaker could have uttered. 
Assuming the speaker is co-operative and obeys the maxim of quantity, providing as much information as 
required, we reason that  if the speaker could have truthfully uttered B, s/he would have. Given that  the 
speaker chose not to, we make the inference that  B is false in the speaker’s mind. For example, this 
reasoning gives rise to the inference in (34), repeated below as (40): the speaker uttered the sentence 
containing some, when the alternative containing all (which entails the some-statement) would have been 
stronger. Given the speaker did not utter the all-statement, we infer that it must be false. 
(40) Jack ate some of the fries 
    Jack did not eat all of the fries
Consider how this reasoning applies in the case of our FC disjunction. For a sentence like (41), we have to 
consider the individual disjuncts as alternatives (cf. Sauerland, 2004). That  is, the disjuncts themselves are 
competitors of the disjunctive assertion. A second crucial ingredient  in analyses such as Fox (2007), is the 
element of recursivity: we must  consider not just the alternatives, but  these alternatives enriched with any 
inferences they might themselves give rise to (see also Kratzer & Shimoyama, 2002; Alonso-Ovalle, 2005, 
among others), i.e. we must compare the assertion to its strengthened alternatives. Put  differently, 
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exhaustification will apply to pre-exhaustified alternatives, i.e. alternatives that  are themselves exhaustified. 
In a context where tea and coffee are salient alternatives, (41a) gives rise to the alternatives in (41b) and 
(41c).
(41)a. Ethan may have tea or coffee
  b. EXH(Ethan may have tea)
   i.e. Ethan may have tea and Ethan may not have coffee (Ethan may only have tea)
  c. EXH(Ethan may have coffee)
   i.e. Ethan may have coffee and Ethan may not have tea (Ethan may only have coffee)
The strengthened alternatives in (b) and (c) are both stronger than the assertion in (a); exhaustification 
therefore eliminates them: 
(42)a. Ethan may have tea or coffee
  b. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have tea))
   i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have tea 
  c. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have coffee))
   i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have coffee
  d. Ethan may have tea and Ethan may have coffee
Given that Ethan is not restricted to one or the other, it  follows that  he may have either tea or coffee (he has 
free choice of the two). Thus we have our FCI in (42d).
 FC indefinites like any have been analyzed on a par with FC disjunction (cf. Krifka, 1994; Chierchia, 
2006, 2013). The literal meaning of (43a), in a context where the relevant alternatives include tea, coffee, 
and juice, corresponds to the disjunctive assertion in (43b). Recall that the alternatives of any are its 
contextually defined (sub)domain alternatives, in this case: {teas}, {teas, coffees}, {teas, juices}, {juices}, 
{coffees, juices}, etc. Obligatory exhaustification of the strengthened domain alternatives (43c-e), as in the 
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case of FC disjunction, gives rise to the FCI in (43f), which conveys that Ethan has free choice of these 
various subdomain alternatives.  
(43)a. Ethan may have anyD drink      [where D includes tea, coffee, juice] 
 b. Ethan may have tea, coffee, or juice
  c. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have tea))
   i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have tea
  d. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have coffee))
   i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have coffee
  e. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have juice))
   i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have juice
  f.  Ethan is allowed to have tea and Ethan is allowed to have coffee and Ethan is allowed to have juice
Returning now to the acquisition question, the next section presents an experiment designed to test 
children’s ability to compute such FCIs arising from the indefinite under the deontic modal is allowed to.
4.  Experiment 3: Children’s Free Choice Inferences from any11
4.1 Method
We used a modified version of the Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain & Thornton, 1998, 2000) to 
investigate children’s comprehension of FC any in deontic modal statements. 
4.1.1 Subjects
16 English-speaking children from the Sydney area were tested at  Macquarie University, Australia. One 
child failed the control items and was excluded from the analysis. The 15 remaining English-speaking 
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11 This study is also reported in Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, and Crain (2013).
children were aged 4;01-6;08 (M=5;01). All children were acquiring English as a first language, according 
to the information provided on parental permission forms. Families were paid $20 for participating.  
4.1.2 Procedure
The TVJT  was carried out by a single experimenter using a laptop computer. Stories were told (by the 
experimenter) using cartoon pictures and animations created and displayed in PowerPoint. Pre-recorded 
video clips of a puppet created the pretense that  the puppet was participating in the task live via webcam. 
Participants were told that the puppet was not  very good at  paying attention to stories, and were given a 
scorecard to fill out in order to help the puppet  to learn how to pay better attention. At  the end of each story, 
the puppet  was either asked to recall something from the story or to describe something that  had happened 
in the story. Participants were asked to determine whether the puppet’s statement  was ‘right’, in which case 
s/he was instructed to put  a stamp under the ‘happy face’ column of the report  card. If the puppet  was 
‘wrong’, the participant  was instructed to put a stamp under the ‘sad face’ column of the report card. Follow-
up justifications were elicited from subjects to ascertain their reasons for providing yes or no responses. All 
subjects were tested individually. Sessions were videorecorded for later coding and analysis. 
4.1.3 Materials
We designed stories that made free choice statements felicitous. The critical test  stories  revolved around a 
series of (child) cartoon characters and their babysitter Mr. Cat. It was established that  Mr. Cat was in charge 
of setting rules for the children to follow. Each story context clearly provided different possible 
(sub)domains of quantification. On the critical test  trials, Mr. Cat would utter a rule that indicated the 
cartoon character could interact with one of the possible subdomains in some particular way, e.g., Lucy is 
allowed to hold the big rabbits. Then the puppet was asked to recall the puppet’s rule, and would utter a FC 
statement, e.g., Lucy is allowed to hold any rabbit! Depending on whether subjects accepted the FC 
statement, we could infer whether they were computing merely the literal meaning (the disjunctive assertion 
Lucy may hold the big rabbits or the medium rabbits or the small rabbits) or the FCI (the conjunctive 
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inference Lucy is allowed to hold the big rabbits and Lucy is allowed to hold the medium rabbits and Lucy 
is allowed to hold the small rabbits). The literal meaning (but  not  the FCI) was compatible with Mr. Cat’s 
story, so if the child provided a no-response, we could infer that they were calculating the FCI. Thus yes- 
and no-responses, along with appropriate follow-up justifications, were taken as a measure of the child’s 
ability to compute FCIs.
 Each child received two training items, followed by four test  and six control items, which were pseudo-
randomized and counterbalanced. The four test  trials varied in the dimension of the subdomain alternatives 
(size, colour, texture, and kind of animal). An example test story is provided in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 3: Experiment 3: Example test story
(Slide 1/3)
“Today Lucy is visiting a rabbit farm. There are big 
rabbits, medium rabbits, and little baby rabbits! Will 
Lucy get to hold the rabbits? Let’s see what Mr. Cat 
says. Remember, he knows all the rules!”
(Slide 2/3)
“Mr. Cat says, “Lucy, you may hold the big rabbits, but  
you may not hold the medium rabbits and you may not 
hold the small rabbits, because they’re still growing.”
(Slide 3/3)
EXP: Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the 
story?
BABA: Hmm... Lucy was allowed to hold any rabbit! 
(target: no)
In this test  story, the domain of quantification consists of a set  of six rabbits which vary along the contextual 
dimension of size, i.e. there are two big rabbits, two medium rabbits, and two small rabbits. The largest 
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domain of quantification in this context  is the one containing all six rabbits (two big, two medium, and two 
small). Possible subdomain alternatives in this context include: {big rabbits}, {big rabbits, medium rabbits}, 
{small rabbits, big rabbits}, {medium rabbits}, etc. In the story, Lucy is visiting a rabbit  farm and is told by 
Mr. Cat  that  she is only allowed to hold the big rabbits, since the medium and small ones are still growing 
and rather fragile.12 Next, a puppet  appears on the screen and is asked to recall something about  the story: 
Can you tell us something about the story? He answers with a free choice statement: “Lucy was allowed to 
hold any rabbit!” Participants were asked to decide if the puppet’s statement  was right  or wrong. If 
participants computed only the literal meaning of the puppet’s statement (44a), they were expected to accept 
the statement, as it  was compatible with Mr. Cat’s rule; if they computed the FCI (44b), they were expected 
to reject the sentence.
(44)a. Lucy is allowed to hold the big rabbits, the medium rabbits, or the small rabbits
  b.  Lucy is allowed to hold the big rabbits and Lucy is allowed to hold the medium rabbits and 
   Lucy is allowed to hold the small rabbits
The four test stories are provided in Table 4. All of the puppet’s lines were pre-recorded with neutral 
intonation, and in particular without  stressing any. Having the critical test  sentences presented via video files 
ensured consistency in stimuli across subjects.
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12 An anonymous abstract reviewer raised the concern that the Condition of Plausible Dissent has not been 
satisfied in such a trial. The concern is that if Mr. Cat’s rule makes reference only to the objects that Lucy 
is allowed to carry out the action with, the child may consider that the same rule can apply to the other 
objects, but has merely been omitted by Mr. Cat (rather than holding as prohibitions against carrying out 
the action with the other objects). This however, is not the case. In every test story, Mr. Cat not only 
explicitly prohibits against carrying out the action with the other (subsets of) objects, he also provides an 
explanation for the prohibition. In the rabbit story for example, Mr. Cat says that Lucy is not allowed to 
hold the medium or small rabbits because they are too small and fragile. Every story was consistent in this 
respect, satisfying the Condition of Plausible Dissent. 
Table 4. Experiment 3: (4) free choice test stories 
Test story 1 1. Today Emily is visiting a farm. Emily sees some pigs, 
some cows, and a sheep! Will Emily get to feed the 
animals? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says. Remember, he 
knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says, “Emily, you may feed the pigs, but you may 
not feed the cows and you may not feed the sheep, 
because they’ve already eaten.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Emily was allowed to feed any animal’
Test story 2 1. Today Billy’s friends are going to come over and play 
with him. Billy sees some yellow trucks, some red trucks, 
and some blue trucks! Will Billy get to push the trucks 
around? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says. Remember, he 
knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says, “Billy, you may push the yellow trucks, but 
you may not push the red trucks and you may not push the 
blue trucks, because they belong to the other kids.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Billy was allowed to push any truck’ 
Test story 3 1. Today Lucy is visiting a rabbit farm. There are big rabbits, 
medium rabbits, and little baby rabbits! Will Lucy get to 
hold the rabbits? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says. Remember, 
he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says, “Lucy, you may hold the big rabbits, but you 
may not hold the medium rabbits and you may not hold 
the small rabbits, because they’re still growing.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Lucy was allowed to hold any rabbit’ 
Test story 4 1. Today Mary’s daycare has some very special decorations 
up. Mary sees some fuzzy stars, some wooden stars, and 
some metal stars! Will Mary get to touch the stars? Let’s 
see what Mr. Cat says. Remember, he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says, “Mary, you may touch the fuzzy stars, but 
you may not touch the wooden stars and you may not 
touch the metal stars, because they’re very fragile.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Mary was allowed to touch any star’ 
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In addition to the four test stories, each child also saw six control stories. Control items consisted of: (i) 
sentences containing only the deontic modal is allowed to to ensure full comprehension of the modal 
without  the FC indefinite; (ii) sentences containing the NPI any under negation;13  and (iii) sentences 
containing FC any where the target  response was yes, to ensure that  children could plausibly give a yes 
response to a FC statement where appropriate.14 While the four FC test  trials and modal and NPI controls 
were randomized, the two FC control trials were presented last, so as not to contaminate the children’s 
interpretations of the critical test trials.15 
 The control items allowed us to make sure subjects were on task, and controlled for children’s 
knowledge of the relevant  components of the critical test  sentences. The modal and NPI control items could 
be associated with a target yes or no response. If a subject  provided a yes response to a given test story, the 
following control item would have as its target  a no response, and vice versa. This allowed us to balance the 
overall number of yes and no responses. Any child who did not  answer correctly on at least  3 of the 4 
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13 Ordinarily one would include control sentences containing just the FC indefinite without the modal, but 
this was impossible, as any would be unlicensed in the resulting episodic sentence. Rather than introduce 
the complication of subtrigging (e.g., Lucy held any rabbit that was close by), we chose to test children’s 
comprehension of any by using its NPI instantiation, which at least allowed us to definitively isolate any 
from the modal. Another reason to test any under negation was to control for the possibility that children 
might interpret FC any as a universal like every or all (e.g., they would interpret the test sentence as Lucy 
was allowed to hold every rabbit). Testing every-sentences in the same FC contexts would not help to tease 
apart children’s comprehension of any and every, as presumably the target response in the case of every 
would also be no (assuming children might interpret the sentence as, Every rabbit x is such that Lucy can 
hold x). Justifications would also fail to tease apart the two interpretations, as they would be the same for 
rejections of FC any and rejections of every (e.g., it is false that Lucy was allowed to hold any/every rabbit, 
since Lucy was only allowed to hold the big rabbits). This is where the NPI controls came in handy; in 
control story 1 in Table 6 for example, where Emily fed one giraffe, the sentence Emily didn’t feed any 
giraffes should yield a no-response, unless it was interpreted as Emily didn’t feed every giraffe, in which 
case the target answer would be yes. Thus a child’s response on such a trial could indicate whether that 
child’s grammar distinguished any from every.
14 In other words, we wanted to rule out the possibility that a child (with a non-adult-like grammar) might 
simply reject any sentence containing FC any, thereby giving the appearance of target-like performance on 
the critical test trials.
15 Since the purpose of the FC control trials was to ensure that children could respond positively to a 
felicitous FC statement, situating these trials after all the test trials (with a no-target) arguably stacked the 
deck against us; if there were any contamination effect at all, it would go in the direction of children 
rejecting the FC controls. If they successfully accepted these controls however, then we could be assured 
that the children were not simply employing a reject-all strategy in their comprehension of FC statements.
control trials were excluded from data analysis. The puppet’s statements on the modal control stories are 
provided in Table 5, the NPI controls in Table 6, and the FC controls in Table 7.  
Table 5. Experiment 3: Modal control items (2)
Control story 1 1. Sally is feeling rather hungry and goes to the kitchen to 
find a snack. Sally sees some chocolate and an apple! Will 
Sally have a snack? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says. 
Remember, he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says: “Sally, an apple is much healthier than 
chocolate. You may have an apple, but you may not have 
chocolate.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
(i) ‘Sally was allowed to have an apple’ (target: yes)
(ii) ‘Sally was allowed to have chocolate’ (target: no)
Control story 2 1. Billy has finished his dinner and is feeling rather bored. 
He could go for a swim or he could read some fun books. 
Will Billy find something to do? Let’s see what Mr. Cat 
says. Remember, he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says: “Billy, it’s not a good idea to swim right 
after eating. You may read a book, but you may not swim 
right now.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
(i) ‘Billy was allowed to read a book’ (target: yes)
(ii) ‘Billy was allowed to swim’ (target: no)
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Table 6. Experiment 3: NPI control items (2)
Control story 1 1. Emily is at the zoo and sees some little donkeys and some 
big donkeys, and some little giraffes and some very tall 
giraffes! The donkeys have already eaten, but the giraffes 
are very hungry. Emily feeds the little giraffes but the tall 
giraffes are too tall, so she doesn’t feed them.
2. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
(i) ‘Emily didn’t feed any giraffes’ (target: no) 
(ii) ‘Emily didn’t feed any donkeys’ (target: yes)
Control story 2 1. Sally is playing a game where she has to find some hidden 
shapes. She has to find some green and yellow triangles, 
and some red and blue diamonds. Sally finds the red 
diamonds but the triangles and the blue diamonds are 
hidden up too high so she doesn’t find them.
2. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
(i) ‘Sally didn’t find any diamonds’ (target: no) 
(ii) ‘Sally didn’t find any triangles’ (target: yes)
Table 7. Experiment 3: FC control items (2)
Control story 1 1. Today Mr. Cat brings Lucy to the pizzeria after school. Lucy 
sees a pepperoni pizza, a ham pizza, and a veggie pizza. Will 
Lucy get to order pizza? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says. 
Remember, he knows all the rules!  
2. Mr. Cat says: “Lucy, you’ve been a very good girl today. 
You may order a veggie pizza, and you may order a ham 
pizza, and you may order a pepperoni pizza.” 
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Lucy was allowed to order any pizza’ (target: yes)
Control story 2 1. Today Mr. Cat brings Mary to the ice cream shop after 
school. Mary sees some strawberry ice cream, some vanilla 
ice cream, and some chocolate ice cream! Will Mary get to 
have some ice cream? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says. 
Remember, he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says: “Mary, you’ve been a very good girl today. 
You may have strawberry ice cream, and you may have 
vanilla ice cream, and you may have chocolate ice cream.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Mary was allowed to have any flavour ice cream’ (target: yes)
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4.2 Results  
Children’s accuracy on the different  trial types are provided in Fig. 6. Children performed at  ceiling on the 
FC and modal control trials. They accepted all FC control trials, and accepted and rejected the modal control 
trials accordingly. They also performed well on the NPI control trials, with an accuracy rate of 87%.16,17 
Finally, children were also target-like on the FC test trials, rejecting these FC statements 95% of the time.18  
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16 The reader may recall that children as a group were only 66% accurate on the any test condition from 
Experiment 2. The any control items here however are not directly comparable to the any test items from 
Experiment 2. The test items on Experiment 2 all hinged on domain widening: if the sentences were 
interpreted with a wider domain of quantification, no-responses were expected. The NPI controls here had 
two possible versions/targets: the one that was used on 28/30 trials did not hinge on domain widening, and 
thus are more comparable to the NPI control condition from Experiment 2 (on which children performed at  
ceiling). Successfully accepting Emily didn’t feed any donkeys in Story 1 (Table 6) for example, only 
required comprehension of the test sentence as a plain negative existential statement (i.e. because there was 
only one ‘kind’ of donkey in the story). The control could however also be associated with a no-target, in 
which case domain widening was at issue (Emily fed only a subset of the giraffes, so the child was 
expected to reject Emily didn’t feed any giraffes). The purpose of this was the following: this version of the 
control would only be used if the child was providing non-target responses on the test trials, i.e. accepting 
the FC test trials. We wanted to know if a child who was accepting the FC test trials could nevertheless be 
shown to be sensitive to the domain alternatives in the context. Testing them on NPI items where 
sensitivity to the domain alternatives was required was a way to do this. (Children who were target-like on 
the FC test trials would already be demonstrating sensitivity to domain alternatives, so the NPI controls 
would not be required for this particular purpose.) Ultimately however, only two out of the 30 total NPI 
control trials (across all 15 children) involved a no-target, and both trials were answered correctly by the 
relevant children.     
17 One question that might arise is why children did not perform at ceiling on the NPI controls. A one-way 
ANOVA on the control conditions revealed a significant main effect of control type (F(2,42)=5.09, p<.05), 
with the children being significantly less accurate on the NPI controls than either the FC or modal controls 
(Tukey HSD, both p<.05). Moreover, recall that the children from Experiment 2 were at ceiling on the NPI 
control condition. The reason this version of the NPI control may have been harder in comparison to the 
NPI control condition in Experiment 2 is the following: these controls involved two kinds of objects, one 
of which also involved subsets, e.g., donkeys vs. tall and short giraffes, while Experiment 2 NPI controls 
merely involved three different shapes (and no subsets), e.g., triangles vs. hearts vs. circles. It is possible 
that having to sort out the two kinds of objects and additionally two subsets of one of the kinds of objects 
made the items slightly harder for the children. Nevertheless, what is important for us is that children 
generally did well on all control conditions, with every child answering correctly on at least 3 out of 4 
control trials.
18 Although children’s accuracy overall was lower on the NPI condition than on the FC test condition, the 
mean accuracy on the two conditions did not differ significantly (t(27)=-1.08, p=.29).  
Follow-up justifications from the the children allowed us to ascertain their reasons for accepting or rejecting 
the statements. Justifications for rejecting the FC statements sometimes made explicit reference to the 
subdomain alternatives that were and were not “allowed”, according to Mr. Cat’s rule. Children’s 
construction of domain alternatives was also attested by their frequent  use of the focus operator only, e.g., 
“Lucy was only allowed to hold the big rabbits.” Some examples of justifications are provided below.
(45) [CHI-03 (age 4;09)]
PUP:  Hmm... Emily was allowed to feed any animal.
CHI:  Wrong. 
EXP:  Wrong? How come?
CHI:  ‘Cause he wasn’t paying attention.
EXP:  He wasn’t paying attention. He didn’t say the right thing. Do you remember what the 
     rule was? What Mr. Cat said? 
   CHI:  Mr. Cat said Billy, he’s only allowed to feed the pigs.
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(46) [CHI-05 (age 5;03)] 
PUP:  Hmm... Emily was allowed to feed any animal.
CHI:  No.
EXP:  No. How come?
CHI:  She was only allowed to feed the pigs.
EXP:  That’s right, and what did he say? 
CHI:  He said Sal- he said Emily’s allowed to f- allowed to feed any animal.
EXP:  That’s right. And is that good or is that silly?
CHI:  That’s silly.
(47) [CHI-06 (age 5;09)]
PUP:  Hmm... Billy was allowed to push any truck.
CHI:  He was being silly!
EXP:  He was being silly, how come?
CHI:  Billy wasn’t allowed to touch any truck.
EXP:  Yeah? What was the rule? What did Mr. Cat say?
CHI:  Um, he’s only allowed to um push the um yellow trucks.
 
Summarizing the data then, 4- and 5-year-old children appear quite target-like in their ability to compute 
FCIs from FC any in deontic modal statements.
4.3 Discussion
4.3.1 Spontaneous vs. Experimental Data
We have thus far examined two sources of data pertaining to children’s knowledge of FC any: their 
spontaneous production, and their comprehension in a carefully controlled experimental setting. There are 
two observations worth considering in light of these two sets of data. The first  is a commonality between the 
two: both sources indicate target-like knowledge with respect  to FC any. What little spontaneous production 
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of FC any we could find was extremely target-like, suggesting that  the children who produced it 
productively were aware of the distributional constraints on any. The experimental data on the other hand, 
showed us that  the children we tested knew how to compute any’s semantic contribution in a FC statement. 
That is, by the age of 4, children know how to compute FCIs from any. 
 The second observation has to do with the relative ages covered by the two data sets. We do not have 
spontaneous production samples from the children who were tested on the FCI experiment, and conversely 
we do not have experimental data from the children whose speech was recorded for the spontaneous 
corpora. Thus we have to be somewhat cautious in generalizing across the two groups. But let  us 
nevertheless consider for a moment the relative age ranges. According to the spontaneous production data 
from the two children who did exhibit productive use of FC any, FC any did not emerge until 3;06 (Thomas) 
and 4;03 (Adam), significantly after the onset  of NPI any in both cases. The children tested on the FCI 
experiment on the other hand all did quite well, including the youngest at  age 4;01. Thus it seems the age of 
emergence of FC any corresponds roughly to the later end of our spontaneous age range, and roughly to the 
lower end of our experimental age range, i.e. roughly around 4 years of age. 
 One could nevertheless hypothesize that  children have knowledge of FC any earlier, perhaps from as 
early as they have knowledge of NPI any, but  that FC any statements are simply too infrequent to 
adequately capture in the corpora examined (setting aside Adam’s and Thomas’ corpora). Perhaps the 
circumstances that would invite modal statements containing FC any are not  as numerous, and thus we see 
what looks like an absence of FC any in many of the children’s earlier transcripts. The lack of longitudinal 
speech samples and experimental data from the same set  of children makes it  difficult  to draw such a 
conclusion however, and we must  be satisfied with a rough estimate of an upper limit; in other words, FC 
any appears to be acquired by about 4 years of age, possibly earlier.     
 In summary, from the onset  of their productive use of FC any, children appear to be target-like in their 
spontaneous production, and moreover from as young as we can test them using the TVJT, also appear quite 
target-like in their comprehension of FC any.
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4.3.2 On Children’s Knowledge of Alternatives
The experiment described in Section 4 builds on previous work by Zhou, Romoli, and Crain (to appear), 
though this latter study had a slightly different focus and examined FCIs from disjunction rather than FC 
indefinites. In this section, I’ll briefly compare the two studies, and discuss the implications of the findings 
for children’s knowledge of alternatives (see Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain (2013) for details). 
 Zhou, Romoli, and Crain (to appear) (hereafter ZRC) examined children’s ability to compute FCIs from 
disjunction in Mandarin, and found excellent  performance. Their goal was to compare children’s 
performance on FCIs and on scalar implicatures (SIs); if FCIs really are a kind of SI, one might  expect 
children to have some difficulty computing FCIs, given previous literature demonstrating children’s 
persistent difficulties with SIs (see among many others, Chierchia et al., 2001; Gualmini et  al., 2001; Guasti 
et  al., 2005). ZRC conducted a TVJT with 22 monolingual Mandarin-speaking children (3;07-4;09, 
M=4;03). Children heard four free choice test  trials and four scalar implicature control trials. On all trials, if 
children computed the relevant inference (whether FC or typical SI), they were expected to reject  the test 
sentence. An example FC test story is provided below:
(48) Typical FC test trial
[Context  contains a green car, an orange car, and a purple car] Kung Fu Panda and Batman are 
participating in a car-pushing competition. Before the competition, Mr. Owl (the judge) 
explained the rules, telling Kung Fu Panda that he was only allowed to push the green car, and 
telling Batman that  he was only allowed to push the orange car. But Kung Fu Panda and 
Batman were forgetful, so when the game was about to start, they asked the puppet to remind 
them of the rules.
  Puppet’s statement: 
 gongfu  xiongmao keyi tui  luse xiaoche huozhe juse xiaoche
  Kungfu Panda  may push green car or  orange car
  ‘KungFu Panda may push the green car or the orange car’
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Notice that the puppet’s statement  on its literal interpretation is compatible with the context; on its FC 
interpretation however, it  contradicts the owl’s rule. Thus depending on whether children computed the 
literal meaning or the FCI, ZRC could determine whether children had successfully computed the FCI.
 Children heard two kinds of SI controls. On one kind of control, children heard disjunctive statements in 
conjunctive contexts. For example, in a context where the red mermaid found both a white shell and a blue 
shell, the puppet would utter the sentence:
(49) hongse meirenyu zhaodao-le baise beike huozhe lanse beike
   red  mermaid found  white shell or  blue shell
   ‘Red mermaid found a white shell or a blue shell’
If children computed the exclusivity inference (that the mermaid did not  find both), they were expected to 
reject the statement.
 On the other control type, children heard an existential modal statement in a context  compatible with a 
universal modal statement. For example, in a context  in which Mr. Owl said that Winnie the Pooh must eat a 
green pepper, the puppet would utter the sentence:
(50) weinixiong  keyi chi qingjiao
   Winnie.Bear may eat green.pepper
   ‘Winnie the Pooh may eat a green pepper’
Again, if children computed the “not-required-to” inference, they were expected to reject the statement.
 ZRC found that  children computed FCIs at a rate of 91%, compared to an SI rate of only 18%; their 
performance on the two conditions differed significantly (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, z=4.52, p<.001). On 
the face of it, this finding challenges the SI approach to FCIs. If FCIs are derived in the same way as SIs, 
why should children succeed on one kind of inference but not the other? 
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 Building on recent work suggesting that  children are better at  computing SIs when the alternatives are 
explicitly mentioned in the discourse context  (among others, see Gualmini et  al., 2001; Chierchia et  al., 
2001; Barner et  al., 2010), and more generally that  children’s inability to derive SIs lies in a difficulty with 
alternatives (Reinhart, 2004, 2006; Chierchia et al., 2001; Barner et  al., 2011; Barner & Bachrach, 2010), 
ZRC suggested that the reason their children succeeded on the FC condition was because the alternatives 
required to compute the FCIs were provided explicitly as substrings of the disjunctive assertions. Thus 
children performed well because the alternatives were explicitly mentioned as substrings of the test 
sentences themselves, and not merely present in the discourse context. This account  makes the prediction 
that if the alternatives were not  provided explicitly as substrings of the assertion, children might  fail to 
compute FCIs, as they often do with SIs. The data presented in Section 4 speak directly to this point; FC 
indefinites are argued to give rise to the same kinds of FCIs as FC disjunctions, but  the any-statements, 
unlike the disjunction statements, do not explicitly provide the alternatives as substrings of the assertion. 
Thus explicit  mention as substrings cannot be the factor responsible for children’s success on FCIs. Rather, 
Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain (2013) pursue a more fine-grained hypothesis based on the following 
observation: children succeed on inferences involving alternatives that  do not  have to be: (i) learned as co-
scalar, or (ii) retrieved from the lexicon. Consider first the cases where children have been shown to have 
difficulties: computing the not-all implicature from some, the not-and  implicature from or, or the not-must 
implicature from may. In these cases, there are (at least) two crucial ingredients for success. First, the child 
must learn the co-scalar status of these terms, i.e. they must learn that some and all lie on the same quantifier 
scale, and that  they are related in terms of strength. Second, in order to compute the implicature when 
presented with a some-statement (i.e. on an experimental task), the child must  be able to retrieve the stronger 
alternative all from the lexicon in order to compute the implicature. Failure to compute the implicature 
could result  from a deficit  in either ingredient; that  is, either the child has yet to learn the co-scalar status of 
some and all, or the child is unable to retrieve all from the lexicon during the experiment. 
 In contrast, consider the inferences where children have been shown to succeed: SI conditions where the 
alternatives are made explicit  in the discourse context, FC disjunctions where the alternatives are explicitly 
provided as substrings of the assertion, and FC indefinites where the domain alternatives are made salient 
114
and explicitly mentioned in the discourse context. What these inferences have in common is that the child 
does not  have to: (i) learn the co-scalar status of the alternatives, as they are either pragmatically or 
explicitly provided; or (ii) retrieve the relevant alternatives from the lexicon, as, again, they are 
pragmatically or explicitly provided.
 Returning our discussion to any, what we have learned in this section is that  children are quite adept at 
computing FCIs off of any’s domain alternatives. This is consistent with the results from the NPI study 
reported in Chapter 3, where many of the children we tested were also shown to be sensitive to any’s 
subdomain alternatives. In general, children’s performance on SIs and FCIs suggests children can be quite 
adept at  making use of contextually provided alternatives. This allows them to succeed in the 
comprehension of NPI and FC any: in the case of the former, the adult-like children successfully select  the 
largest domain and exhaustify the subdomain alternatives, and in the case of the latter, they succeed at 
identifying the relevant subdomain alternatives and computing FCIs from those alternatives.
5.  Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen more evidence of 4- and 5-year-olds’ target-like knowledge of the semantics of 
any. In particular, we began by examining the distribution of FC any, and determined that  if productive, 
children’s spontaneous production of FC any is target-like. From the onset of productive use of FC any, 
children use any in well-licensed modal statements and very rarely make commission errors. We then turned 
our attention to the semantics of FC any, in particular examining the FCIs that arise when any is used in a 
deontic modal statement such as, Lucy is allowed to hold any rabbit. The results of the TVJT  reported in this 
chapter revealed that  4- and 5-year-olds have no difficulty computing FCIs from FC any. The results were 
shown to converge with previous work on FC disjunction in Mandarin. We discussed how these findings 
bear on children’s knowledge of alternatives, and proposed that children are quite adept at  computing 
inferences based on alternatives that  are provided in the discourse context or in the assertion itself. In 
particular, as concerns any, children appear sensitive to any’s contextually determined domain alternatives. 
This particular finding converges with a large part of the NPI data reported in Chapter 3. 
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 In sum, 4- and 5-year-old children are quite sensitive to the semantics of any. In the remaining chapter 
of this dissertation, we will turn to the how question: how exactly do children arrive at  the target semantics 
for any?
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Chapter 5 
         
The Learning Problem
1.   Where We Are Now
Up to this point  in the dissertation, we have largely focused on what children know about any. After charac-
terizing the negative polarity item (NPI) any in the adult grammar (Chapter 2), we examined in detail 
whether 3-5-year-old children were target-like with respect to their production and comprehension of any. 
We began Chapter 3 by highlighting the fact that previous studies exclusively targeted children’s knowledge 
of the restricted distribution of any. These studies demonstrated that children by the age of 3-4 years are sen-
sitive to the licensing condition on any. In addition to these studies, we examined samples of children’s 
spontaneous production, which also clearly demonstrated young children’s sensitivity to the licensing condi-
tion. But  the objection raised in Chapter 3 was that  merely targeting children’s knowledge of the NPI licens-
ing condition is not sufficient to tap into children’s knowledge of the semantics of any. The experiment  pre-
sented in Chapter 3 demonstrated that  as a group, 4-year-olds were sensitive to any’s subdomain alternatives, 
and moreover interpreted any as quantifying over the widest  possible domain in the context (although not  all 
the children were fully adult-like in this respect, a point we will come back to in the discussion in this chap-
ter). In Chapter 4, we saw the results of an experiment with children in the same age range who were shown 
to be adult-like in their ability to compute free choice inferences (FCIs) from any. That  study provided fur-
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ther evidence of children’s adult-like competence with respect to any’s semantic contribution to the sen-
tences in which it appears.
 In this chapter, we will finally turn our attention to the how question, discussing how children arrive at 
the target knowledge of any (on both its NPI and FC uses). According to the results of our experiments, the 
acquisition of the semantics of any is for the most  part  complete by roughly 4 or 5 years of age.1 How do 
children get to this stage? Critical to this discussion is the nature of the evidence that children receive in their 
linguistic input. I assume without question that the input  must somehow lead the child to the target grammar; 
the question is what precise aspects of the input  are informative to the child in this respect, and how they are 
informative in leading the child to the target. For example, does the superficial distribution of any lead the 
child to its semantics? Does the relative frequency of any in different  environments lead the child to its li-
censing properties? Do the larger discourse contexts in which any appears lead the child to its semantics? Is 
there explicit  evidence of domain widening, or of the process by which FCIs arise? These are the questions 
we will address in Section 3, where we examine some samples of child-directed speech. 
 Ultimately, the proposal I will make roughly follows the following narrative (to be made more precise in 
this chapter): we have seen experimental evidence that by the age of 4, children have knowledge of the ex-
haustification of any’s subdomain alternatives, of domain widening, and of FCIs from any under deontic 
modals. We will see that the parental input provides distributional information as to the dual nature of any, 
i.e. that  it  appears in DE environments and certain modal and sub-trigged statements.2 In contrast, it  is not at 
all clear whether the input  provides evidence for how to exhaustify alternatives, how to widen the domain, 
or how to compute FCIs -- all properties which we have demonstrated are adult-like in most 4-year-olds. I 
118
1 In Chapter 3, I provided an explanation for the “non-wideners” (children who appeared to allow restric-
tion of the domain of any), which appealed to performance factors. In this chapter I’ll aim to first provide 
an account of the target-like children’s performance, and then within the same proposal, provide an alterna-
tive explanation for the non-wideners. 
2 This could in itself pose a challenge to the learner, who has to sort out the two different uses of any. If a 
learner is sensitive to the relevant properties of the two environments (i.e. to DEness in one, and to the 
presence of a modal in the other), the child might be able to keep track of the two licensing contexts, and 
make generalizations on the basis of the dual distribution. If the child was not (or could not be) attuned to 
these properties of the context however, it’s not clear that the child could make accurate generalizations 
about any’s restricted distribution.
propose that  the child must  make use of the relatively clear evidence concerning the distribution of any in 
order to arrive at  the target  grammar, where the target is the analysis of any as a polarity-sensitive element 
that is interpreted as both an NPI and a FC item. I argue that  the key lies in restricting the hypothesis space 
of available options from which the learner must choose. When we look cross-linguistically, we see a re-
stricted space of possible polarity-sensitive indefinite (PSI) types, which vary in systematic and predictable 
ways. Ultimately I will propose that the child does not need explicit, positive evidence for how to exhaustify 
subdomain alternatives, how to widen the domain, or how to compute FCIs. Put  more strongly, the child 
cannot rely on such explicit  evidence, because it  simply does not exist  in the input. Given a restricted set  of 
options however, the distribution of any in the input is sufficient to allow the child to map any to exactly that 
type of indefinite that triggers obligatory exhaustification of subdomain alternatives, that has the potential to 
widen the domain of quantification, and finally, that gives rise to FCIs in certain modal contexts.
2.  Revisiting the Target of Acquisition 
Before we turn to the child-directed speech, let us reiterate what must be acquired, i.e. what exactly we con-
sider to form part of the target grammar at which the child must ultimately arrive.3 Once we have the target 
in hand, we will be in a position to determine whether there is ample evidence in the input to derive these 
target properties.
 In Chapter 3, we attempted to identify the target  along a couple of dimensions: on the one hand, we 
identified a more structural dimension, which included a number of distributional facts about  any as well as 
its syntactic licensing condition; on the other hand, we discussed its semantics. With respect  to any’s distri-
bution, we identified the following relevant  properties: (i) any surfaces as an indefinite determiner which can 
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3 The reader might object to the use of the term “target grammar”, as I am focusing on the development of 
a particular lexical item, any. But ultimately I view the development of this lexical item as an integral (or 
rather, representative) part of the development of the polarity sensitive system, which does, on the account 
we’ll adopt, root polarity sensitivity within the domain of “grammar”. I do not view the development of 
any as uniquely a phenomenon of word learning; of course the child must learn the word any and what 
meanings it maps to, but on the view I adopt here (by and large, that presented in Chierchia (2013)), 
grammatical operations (such as the generation of focal alternatives, exhaustification of these alternatives, 
the checking of focal features that trigger exhaustification, etc.) will be part and parcel of the development 
of the meaning of any. Thus to know the meaning of any is to know all of these aspects of grammar.
take an NP complement (which itself can be elided); (ii) it  can occur within an NP as part of a complex in-
definite such as anything or anyone; (iii) it  can be used as a modifier of the comparative adverb more. With 
respect to the syntax of its licensing, we stated that the child has to learn that any must  be c-commanded by 
its licenser. Finally, with respect to the semantic dimension of any, we discussed the exhaustification of its 
alternatives, as well as its domain widening property. 
 At  this point, I’d like to be a bit more precise about what exactly needs to be learned about the licensing 
condition on any. I take it for granted that the child’s grammar incorporates a notion of c-command that  does 
not need to be learned from the input, or at the very least, that such a notion is in place well before the emer-
gence of any in the child’s production. Thus I will not focus too much on the structural licensing condition. I 
would however like to be more precise about the semantic nature of the licensing condition. First, recall 
Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) condition on any:
(1) Strengthening: any is licensed only if the widening that  it  induces creates a stronger statement, i.e., 
only if the statement on the wide interpretation => the statement on the narrow interpretation.
(Kadmon & Landman, 1993:369)
This account, while descriptively valid, is not  particularly informative when transferred over to our discus-
sion of the acquisition of any. On this account, and in fact on any account that merely states a licensing con-
dition, what  the child must learn about  any is a lexically specified constraint on its distribution.4 On the one 
hand, if we assume (1) to be the target  semantic property, it  is not  clear how to go about  probing for chil-
dren’s knowledge of the property. Presumably, once the child has learned that (1) is part  of any’s lexical se-
mantics, its restricted distribution (i.e. its restriction to DE environments) will fall out naturally, since the 
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4 Alternative proposals like Giannakidou’s (1998, 2011) non-veridicality account will similarly require that 
the child learn some condition that is built into the lexical semantics of any; in the case of non-veridicality 
for example, the child must learn, as part of any’s lexical semantics, a constraint against its appearance in 
the scope of a veridical operator. Thus whatever the relevant licensing property is, accounts that merely 
state the licensing condition in terms of a restricted distribution, will require that the child learn, as part of 
the meaning of any, a stipulated licensing condition.
condition is only satisfied in such environments. Thus one could take the child’s ability to restrict any’s dis-
tribution as indirect evidence that they had knowledge of (1).5
 But  considering more compositional accounts along the lines of Krifka (1995) and Chierchia (2013) that 
build on the intuitions underlying (1) will allow us to better unpackage the precise elements that  constitute 
the target of acquisition. According to Krifka (1995), anything introduces a set of alternatives, of which any-
thing is the most  ‘general’ property; the alternatives of anything are all properties that  are stronger (or more 
specific) than the most general property of thing. A statement  such as John saw anything asserts that John 
saw something of the most general kind, but  also generates a scalar implicature, leading to the negation of 
the stronger alternative propositions. Doing so yields a contradiction, for it  is impossible for John to see 
something of the most general kind, while not  seeing anything more specific. Essentially the sentence asserts 
that John saw something, but  generates an implicature that he did not see anything in particular. This seman-
tic contradiction is what rules out  any in non-DE environments. Chierchia (2006, 2013) builds on this pro-
posal but implements it  in slightly different  terms. For him, any triggers a set  of subdomain alternatives, 
which obligatorily must  be exhaustified. The obligatoriness of this exhaustification is implemented through 
a system of feature-checking, whereby any is lexically specified with a focal feature that requires checking 
by a covert  exhaustification operator. As we saw in Chapter 2 (and as in the case of Krifka’s proposal), ex-
haustification of the subdomain alternatives succeeds in DE environments but yields a logical contradiction 
in non-DE environments; this is how the restricted distribution of any is derived on this account. But note 
that within this analysis, there is no formal correlate of “domain widening” or strengthening per se. To ex-
plain true widening of the kind seen in Kadmon and Landman’s examples, Chierchia invokes contrastive 
focus. Given that any’s alternatives are subdomain alternatives, this nicely explains why, when contrasted 
with a preceding plain indefinite statement, any is felt  to create a stronger statement: the domain of any is 
being contrasted with the more restricted domain of the preceding plain indefinite. But if there is no contras-
tive focus (i.e. no antecedent indefinite quantifying over a more restricted domain), any’s domain can be as 
restricted as that of a plain indefinite. Finally, Chierchia also attempts to derive the NPI/FC dichotomy in a 
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5 Of course there will be other prerequisites to the production and comprehension of any; for example the 
child will also have to have DE operators and modals in place in order to produce and comprehend any.
principled way, that  is to say, not  as a coincidental ambiguity. For him, indefinites like any (that oscillate 
between NPI and FC uses) always trigger exhaustification of their subdomain alternatives; the key is that 
they also allow for pre-exhaustified alternatives (i.e. recursive exhaustification). This is what  allows us to 
generate FCIs in the modal contexts we examined in Chapter 4. 
 On the Krifka/Chierchia-style analysis then, there are a few ingredients that  the child needs to have in 
place in order to produce and comprehend any in an adult-like way. First, the child has to learn that any’s 
alternatives are subdomain alternatives. I take it for granted that  the child’s grammar allows for the genera-
tion of alternatives; the possibility of activating alternatives is not  specific to NPIs, and is thus independently 
required elsewhere in the grammar. Scalar quantifiers and elements forming Horn scales for example all 
have the potential to activate alternatives. What  the child must  learn is the nature of the alternatives for any 
given scalar term. In the case of any in particular, the child must  learn that it  activates subdomain alterna-
tives. I also assume that the child’s grammar will allow for exhaustification of alternatives, again, a process 
required independently of any account  of NPIs. Specifically with respect to any, the child must learn that 
any carries a focal feature that  triggers obligatory exhaustification of its (subdomain) alternatives.6 And to be 
able to carry out this exhaustification, the child must  have covert  exhaustification operators in place. Addi-
tionally, in order to achieve ‘domain widening’ effects of the Kadmon-and-Landman type, the child must 
have knowledge of contrastive focus (cf. Rooth, 1992). That is, the child must know how to generate or 
identify a set of focal alternatives (in this case, more restricted subdomain alternatives), and exhaustify with 
respect to these focal alternatives.
 Finally, consider briefly the acquisition of FC any. While both the Kadmon and Landman and Chierchia 
analyses can be considered examples of unified analyses of any, they lead us to define the target  of acquisi-
tion slightly differently. The Kadmon and Landman analysis, as we said above, requires that the child learn 
the lexical meaning of any, which will include a condition that it must strengthen the assertion. There is no 
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6 Again, strictly speaking, there are other prerequisites that I will assume are already in place by the rele-
vant point in development when the child acquires any. For example, in order to check any’s focal feature, 
the child must have a grammar that allows for feature-checking. Since syntactic feature-checking is re-
quired on independent grounds (or at least, is in place before she produces her first NPI, as evidenced by 
the ability to produce appropriate subject-verb agreement, past tense agreement, etc.), we will not focus on 
how the child acquires feature-checking. 
distinction between NPI and FC any in this respect. Chierchia’s analysis requires that  the child learn that  any 
triggers obligatory exhaustification of its subdomain alternatives, and moreover that (unlike NPI-only in-
definites) any allows for pre-exhaustified alternatives. Moving to the other end of the spectrum, a non-
unified account such as Dayal (1998, 2011) leads us to expect that  the child must learn the two any’s inde-
pendently. The child must learn the licensing condition on NPI licensing (whichever conception of it  one 
chooses), and the child must  also learn the universal quantifier any, which (glossing over details) differs 
from universal every in that  it quantifies over possible individuals. In this case, we might  expect  the input  to 
provide evidence for NPI licensing as well as for any’s universal quantificational force. But  it’s not clear 
whether this alone will get  the child to domain widening/strengthening, or FCIs of the kind children were 
shown to be able to compute in Chapter 4. To acquire these properties, we might  expect the input  to also 
provide evidence for strengthening/widening, and for the computation of FCIs.7  Thus on an account like 
Dayal’s, we can conceive of the required evidence as coming in two parts: whatever the input  would need to 
provide on any account  of NPI any (let’s say, what we proposed would be needed on Kadmon and Land-
man’s account), plus evidence of the modal nature of FC any, including evidence of the FCIs that are possi-
ble in these modal contexts.
 Let us now turn to an examination of child-directed speech to see if the input  provides any evidence of 
the kind that might lead the child to infer the target properties of any.
3.  Corpus Study 3: What the Input Provides
3.1 Evidence for any
Let us now consider the question of what evidence exists in the child-directed speech for the various target 
properties of any that we discussed in Section 2. I’ll consider here data from three longitudinal corpora 
available on CHILDES (the Kuczaj corpus (US) and the Lara and Thomas corpora (UK)).8 The basic fre-
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7 It is not obvious what kind of evidence would be informative for the procedure of computing a FCI. I’ll 
discuss this further in Section 3.
8 Of the 40 corpora I reported on in Chapters 3 and 4, these three corpora contained the greatest number of 
transcripts; the Lara and Thomas corpora also contained the largest number of total child utterances. 
quencies of any in the input  are provided in Table 1.9 After reporting on these basic frequencies, I’ll discuss 
(in a more qualitative manner) the kind of evidence that  the input provides for the syntactic dimension of 
any, and then move on to any’s semantics.
Table 1. Frequencies of any in Kuczaj, Lara, and Thomas parental speech samples
Corpus Total parental utterances Total any NPI any FC any
Kuczaj 
(Abe’s father)
(ABE’S AGE RANGE: 
2;04,24-5;00,11)
12,753
130
(1.02% of all 
utterances)
125 
(96.15% of all 
any)
5 
(3.85% of all any)
Lara 
(Lara’s mother)
(LARA’S AGE RANGE: 
1;09,13-3;03,25)
78,701
428
(0.54% of all 
utterances)
423 
(98.83% of all 
any)
5 
(1.17% of all any)
Thomas 
(Thomas’ mother)
(THOMAS’ AGE RANGE: 
2;00,12-4;11,20)
324,778
2528
(0.78% of all 
utterances)
2429 
(96% of all any)
99 
(3.92% of all any)
Of the 130 instances of any in Abe’s father’s speech (Kuczaj corpus), 125 (96.15%) were instances of NPI 
any; here licensing primarily involved sentential negation (81=64.8%) and interrogatives (38=30.4%).10 The 
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9 In analyzing the parental speech samples, I also discounted any repetitions, imitations, routine or idio-
matic expressions containing any, and any unclear utterances where a potential licenser was occluded by 
xxx in the transcripts. The adult examples of any were generally grammatical; only Thomas’s mother’s 
speech revealed any exceptions; I classified five of her 2434 total NPI any as ungrammatical (for example, 
you’ve had enough now, please do take anymore out, Thomas). It’s not clear whether these were merely 
transcription errors, but they were nevertheless classified as ungrammatical.
10  According to Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007), any is subject to a disjunctive licensing condition: it is li-
censed by downward entailment in declaratives but  strong exhaustivity in interrogatives. Giannakidou 
(1998) subsumes interrogatives with other non-veridical operators. Importantly, Nicolae (2013) builds on 
Guerzoni and Sharvit’s observation regarding strong exhaustivity, and analyzes interrogative licensing 
within an exhaustification-based framework, such that NPI any in declaratives and interrogatives is li-
censed in the same way, i.e. by successful exhaustification of its subdomain alternatives. I will return to the 
issue of licensing in questions in Section 5.3.2. See also Tieu (2010) for relevant discussion.
remaining 4.8% of NPI any involved licensing by other DE operators. Finally, 5 (3.85%) of all occurrences 
of any were instances of FC any. In the Lara corpus, 423 (98.83%) were instances of NPI any; here too li-
censing was primarily by sentential negation (342=80.85%) and interrogatives (69=16.31%); 2.84% of NPI 
any involved licensing by other DE operators. Finally, 5 (1.17%) of the occurrences of any were instances of 
FC any.11 Finally, 2429 (96%) instances of any in Thomas’ mother’s speech were instances of NPI any, with 
1718 (=70.73%) of these involving licensing by sentential negation, and 436(=17.95%) involving licensing 
in interrogatives; the remaining 11.32% of NPI any involved licensing by other DE operators. 99 (3.92%) of 
the total occurrences of any were instances of FC any. 
 On the whole, the input  seems to provide fairly robust  (positive) evidence of any’s restricted 
distribution.12 Next, let’s take a qualitative look at the kinds of examples of any children hear in the input, 
and determine in particular whether there is evidence for the structural dimension of any, under which we 
included: (i) the determiner/modifier status of any; (ii) the c-command requirement on licensing; and (iii) the 
non-clausebounded nature of the licensing/c-command relation. As seen in the examples in (2), any consis-
tently showed up either as a determiner or as a modifier of the comparative adverb more. The parental input 
also provides positive evidence of the c-command requirement on licensing: all instances of any in declara-
tive statements involved any c-commanded by a DE operator, as seen in all of the examples in (2).13 We also 
find evidence that the structural dependency between licenser and NPI is not clause-bounded; as can be seen 
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11 Note that even though Lara heard the lowest frequency of any in the input, she was not the slowest to 
acquire any nor did she struggle with productive use of any in her own spontaneous speech. Abe’s first 
productive use of any was at 2;06,14, Lara’s at 2;06,28, and Thomas’ at 2;07,22. Moreover, comparing the 
ages at the end of the transcripts for the three children, Lara was much younger than either Abe or Thomas. 
Finally, of the 40 children examined overall, Lara produced the third largest absolute number of any across 
all transcripts.
12 There is however no direct negative evidence telling the child that any cannot appear outside of these 
licensed contexts. 
13 There is however no direct negative evidence indicating that NPI any is ungrammatical outside the scope 
of a DE operator. 
in the examples in (3), the parental input  provides positive evidence that any in an embedded clause can be 
licensed by a negation in the higher clause.14 
(2) a. *FAT:  we don’t have any hot chocolate . (Kuczaj, Transcript 118, Line 19)
  b. *FAT: we didn’t get you any new socks . (Kuczaj, Transcript 166, Line 448)
  c. *FAT: I don’t think we have any more . (Kuczaj, Transcript 110, Line 619)
  d. *MOT: he hasn’t got any feet . (Lara, Transcript 98, Line 559)
  e. *MOT: Lara hasn’t got any shoes on . (Lara, Transcript 100, Line 252)
  f. *MOT: you don’t need any more . (Lara, Transcript 119, Line 3621)
(3) a. *FAT: I don’t think that there’s anything cooking in that pan (.) Abe . (Kuczaj, Transcript 23, Line 53)
  b. *FAT:  I don’t think we have any honey (.) Abe . (Kuczaj, Transcript 182, Line 308)
  c. *MOT: I don’t think anybody can really . (Lara, Transcript 101, Line 8953)
Next, consider evidence for FC any. Children hear any in episodic, sub-trigged statements, as well as modal 
environments (with overt and covert  modals). The total 10 utterances containing FC any produced by Abe’s 
father and Lara’s mother are provided below (with sufficient context to derive the intended meanings):
(4) Abe’s father (Kuczaj corpus)
  a. *FAT: okay (.) Abe look you put this on the paper then you keep the pencil against the edge of  
   this and draw see (.) then you end up with a animal .
126
14 It is worth noting that almost all such instances of a matrix negation and an embedded NPI any in Abe’s 
father’s speech involve neg-raising predicates such as think. Such neg-raising sentences are often inter-
preted as though the negation appeared in the embedded clause, and the grammatical status of the construc-
tion is controversial. Assuming traditional syntactic “raising” accounts (Fillmore, 1963; Ross, 1973; Prince, 
1976, a.o.), according to which the negation is base-generated within the embedded clause, the instances in 
(3) may not actually constitute evidence for the child that NPI licensing is not clause-bounded in English. 
Assuming a semantic/pragmatic analysis (cf. Bartsch, 1973; Gajewski, 2007) however, according to which 
the internal negation reading is generated via a presupposition, these instances would, like non-neg-raising 
examples, provide evidence for the lack of clauseboundedness. 
   *CHI: what animal ?
   *FAT: any animal that you want . (Transcript 12, Line 169)
  b. *FAT: being around you two drowsy people would make anyone feel tired . (Transcript 53, Line 734)
  c. *FAT: why don’t you tell me a story?
   *CHI: what kind of story?
   *FAT: any kind . (Transcript 130, Line 587)15
  d. *CHI: Dad (.) are you going to throw these away ?
   *FAT: pick up anything you don’t want me to throw away . (Transcript 151, Line 251)
  e. *CHI: Dad (.) do you believe a dog could be that big ?
   *FAT: anything’s possible but was it really that small ? (Transcript 201, Line 442)
(5) Lara’s mother (Lara corpus)
  a. *MOT: you pop some bricks on there .
   *CHI: where does this go ?
   *MOT: it can go anywhere you want it to . (Transcript 47, Line 503)
  b. *MOT: you’re supposed to just guess .
   *MOT: just pick one .
   *MOT: any one . (Transcript 53, Line 762)
   *DAD: <pick a> [/] pick a card .
   *DAD: any card . (Transcript 53, Line 764)
  c. *MOT: what does Amy eat ?
   *CHI: hay .
   *MOT: no she doesn’t .
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15 In analyzing children’s spontaneous production of any, I excluded two-word utterances containing any, 
as the issue was whether children could produce grammatical, licensed instances of any; I thus did not 
count such examples, since in many cases, (i) it was impossible to determine what the intended meaning 
was (and therefore what, if anything, was licensing any); (ii) we wanted to make sure children were capa-
ble of producing full sentences containing any. The examples in (4c) and (5b) however involve apparently 
elided material whose meaning is easy to reconstruct given the linguistic antecedents in the immediately 
preceding utterances; thus I have included these in our discussion. 
   *MOT: she eats anything and everything, doesn’t she ? (Transcript 66, Line 794)
  d. *MOT: they’ll eat the horse .
   *MOT: they’ll eat anything they can . (Transcript 109, Line 1450)
   *CHI: why’ve we got to shut that bit ?
   *MOT: so that the lions don’t get out and eat everyone .
  e. *CHI: I don’t like the water on me .
   *MOT: there .
   *MOT: now any water will go on the cushion . (Transcript 116, Line 985)
   *MOT: not on you .
Beyond evidence for licensing of any, we might  expect  to find evidence for the quantificational force of any: 
existential on NPI uses and universal on FC uses. The examples in (2)-(5) are again relevant. In order to un-
derstand what NPI any contributes to the truth conditions of a sentence in which it appears, for example, 
what the child needs to learn is to interpret  it  as an existential within the scope of negation. Crucially, the 
successful acquisition of this meaning is reliant on sentence-meaning pairs, i.e. hearing the sentence uttered 
in a situation that  makes the sentence true. For example, Abe’s father presumably uttered (2a) in a context 
where there truly was no hot chocolate. Abe would have had to be able to perceive the truth of the assertion 
in the absence of the hot chocolate. Likewise, we assume that Lara’s mother uttered (2e) in a situation where 
Lara in fact  did not have shoes on. Assuming (that  children assume that) parents utter their sentences truth-
fully, the child must be able to glean the meaning of any in the scope of negation by interpreting these sen-
tences in the relevant contexts, thus deriving the appropriate truth conditions.16 The cases of FC any are con-
siderably more subtle, given the modal meanings that accompany them. Certainly to map FC any to an exis-
tential quantifier scoping under the modal in the cases in (4) and (5) would yield rather strange results;  these 
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16 Another prerequisite is that children have some notion of DEness in place. The input provides positive 
evidence of any in the scope of DE operators, but it does not provide explicit evidence of what a DE infer-
ence is, or how to distinguish DE from non-DE operators. See Gualmini and Crain (2002) for claims that 
children do not in fact need to learn downward entailment (i.e. they have innate knowledge of the logical 
property of downward entailment). 
are contexts where the parents seem to be making generalized, universal claims.17 Presumably with the help 
of the larger situational context in which these sentences are uttered, the child arrives at  the universal mean-
ing of any in these modal contexts. In (5d) for example, when the mother says that they have to try to pre-
vent  the lions from eating anything they can, the context (along with knowledge of what  the modals in the 
sentence mean) should direct  the child to the intensionality of any: no individuals have yet  been eaten, and 
they are trying to prevent all of the animals in the context from potentially being eaten. Thus relying on these 
sentence-meaning pairs in context might  well lead the child to infer that  any quantifies over a (wide) set  of 
possible individuals.18 
3.2 The Gap Between the Input and the Target (Poverty of the Stimulus)
So far, we have seen that  the input provides unambiguous evidence for the fact that any has a restricted dis-
tribution (i.e. to its DE and modal licensing contexts). It  is perhaps not surprising then that 3- and 4-year-old 
children can restrict  any to the scope of operators like negation in both their production and comprehension. 
But  let us now turn our attention to the semantic dimension of any, namely to the properties that  we tested in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
 Most 4-year-olds on Experiment 2 were sensitive to any’s subdomain alternatives, and interpreted any as 
quantifying over the largest domain alternative in the context; that  is, in the same experimental contexts, 
children interpreted any as quantifying more widely than plain indefinites. In order to succeed on this task, 
children first  need to know that  any’s alternatives include subdomain alternatives; on top of this, they need 
to know how to exhaustify these alternatives; finally, to quantify as “widely” as possible, they also need to 
know how to contrast any’s domain with alternative domains in the context. What  evidence in the input 
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17 Note also that the evidence should indicate the difference between any and every; under Dayal’s analysis, 
any is crucially different from every in that it quantifies over possible individuals; this seems to be apparent  
in the characterizing modal statement in (5c), which contains both anything and everything, hinting at the 
subtle difference between the two.
18 I would nevertheless expect the intensionality of FC any to make the learning task more difficult (than 
the task of inferring the existential meaning of any under negation).
could lead the child to these three ingredients? Consider again the parental samples of NPI any, repeated 
below:
(6) a. *FAT:  we don’t have any hot chocolate . (Kuczaj, Transcript 118, Line 19)
  b. *FAT: we didn’t get you any new socks . (Kuczaj, Transcript 166, Line 448)
  c. *FAT: I don’t think we have any more . (Kuczaj, Transcript 110, Line 619)
  d. *MOT: he hasn’t got any feet . (Lara, Transcript 98, Line 559)
  e. *MOT: Lara hasn’t got any shoes on . (Lara, Transcript 100, Line 252)
  f. *MOT: you don’t need any more . (Lara, Transcript 119, Line 3621)
(7) a. *FAT: I don’t think that there’s anything cooking in that pan (.) Abe . (Kuczaj, Transcript 23, Line 53)
  b. *FAT:  I don’t think we have any honey (.) Abe . (Kuczaj, Transcript 182, Line 308)
  c. *MOT: I don’t think anybody can really . (Lara, Transcript 101, Line 8953)
It  is not  immediately clear to me how such examples indicate that any’s alternatives are subdomain alterna-
tives. Of course, we can imagine the subdomain alternatives that might  be active in the utterances; in (6a) for 
example, Abe’s father could be saying that they don’t have any kinds of hot  chocolate -- not  the one Abe 
usually drinks at  home, or the one that Abe usually drinks at his grandparents’, or the kind he once drank at 
school. But there is nothing in the utterance itself that  forces this interpretation, and in fact, it’s not immedi-
ately clear what prevents the child from simply interpreting any as a (or the entire noun phrase as a bare 
noun hot chocolate). So while it’s possible (and in fact, necessary, on Chierchia’s account) that  any always 
activates subdomain alternatives, the sentences themselves do not  force these subdomain alternatives to be 
salient, and they certainly don’t force the child (in any obvious way) to adopt the hypothesis that any’s alter-
natives are in fact, subdomain alternatives. In other words, it  isn’t  at  all clear how these examples in the in-
put are informative regarding the nature of any’s alternatives.
 The kind of evidence that  would be informative regarding the nature of any’s (subdomain) alternatives 
would, I believe, be the same kind of evidence that  would be informative about any’s potential for domain 
widening. It  is precisely those contexts containing salient  subdomain alternatives that would allow for con-
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trastive focus on any; parental productions that  involve contrasting the larger domain of any with more re-
stricted domains in the context  would cue the child into: (i) the fact  that  any can activate a set  of subdomain 
alternatives, and (ii) the fact  that  when there are more restricted domains available in the context, any yields 
the familiar domain widening effect. What would this evidence look like? Consider the following (hypo-
thetical) examples:
(8) a. I don’t have a crayon.
  b. I don’t have any crayon.
  c. I don’t have ANY crayon!
The difference between (8a) and (8b,c) is the widening that  is possible in (8b) and certainly present in (8c). 
The use of any triggers a set  of subdomain alternatives which need to be exhaustified;19 if there are salient 
subdomains in the context, we will get the widened interpretation, according to which the claim that  the 
speaker doesn’t have a crayon is meant  to apply to even exceptional instances of what  might count as a 
crayon. How obvious is this kind of widening in the examples of any in the input? Consider these examples 
from Lara’s mother:
 
(9) *MOT: we haven’t got any seeds . (Lara, Transcript 111, Line 1354)
(10) *MOT: I don’t know any Harrys . (Lara, Transcript 115, Line 497)
It’s not immediately clear how the child could learn, just by hearing (9), the contrast between it and the 
statements We haven’t got a seed or We haven’t got seeds, and likewise for the difference between (10) and 
the statement  I don’t know a Harry. It’s generally not clear from the transcripts whether the children hear 
131
19 If there are no salient subdomains, exhaustification will be vacuous, and the statement will amount to a 
run-of-the-mill negative existential statement.
utterances like (8c), where stress on any might offer a more salient indicator of widening.20 One might imag-
ine that another possible kind of evidence that might helpfully indicate the widening properties of any could 
be the explicit  use of even focus on some element that might  be considered exceptional to the domain, as 
seen in the following hypothetical examples:
 
(11) I don’t have any crayons, not even a fake plastic one.
(12) I don’t have any money, not even a penny.
(13) I don’t like ANY clowns, not even cartoon ones.
Note however that even regular indefinites can co-occur with such indicators of widening or exhaustivity:
(14) I don’t have crayons, not even a fake plastic one.
(15) I don’t have money, not even a penny.
(16) I don’t like clowns, not even cartoon ones.
Given that the overt marker of exhaustive widening is not unique to any, it’s not entirely clear that  instances 
like (11)-(13) would actually be helpful in highlighting the domain widening induced by any. Even if these 
were hypothetically useful, we observe that of the 130 utterances of any produced by Abe’s father, and the 
428 utterances of any produced by Lara’s mother, there is not a single instance akin to the examples in (11)-
(13). We do find however, one example that may hint at domain exhaustivity, from Abe’s father:21
(17) *FAT: you mean you didn’t do anything at all all day long ?  (Abe, Transcript 75, Line 218)
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20 Of course we’ll recall that neither Kadmon and Landman nor Chierchia claim that stress is required for 
widening. On Chierchia’s account, contrastive focus is required. But for the child, presumably prosodic 
salience would provide a much stronger cue to widening than an unstressed any, even if there were domain 
alternatives floating around in the context.
21 And in fact this one example is complicated by the fact that at all is itself considered an NPI.
Examples such as (17) might in principle be helpful for pointing out the exhaustive nature of the widened 
domain, though it’s unclear how useful they are in practice given that  we found only one instance across all 
of Abe’s father’s uses of any (and none across Lara’s mother’s). If the domain widening properties of any are 
to be gleaned from the linguistic context  in which any appears, namely those contexts which also include 
some overt  marker of exhaustivity such as at all, we might  expect such markers to occur more frequently 
than they apparently do.   
 To ensure that the lack of explicit evidence tying any to (even a potential for) domain widening is not  
restricted to the three parents’ whose speech we’ve examined, let me briefly provide further evidence for the 
paucity of evidence we are dealing with, from a greater set  of parental speech samples. In addition to the 
three longitudinal corpora we have already discussed, I also examined caregiver productions of any in the 
Warren corpus (also available on the CHILDES database), which contains 20 files, each a transcript of a 
play session involving a child interacting first with one parent  and then with the other.22 Although this cor-
pus contains less data per parent, it provides data from 20 different mothers and 20 different  fathers. Using 
the CLAN program, I was able to isolate 29 different instances of NPI any. Of these, only one could argua-
bly provide evidence for domain widening:
(18) *MOT: no , the rabbit is silent .
   *CHI: only they can make rabbit noise .
   *MOT: well , what kind of rabbit noise ?
   *CHI: oo !
   *MOT: no , I don’t think the rabbit makes any noise . 
(Warren corpus, George transcript, Line 456)
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22 According to the CHILDES database manual entry for the Warren corpus, all children were from white, 
middle-class, nonprofessional families. Ten of the transcripts are from the younger group of children (1;06-
3;01) and ten are from the older group (4;06-6;02). Each session with mother or father lasted from 15-30 
minutes. Given each child conversed for at least half an hour, the data cover a minimal (total) timeframe of 
10 hours of transcribed speech.
This example is quite like the theoretical ones that we are familiar with, and we can easily apply Chierchia’s 
analysis to explain the widening effect. Salient  in the discourse context is the restriction of the domain of 
quantification to noises made by rabbits; the any-statement can be seen as invoking a contrast between this 
previously restricted domain of rabbit  noises, and a larger domain containing non-rabbit noises. It is this 
contrast that gives us the strengthening effect of the mother’s assertion. 
 While this example may be reason for some optimism, consider the following. Of the 577 instances of 
NPI any across the Lara, Kuczaj, and Warren corpora combined, we found only two instances of apparent 
widening like that in (18): this amounts to roughly 0.35% of NPI any that  explicitly demonstrates domain 
widening. Contrast  this with the 431 instances of NPI any occurring in the scope of sentential negation. In 
other words, while 75% of instances of NPI any provide evidence that any is licensed in the scope of nega-
tion, a mere 0.35% provide evidence of domain widening. What  I want  to emphasize here is the overwhelm-
ing imbalance in the nature of the evidence for the different  dimensions of any. It  is not at  all clear that  there 
is evidence in the input explicitly tying any to domain widening.
 The reader might object that  some of the cases of FC any reviewed in this section could also provide 
evidence for widening; in fact, it  seems that  there are more clear cases of contrastively focused FC any than 
contrastively focused NPI any. The following examples from the Kuczaj and Lara corpora seem particularly 
relevant:
(19)a. *FAT: okay (.) Abe look you put this on the paper then you keep the pencil against the edge 
   of this and draw see (.) then you end up with a animal .
   *CHI: what animal ?
   *FAT: any animal that you want . (Kuczaj corpus, Transcript 12, Line 169)
  b. *FAT: why don’t you tell me a story?
   *CHI: what kind of story?
   *FAT: any kind . (Kuczaj corpus, Transcript 130, Line 587)
  c. *MOT: you’re supposed to just guess .
   *MOT: just pick one .
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   *MOT: any one . (Lara corpus, Transcript 53, Line 762)
   *DAD: <pick a> [/] pick a card .
   *DAD: any card . (Lara corpus, Transcript 53, Line 764)
 
In (19a), Abe questions what kind of story he should tell, and we can imagine that the wh-indefinite comes 
with a contextual domain restriction, e.g., to the typical kinds of stories that  Abe and his father are used to 
telling, or to the kinds of stories that his father usually likes to hear, let’s say; Abe’s father’s use of any seems 
to invite a widening of this domain, such that Abe is free to choose any kind of story he desires, even if out-
side of the typical domain. (19b) is similar in this respect. The contrast in the wider domain of any with a 
previously restricted domain is even clearer in (19c), where Lara’s father’s use of any immediately follows 
up on an imperative containing the plain indefinite a. 
 We should therefore add such FC examples as well to our collection of evidence that  potentially ties any 
to domain widening. But even with the addition of such examples, recall that  Abe’s father’s set  of transcripts 
and Lara’s mother’s set  of transcripts each contained only 5 instances of FC any overall. This makes it  very 
difficult to hinge (the child’s making) the connection to domain widening on evidence from FC any.
 Finally, it  is not entirely clear what evidence would be required to lead the child to the ability to compute 
FCIs from any in modal statements (as they were shown to be able to do on Experiment  3). The FCI is what 
underlies the ‘freedom of choice’ meaning of any, and the examples in (19) of course express freedom of 
choice; the question is how the child figures this out. An example like (19a), which makes explicit reference 
to the addressee’s desires might  perhaps be the most  salient indicator of the addressee’s ‘freedom of choice’, 
since it directly involves the child’s making a choice. But  it’s very difficult to say how the child pieces to-
gether the mechanics of FCIs from the evidence available in the input. What in the input could tell the child 
that she must consider pre-exhaustified alternatives in the case of FC any? What tells the child how to ex-
haustify with respect  to these pre-exhaustified alternatives? The answer to such questions is not  at  all clear 
from our examination of the parental speech samples. Moreover, even if we could identify the relevant  cues 
in the examples we have seen, recall that FC any is not very frequent in the parental speech. While it  might 
be sufficient  to indicate to the child that FC any is possible in modal contexts, it’s not clear to me whether 
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the examples are abundant  enough to allow the child to derive the kind of sophisticated semantic knowledge 
that was required for success on Experiment 3. If the 4-year-olds we tested did not have this knowledge, i.e. 
if they had failed to compute the relevant FCIs, they would have provided non-target  truth value responses. 
Yet recall that the children performed at 95% accuracy.  
 In summary, while the input provides unambiguous evidence for the restricted distribution of any, as 
well as for its licensers, it is not quite so clear what  evidence allows children to pick up on its particular se-
mantics, which ultimately gives rise to domain widening and FCIs of the kind we saw in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Table 2 summarizes the list of target properties and whether we can find evidence for them in the input.
Table 2. Input vs. target
Target property Evidenced in the 
input
Syntactic category/distribution yes
Quantificational force yes
Licensing condition (DE restriction) yes
Domain widening: Activation of subdomain alternatives with contrastive focus ?
NPI any: Exhaustification of alternatives ?
FC any: Pre-exhaustification of domain alternatives ?
4.  Solving the Learning Problem
We have now identified the learning problem that is posed by any to the child learner. By the age of 4, chil-
dren show extremely sophisticated knowledge of the semantic properties and semantic operations associated 
with any, which allows them to produce and comprehend any (on its NPI and FC uses) in an adult-like way. 
Yet  there is little to no explicit  evidence in the input  that  ties any to these particular semantic operations. 
How then, can we explain how the child arrives at the target grammar? In this section, I propose that  chil-
dren do not have to learn these semantic properties and operations per se, from evidence in the input. Rather, 
they must use the distributional information that is available in the input to guide their choice from among a 
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constrained hypothesis space of indefinite types. The child’s task as a learner is therefore not to “search” for 
evidence of domain widening or recursive exhaustification per se; rather the child must  pay attention to the 
distribution of the indefinite in the input, and on the basis of this information, map any to the right  category 
of indefinite (among a set  of restricted options). I will argue that the evidence from the parental input  we 
have examined thus far is sufficient (or rather, must be sufficient) to allow children to make this choice.
4.1 An Innately Constrained Hypothesis Space: Chierchia’s Typology
To solve the learning problem that  we’ve raised, I’ll suggest  that  what we need to do is take a step back and 
look at  how any fits into the cross-linguistic typology of PSIs. Up to this point, I have been pinpointing very 
specific aspects of Chierchia’s proposal that successfully capture the behaviour of NPI and FC any; but in 
fact, one of the greatest merits of the proposal is that the analysis extends beyond any to PSIs across lan-
guages. So let us take a step back and look at the range of indefinite types across languages. 
 First, it is insightful to consider the historical evolution of any, which suggests the formation of related 
classes of indefinites. Chierchia discusses how the Proto-Indo-European oinos ‘one-like’ (literally one plus 
an adjectival ending), evolved into different  kinds of indefinites in different  languages. In German, oinos 
evolved into einig-, a plain indefinite. In English, it  evolved into NPI any (around the 16th century), only 
later becoming ambiguous between NPI and FC any in Modern English. In Italian on the other hand, oinos 
evolved into alcuno/alcuni, a pure NPI in the singular form, but  plain indefinite in the plural form. This is 
summarized in Fig. 1.
137
 Fig. 1: Evolution of any (Chierchia, 2013)
Chierchia suggests that these different indefinite types correspond to contiguous grammatical classes that 
can shift from one to another. Chierchia’s theory derives the distribution/behaviour of PSIs by allowing free 
variation along two particular dimensions: (i) the kinds of alternatives that the polarity-sensitive terms acti-
vate, and (ii) the possible modes of exhaustification, i.e. the ways in which these alternatives get factored 
into the meanings of the sentences that  contain them. His full typology is provided in Table 3; note however 
that I will only focus on the part of the typology that is relevant for our present discussion of any.
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Table 3. Chierchia’s theory-driven typology
Modes of exhaustification
Types of alternatives Weak Strong
Degree-alternatives 
(emphatic NPIs)
E
koii bhii, ek bhii, give a damn
ES
sleep a wink
Simple D-alternatives + σ-
alternatives (pure NPIs)
O
ever, mai, alcun
OS
in weeks, N-words
Exhaustified D-alternatives 
+ rich scale (Total variation 
∃-FC) 
O
irgendein, un qualsiasi NP 
(total ∃-FCI/NPI)
OS   
?
OPS
un NP qualsiasi, 
un oarecare, un 
quelconque
(total pure ∃-FCI)
Exhaustified singleton D-
alternatives + rich scale 
(partial variation ∃-FC)
O 
irgendein
(partial ∃-FCI/
NPI without 
anti total 
variation)
OATV
vreun
(partial ∃-FCI/
NPI with anti 
total variation)
OPS 
un qualche
(partial pure ∃-
FCI without 
anti total varia-
tion)
OPSATV
?
(partial pure ∃-FCI 
with anti total 
variation)
Exhaustified D-alternatives 
+ reduced scale (∀-FCI)
O  
any
∀-FCI/NPI
OS 
?
OPS 
qualsiasi
(pure ∀-FCI)
(Chierchia, 2013:367, Ex.112)
Along the first dimension, we find two kinds of alternatives: domain alternatives and degree alternatives. 
PSIs that activate domain alternatives include any, and are exhaustified via a covert  only-like operator (O) 
(as we saw in Chapter 2). PSIs that  are associated with degree alternatives, e.g., alternatives that  can be 
aligned along a scale of degrees are called emphatic NPIs, and include English give a damn; these are ex-
haustified via a covert  even-like operator (E). The E-operator requires that  the assertion be the least  likely 
among the alternatives (with likelihood defined in terms of entailment). The least likely alternative is the 
strongest, as it entails all other alternatives. This is represented as follows:
(20) p⊳c q if p→q and qp (p is less likely than q iff p entails q and q does not entail p)
(Nicolae, 2012:235) 
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Next, within the group of PSIs that activate domain alternatives, we see variation in whether or not  the PSI 
tolerates pre-exhaustified alternatives. Those that do not tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives, like ever, are 
so-called “pure NPIs”, and only appear in the typical NPI licensing/DE contexts. PSIs that  do tolerate pre-
exhaustified alternatives however, like any, additionally exhibit the FC effect in certain modal contexts. 
 Along the second dimension, there are essentially two modes of exhaustification: weak and strong. 
Weak exhaustification only takes into account  truth-conditional meanings, while strong exhaustification in-
volves enriched meanings (i.e. truth conditions along with implicatures and presuppositions). The further 
distinctions made within the various subclasses of PSIs are not  immediately relevant for our current pur-
poses. It suffices here to note that  fully exploiting the possible variation along the two dimensions yields a 
typology of 14 different  kinds of PSIs.23 And herein lies our solution to the learning problem: the learner’s 
task can now be thought of as navigating this typological space, making a finite set of decisions to arrive at 
the target PSI, as symbolized in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Simplified representation of the target within Chierchia’s typology
Put very simply, the idea is the following. We can mitigate the learning problem by invoking a restricted hy-
pothesis space: the child only has to entertain a limited set of options. The child does not have to learn that 
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23 In fact, Chierchia refers to it as a generative matrix, rather than merely a descriptive typology. We expect 
to be able to fill out all of the cells of the table with cross-linguistic data. There remains some work to be 
done in this respect.
subdomain alternatives (and pre-exhaustified alternatives) exist. The child does not  have to learn how to ac-
tivate subdomain alternatives, or that  there exist different  modes of exhaustification that “use up” these al-
ternatives, nor does the child need to learn how to exhaustify these alternatives. All of these semantic 
mechanisms of interpretation come for free. Restricted variation with respect to these mechanisms means 
that only a finite set  of possible PSIs can be generated; this in turn means that  the child need only entertain a 
restricted hypothesis space. The child’s learning task is reduced to mapping any to the right  category among 
a restricted set of options.
 In our discussion of the ingredients that  would in principle be required to generate the target-like per-
formance that we observed in Experiments 2 and 3, we posited that the child would need to learn that any 
activates subdomain alternatives, that these alternatives must be exhaustified via an only-like operator, and 
that these alternatives can be pre-exhaustified, giving rise to FC effects. But  we’ve now seen that the input 
does not  provide direct/explicit positive evidence for these semantic mechanisms. What the input  does pro-
vide evidence of is the dual nature of any, namely that  it  is the type of PSI that oscillates between NPI and 
FC uses. In other words, the child receives evidence for any’s restricted distribution. I propose that this is 
precisely what the child needs to map any to the right  category within the typology. The strongest cue that 
children receive with respect to any is its unique distributional pattern; given the paucity of the input regard-
ing the specific semantic mechanisms underlying any, this distributional pattern must be sufficient to allow 
the child to map any to the target PSI.24 
 I should be very clear here that  I am not claiming that  there is no learning involved in the acquisition of 
any. It  is not the case that  the child’s grammar comes pre-equipped with knowledge of any. Rather, the 
grammar provides the child with a set  of semantic mechanisms required to construct  appropriate meanings, 
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24 It may seem as though there are two independent ingredients required to solve the learning problem: (i) a 
restricted hypothesis space and (ii) innate semantic mechanisms like exhaustification. In fact, they are in-
separable. On Chierchia’s account, these semantic mechanisms (and the variation that they can give rise to) 
are what derive the typology, i.e. the child’s restricted hypothesis space on our proposal. Thus it is impossi-
ble to have one without the other. Children start off with innate semantic mechanisms which can only gen-
erate a restricted set of PSI possibilities. They then have to map any to the target PSI among these possibili-
ties. In other words, the innate mechanisms derive the typology, rather than the other way around; children 
do not start with an arbitrary set of possibilities and then derive the mechanisms on the basis of this arbi-
trary set.
e.g., the ability to activate and exhaustify alternatives. As a consequence of these semantic mechanisms (and 
the variation they can give rise to), the grammar thus constrains the options that are available to the child, 
since only a finite set  of PSI types can possibly be generated. What  the child then has to do is map a particu-
lar surface string in the input  to a semantically rich, innately constrained PSI category.  In the next  section, I 
will speculate about how the child might use the distributional pattern to lead to a particular cell within the 
typology.
4.2 The Mapping Task
The basic idea of the proposal in this section is very simple. Assuming PSIs can vary with respect  to the 
types of alternatives that they activate, and the modes of exhaustification that  are available, acquiring a par-
ticular PSI amounts to choosing the right  setting along each dimension. The learning task reduces to map-
ping a particular word or string, to the right PSI within the typology of restricted options, on the basis of its 
unique distributional pattern. 
 Note however that  reducing the hypothesis space is not particularly revealing about how the mapping 
task actually takes place. Navigating within the set of possible options in order to narrow down the possibili-
ties to just the target category is not a trivial task. But we do know one thing about the evidence that the 
child uses, which is almost  tautological in its simplicity: the child must  make use of the evidence that  is 
available to her; after all, this is all the help she will get  from the input. Given the ingredients of Chierchia’s 
typology and the way that the two parameters interact, there are minimally two questions that the learner 
must answer for any given PSI. First, does the PSI in question activate degree alternatives or domain alterna-
tives? Second, does the PSI in question tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives? Let us consider how the map-
ping task might  work for just one slice of the typology, so that we can highlight  both the kinds of decisions 
the learner has to make and the kinds of evidence that would in principle be informative for making these 
decisions. 
 Consider the following, very restricted partial typology that will suffice for the purposes of illustrating 
the mapping task:
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Table 4. Partial typology of polarity-sensitive items (partial representation of Chierchia’s typology)
Types of alternatives Mode of exhaustification: Weak
Degree-alternatives (emphatic NPIs) E (e.g., English give a damn, Hindi koii bhii, ek bhii)
Simple domain alternatives and scalar 
alternatives (pure NPIs) O (e.g., English ever, Italian alcun)
Exhaustified domain alternatives (∀-FCI) O  (∀-FCI/NPI, e.g., English any)
Recall that PSIs like any activate domain alternatives; moreover, these alternatives are exhaustified by 
means of a covert O-operator. Emphatic NPIs and minimizers like English give a damn, sleep a wink, etc., 
on the other hand, activate degree alternatives. These alternatives are exhaustified by the E-operator, requir-
ing the assertion be the least likely (and the strongest). Now imagine a toy learning situation where a child 
acquiring English must  figure out  whether a particular PSI she is hearing in the input  corresponds to the give 
a damn, ever, or any category of PSI. The child must make the following decisions:
Fig. 3: The learner’s decision tree
143
Recall the evidence that is available to the child, summarized in the following figure:
Fig. 4: Evidence available to the learner
The idea is that any informative cues from the input must be among the list in Fig. 4; that is, the child must 
use either all or a subset of the information in Fig. 4 in order to make the required decisions. Consider the 
first decision concerning the nature of the alternatives that the target PSI activates:
Fig. 5: Decision 1: The nature of the alternatives
The question is whether the target PSI is of the give a damn-type, which activates degree alternatives, or of 
the any/ever type, which activates domain alternatives. In this case, I suggest that contexts of use might pro-
vide one useful cue to the learner (there may of course be others). The contexts in which domain alternatives 
are relevant  (as in the case of the any/ever-type) are presumably different from the contexts in which degree 
alternatives are relevant  (as in the case of emphatic NPIs like give a damn). Domains are relevant for quanti-
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fying, while degrees are concerned with expectations about  likelihood of values on a scale. Contexts in 
which we quantify can be completely neutral without any bias or expectation (e.g., recall our example in 
which a person walks into a department store and asks if they sell any cameras), while contexts in which 
emphatic NPIs like drink a drop or give a damn, which involve knowledge of scales and likelihood of dif-
ferent values on a scale, are usually used in contexts where such scales are salient. A person who is asked at 
a bar whether she would like a drink typically does not  respond with, “I won’t  drink a drop.” Thus a learner 
who has sufficient semantic knowledge to construe intended meanings in any given discourse context  might 
be able to pay attention to what  is at issue in the context, and consequently construe the appropriate mean-
ings that are relevant for domain-PSIs vs. degree-PSIs.25 
 Now let  us assume that  the child has decided that  the target PSI is not the emphatic minimizer type but 
rather the any/ever type, which activates domain alternatives. The learning task is still not complete, because 
the child has yet to determine whether the target PSI is a pure NPI without  FC uses (i.e. ever in English) or 
one which oscillates between the two (i.e. any in English): 
Fig. 6: Decision 2: Tolerance for pre-exhaustified alternatives
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25 I leave open the question of whether the child would have to have an innate sensitivity to the difference 
between neutral and negatively biased contexts, or could learn such a distinction simply by paying atten-
tion to different conversational contexts. 
Recall that  the input  provides evidence for any’s particular (restricted) distribution, i.e. to DE and FC/modal 
contexts. Here is where I suggest  the distributional information that  children receive about any may be abso-
lutely critical in leading the child to map any to the right  category within the typology. The distributional 
information may help in (at least) two ways. 
 First, the learner could make use of information about the syntactic distribution of the PSI in question. 
Assuming that  the learner could map distributional information to a syntactic category, the syntactic cate-
gory of a given PSI could guide her to the target PSI within the typology. Syntactic category for example, 
distinguishes adverbial PSIs from quantificational ones. As far as I know, there are no known adverbial PSIs 
that tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives, i.e. there are no “free choice” adverbial PSIs. If the learner could 
pay attention to the syntactic environments in which the relevant PSI appeared, i.e. to the PSI’s syntactic 
distribution, she might  be able to infer its syntactic category, and this syntactic category could help to narrow 
down the possible options.
 Second, the learner could pay attention to the semantic/logical properties of the environments in which 
the PSI appeared. A PSI like ever, which does not tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives, has a distribution 
distinct  from that  of a PSI like any, which does tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives. We know that any is 
restricted to two kinds of environments: the scope of DE operators, and modal (FC) environments. PSIs like 
ever on the other hand are restricted to DE environments. This kind of distributional difference between the 
two could be informative, provided the learner was sensitive to it. 
 Yet  another way in which the distribution might be informative lies in the relative frequencies of the at-
tested environments. Any appears in DE and FC environments at  particular frequencies in the input, which, 
incidentally, were fairly similar across the three parental speech samples we examined. If two PSIs in the 
typology differ categorically in the environments in which they appear, this in principle should make it eas-
ier to tease the two apart on the basis of distributional information. But  even if they overlap in their licensing 
environments, they might differ in the relative frequencies at  which they appear in the overlapping environ-
ments. Any for example shows up in its ‘NPI’ environments 96-99% of the time, while ever should show up 
in such environments 100% of the time. The evidence we’ve examined cannot tell us whether this is suffi-
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cient  to allow the learner to distinguish the two categories, but my suggestion is that it  is one logically possi-
ble cue for the learner, given that it is available in the input. 
 To summarize, if any aspect  of the acquisition of the semantics of polarity sensitivity is to be derived 
from the input, the relevant information must be observable in the input, whether it  takes the form of qualita-
tive or quantitative information. 
 Note that the present proposal requires that  the learner go into the learning task ‘looking for’ certain 
kinds of information. To distinguish contexts in which degree alternatives are relevant from contexts in 
which domain alternatives are relevant for example, the learner has to be sensitive to the difference between 
biased and neutral contexts in which the two kinds of alternatives would be relevant. To use the varying dis-
tribution of any and ever in order to distinguish the two kinds of PSIs, the learner has to be aware of and 
sensitive to the difference between DE and non-DE environments. That is, the learner must be attuned to 
certain properties in the input, in order to use these properties as informative cues.26 
 Finally, whatever information is relevant, we expect  to find that  it is also useful for acquiring PSIs in 
other languages. In other words, the solution proposed here should not be restricted to English. Each PSI 
category in the typology should have its own unique, observable ‘signature’ in the input, whatever the nature 
of the signature, be it statistical or qualitative.
 
5.  Discussion
5.1 Predictions for the Journey to the Target PSI
One of the predictions of the proposal in Section 4 is that  children may make wayward choices on their way 
to the target PSI. Given the restricted hypothesis space, one might expect  to find children in various devel-
opmental stages where they have analyzed a given string as belonging to a non-target PSI category in the 
typology. In Chapter 3, I presented the results of Experiment 2, one of which was that some children did not 
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26 The goal here has been to identify, in principle, the potential cues that could be informative to the learner. 
The data we have reviewed so far cannot tell us which cues would in practice lead the learner to the target, 
or how strong each cue would have to be in order to be informative. It is my hope that identifying the po-
tential cues here will lead to further research that can more definitively characterize the exact learning path 
that the child learner takes.
correctly reject any-statements that  quantified too narrowly. While I speculated as to the status of the chil-
dren who did not  perform in an adult-like manner, let me now raise another possible way of looking at  that 
data. In addressing this point, I’ll attempt to simultaneously present  a prediction of the story presented in 
Section 4. 
 If, as proposed in Section 4, the child’s task as a learner is to map the PSI they hear to the right PSI cate-
gory within the typology, we might expect that children can go through developmental stages during which 
they temporarily map the PSI to the wrong category. In such a stage, we would nevertheless expect  that  the 
(non-target) representation should correspond to one of the other possible options within the restricted typol-
ogy. Given the assumption that the semantic mechanisms and operations underlying these PSIs are innate, 
there is only a finite set of options available to the child. Might our little “non-wideners” have been stuck on 
an intermediate choice, on the way to the target any?
 I suggest that  the answer might be yes, but  only if we invoke one further detail of the typology. Recall 
from Fig. 1 that the PSI any evolved from the Proto-Indo-European word for one, which evolved into the 
non-polarity-sensitive plain indefinite einig- in German, but  into an NPI in English. On Chierchia’s account, 
this split  can be represented in terms of a lexical stipulation on the relevant indefinite’s features: any ac-
quired a focal feature that requires obligatory exhaustification of alternatives, while plain indefinites only 
optionally activate these alternatives.27 If we consider non-polarity-sensitive plain indefinites to be yet  an-
other possible indefinite “type” or category to map to (perhaps envisioned as a cell adjacent to the PSI ty-
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27 This dissertation is decidedly not a study of the historical development of any. It would nevertheless be 
interesting to compare children’s development of any with the historical development of any. Chierchia’s 
story of the switch from NPI to FC item treats the change as a switch in a feature/parameter specification, 
namely in whether the PSI allowed recursive exhaustification of its alternatives. This switch from NPI-only 
uses to NPI/FC uses is particularly striking in light of the fact that the emergence of FC any appears to be 
significantly later than the emergence of NPI any in children’s spontaneous production. Within the same 
perspective, we might say that children initially treat any as disallowing recursive exhaustification of alter-
natives. This would crucially correspond to an allowed option within the typology of possible PSI types. 
Perhaps, given the relatively low frequency of FC any in the parental input, it simply takes longer for chil-
dren to ascertain that any is indeed a PSI that allows for recursive exhaustification of its alternatives. A fu-
ture study could investigate the parallel between the historical development and the child’s development of 
the polarity sensitivity system more generally (beyond the specific example of any). In this respect, it 
would also be worth comparing the historical evolution of PSIs in other languages with the acquisition of 
these items in those languages. 
pology), we might also expect  children to consider this category as an option.28 Of course, plain indefinites 
are not  subject  to the licensing conditions that PSIs are; this means that  if a child has incorrectly mapped any 
to a non-PSI (thus giving rise to the inappropriate domain restriction observed in the non-wideners), the 
same child could be expected not  to restrict any to the scope of appropriate licensers. For all intents and pur-
poses, the child would be expected to treat  any as a. Unfortunately, without production and comprehension 
data from the same child, we cannot definitively answer this. 
 Whatever the status of the non-wideners, i.e. whether the performance factor explanation in Chapter 3 is 
right, or the possibility raised here is right, the typological account proposed in Section 4 does predict that 
children may go through stages where they map an indefinite to a non-target  category. A challenge of testing 
this prediction is that the semantic knowledge that we would want  to test  for is rather sophisticated, and 
given our children performed well by 4 or 5 years of age, it’s not  clear whether we could gather parallel data 
from younger children.  
5.2 Implications of the Universal Account of FC any
Chierchia’s view of the NPI/FC any dichotomy can viewed as a unified account. It’s worth considering how 
a non-unified account would fit with the acquisition data. Under a universal account of FC any for example, 
such as Dayal (1998, 2011), FC any is a(n intensional) universal quantifier distinct from NPI any. Recall that 
FC any showed up very infrequently in the parental speech (1.17-3.92% of all occurrences of any, in the 
three samples that we examined). On such an account, child must learn FC any independently of NPI any. 
The infrequency of FC any makes the learning problem that we have outlined for any all the more difficult. 
In Abe’s father’s sample for example, there were only a total of five instances of FC any. The learning prob-
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28 If we consider the plain indefinite as a contiguous class, we might be able to explain examples of true 
production errors (unlicensed any): such errors might be indicative of the child struggling to determine that 
any is not just a plain indefinite but rather a PSI within the typology. The child data might well mirror the 
historical evolution of the item itself (plain indefinite>>NPI>>FC). The robustness of evidence of licens-
ing of any might be what leads the child away from unlicensed any relatively early on (recall that there was 
in fact very little evidence of an error-prone developmental stage). In contrast, there is much less evidence 
for FC any, so it takes more time for the child to decide that any also has FC uses; thus FC any emerges 
significantly later than NPI any. 
lem that we outlined for any would be considerably exacerbated if the child had to learn all of the semantics 
from the very few instances of FC any in the input. 
 The reader may notice that there is a very subtle, underlying tension in our proposal here: the children 
have to hear enough FC any to recognize that it  has FC uses, and consequently, on the proposed account, to 
then map any to the kind of PSI that oscillates between the two uses (in other words, to distinguish it  from 
something like ever, which only has NPI uses). Yet  these very few instances of FC any in the input  seem 
insufficient  for the learner to acquire the specific semantic mechanisms underlying any. The input might  be 
enough for the child to derive a restricted distribution and perhaps to ascertain the target  quantificational 
force; but  given the overwhelming amount  of evidence for the narrow scope, existential interpretation of 
NPI any, we might expect  children to interpret any exclusively as an existential quantifier. Yet  Experiment  3 
shows that they’re able to do something much more than this. It  is extremely difficult to see how they could 
get to this target state on the basis of so few examples in the input.   
5.3 Extensions of the Exhaustification-Based System
One of the merits of the exhaustification-based system is that  it allows us to capture deep connections across 
different  kinds of PSIs, and moreover across different languages. Variation along the two dimensions we’ve 
mentioned can generate a particular finite set of possible PSIs (fourteen in Chierchia’s typology); but  others 
have since used the exhaustification-based semantics to make connections with yet  other PSIs, including 
positive polarity items (PPIs). PPIs are particularly relevant to acquisition, as children have been reported to 
have difficulties with such items. The next  subsection will therefore discuss an extension of the 
exhaustification-based system to PPIs, and its relationship with the child data. The second subsection will 
discuss how licensing of NPIs occurs in questions, again within the exhaustification-based framework; here 
too I will discuss a connection with child data.  
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5.3.1 An Extension to Positive Polarity Items
Positive polarity items (PPIs) like someone or something can only take wide scope with respect  to strongly 
negative elements such as clausal negation and negative quantifiers:
(20) I didn’t eat something
  a. There is a thing such that I didn’t eat it             ∃>¬
  b. *There is nothing that I ate               *¬>∃
PPIs have been of interest in child language because children appear to have difficulties with the scope re-
strictions of some. Musolino (1998) investigated the comprehension of sentences such as (21) in a context 
where the detective found two of four guys participating in the story. Musolino found that children as old as 
5;09 were non-adult-like in rejecting the sentence, i.e. they allowed a narrow scope reading of the existential 
quantifier.29  
(21) The detective didn’t find some guys
  a. There are some guys that the detective didn’t find
  b. It is not the case that the detective found any guys
Since Musolino’s original study, Gualmini (2004) has reported that  manipulating the experimental materials 
to increase compliance with felicity conditions on the test  sentences leads to improved performance. Chil-
dren’s reported difficulties with PPIs however are not  restricted to comprehension. Recall O’Leary and 
Crain’s (1994) elicited production study which found that children sometimes produced the sentence, ‘No, 
this dog did not get some food,’ where an adult would produce any. Looking to children’s spontaneous pro-
duction, it  is also possible to find examples of some in the scope of negation (where it  is interpreted on a par 
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29 The reader will recall Xiang et al.’s (2006) study which we reviewed in Chapter 3; these authors also 
found some proportion of narrow scope interpretation of some under negation.
with any under negation). The following examples are from Abe’s transcripts (Kuczaj corpus); (24) in par-
ticular may suggest that he has not entirely distinguished the two:
(22) Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 15 (age 2;06,14), Line 298
   *CHI: uhhuh momma (.) I don’t want any more milk don’t want any more milk .
   *MOT:  you don’t want any more milk today ?
   *CHI: uhuh (.) today don’t want some .
   *MOT:  okay (.) it’s up to you .
(23) Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 33 (age 2;08,25), Line 450
   *CHI: uhhuh I need some pennies I can’t get some I can’t get some .
(24) Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 33 (age 2;08,25), Line 684
   *FAT: Abe (.) I think you have enough pennies .
   *CHI: I saw some in there I didn’t get any some .
   *FAT: yes you did you have four pennies .
Yet  samples from the same corpus indicate that Abe is (eventually) able to use both lexical items (some and 
any) in an adult-like manner, and can even use both in the same utterance:
(25) Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 110 (age 3;06,16), Line 354
   *CHI: oh my throat is so thirsty I can’t eat any more cereal until I drink some milk (.) 
   so get me some milk now get me some milk now .
Although the nature of children’s difficulty with PPIs is not entirely clear, I’d like to suggest  that  there may 
lie an explanation of the any/some asymmetry within the exhaustification-based framework we’ve been 
adopting. 
 Nicolae (2012) proposes that  PPIs, like NPIs, also activate alternatives that  require exhaustification. In-
stead of activating subdomain alternatives as any does however, PPIs like some activate so-called super-
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domain alternatives, i.e. larger domains of quantification available in the context. Another difference be-
tween any and some is that whereas any’s alternatives are exhaustified by the O (only-like) operator, some’s 
super-domain alternatives are exhaustified via the E (even-like) operator. I briefly sketch the main idea of the 
analysis here (see Nicolae, 2012 for details). 
 Recall that the operator of choice for emphatic NPIs and minimizers like give a damn, sleep a wink, etc. 
is E, which requires that  the assertion be the least  likely among the alternatives (with likelihood defined in 
terms of entailment). The least likely alternative is the strongest, as it  entails all other alternatives. In the case 
of minimizer NPIs, Nicolae demonstrates that the requirements of the E operator are met in DE but  not in 
upward-entailing (UE) environments. Similarly to how O-exhaustification of any’s alternatives succeeds in 
DE environments but fails in UE environments, E-exhaustification of the degree alternatives likewise fails in 
UE environments but succeeds in DE environments. Without going into details, exhaustifying Mary slept a 
wink requires that the assertion that  Mary slept the minimal amount be the least  likely of the alternatives, 
entailing all alternative propositions according to which Mary slept  more than the minimal amount. This is 
clearly contradictory. On the other hand, exhaustifying Mary didn’t sleep a wink requires that  the assertion 
that Mary did not sleep the minimal amount be the least likely of the alternatives, i.e. the strongest. Since the 
scales are reversed, exhaustification succeeds; if Mary did not sleep the minimal amount, then she did not 
sleep for any amount greater than the minimal amount. 
 Crucially, because some-PPIs activate super-domain alternatives, we end up with the reverse situation: 
E-exhaustification succeeds in UE environments but  fails in DE environments. In an UE context, if some-
thing holds true of a domain, it  will also hold true of any super-domain. If John saw Bill or Mary, it is also 
true that  John saw Bill or Mary or Bob. Thus when we exhaustify with the E-operator in an UE context, the 
assertion will indeed entail all other alternatives. Nicolae formalizes the result of exhaustifying in UE and 
DE contexts as follows:
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(26) John saw someone[+DE] 
  a. Assertion: ∃x∈D[saw(John,x)] 
  b. Alternatives: {∃x∈D’[saw(John,x)]: D⊂D’} 
  c. E[DE] John saw someone[+DE] 
   = ∃x∈D[saw(John,x)] ∧ ∀D’⊃D [(∃x∈D [saw(John,x)]) ◁c (∃x∈D’ [saw(John,x)])]
(27) *John didn’t see someone[+DE].
  a. Assertion: ¬∃x∈D[saw(John,x)] 
  b. Alternatives: {¬∃x∈D’[saw(John,x)]: D⊂D’} 
  c. E[DE] John didn’t see someone[+DE] 
   = ¬∃x∈D[saw(John,x)] ∧ ∀D’⊃D [(¬∃x∈D [saw(John,x)]) ◁c (¬∃x∈D’ [saw(John,x)])] 
(Nicolae, 2012:235)
Now let  us return to the acquisition question. It  is reported that children have difficulties with the scope 
properties of PPIs but  not  of NPIs. In the exhaustification-based system, NPIs must appear in the scope of 
DE operators because these are the environments in which exhaustification is consistent; PPIs on the other 
hand must appear in UE environments because these are the environments in which exhaustification is con-
sistent. Within the typological proposal of Section 4, difficulties arise when children have not  yet  mapped a 
string to the target  PSI within the typology. The question becomes the following: why should mapping some 
to the right  PSI category be more challenging than mapping any to the target category? Here I suggest  three 
possible explanations for children’s difficulty with PPIs (compared to NPIs). These potential explanations lie 
in the key differences between the two kinds of items, within the exhaustification-based framework.
 First, any activates subdomain alternatives, while some activates super-domain alternatives. While there 
may not  be an a priori reason why one ought to be more difficult  than the other, no study to my knowledge 
has examined children’s sensitivity to super-domains. Experiments 2 and 3 of this dissertation are among the 
first attempts to experimentally probe children’s sensitivity to subdomain alternatives. It  remains an empiri-
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cal question whether children can likewise be shown to be sensitive to super-domain alternatives, and 
whether these might  pose more difficulty to children. Recall the kinds of experimental contexts we created 
in Experiments 2 and 3: domains of discourse containing six rabbits (in Experiment  3), or domains contain-
ing nine diamonds (in Experiment  2). In these cases, in order to identify subdomain alternatives, what the 
child has to do is identify “subkinds” of a type, i.e. more specific kinds of rabbits, or more specific kinds of 
diamonds. Now imagine if the child, rather than having to identify subkinds had to identify superordinate 
categories. In other words, given blue diamonds, the child to generalize to a larger class of diamonds of dif-
ferent colours, or if given a set  of small rabbits, the child had to identify a larger set  containing rabbits of 
different  sizes. It’s not clear whether one ought  to be more difficult than the other, but one could imagine that 
children’s conversations tend to revolve more around specific tokens rather than general kinds (i.e. Spot the 
dog rather than canines). I leave it open as an empirical question whether one can be shown to be more chal-
lenging than the other. In theory, a difference between sub- and super-domains could be behind the some/any 
asymmetry in child language.
  Another potential difference that could be behind the asymmetry is the nature of the exhaustification 
process. Recall that  exhaustification of any’s subdomain alternatives is carried out via the O-operator, while 
some’s super-domain alternatives are exhaustified via the E-operator. If we could experimentally determine 
that children perform better with O-exhaustification than E-exhaustification, this might  be suggestive that 
the asymmetry lies in the exhaustification process. It’s not entirely clear how one could compare children’s 
performance with these covert  operators, but one could easily look to children’s performance with the overt 
counterparts (which may not be identical, but  could serve as good approximations for our purposes). Kim 
(2011) in fact  investigates children’s performance with the English focus particles only and even and finds 
that children perform better on comprehension of only than even. This kind of data is exactly what would be 
required to more carefully investigate the hypothesis that the some/any asymmetry derives from an asymme-
try in children’s ability to perform O- vs. E-exhaustification.
 Finally, a reason that  the PPI some might be delayed relative to NPI any lies in an ambiguity of some. In 
English, some can also have an epistemic indefinite use:
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(28) Lisa married some student from the psychology department
Items such as some student give rise to ignorance inferences, signaling the speaker’s ignorance as to the 
identity of the relevant  object  (cf. Kratzer and Shimoyama, 2002; Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito, 2010; 
Fălăuş, 2010; Chierchia, 2011 for relevant  discussion). Although the two uses are semantically distinct, the 
overlap in surface form could result in some difficulty for children, who must sort  out  the different uses in 
the input.30 
 In sum, within the exhaustification-based framework pursued here, some and any differ in key ways, and 
any of these key differences may underlie the developmental asymmetry between some and any.
5.3.2 An Extension to NPIs in Questions
The exhaustification-based framework makes a straightforward extension to licensing in questions, and thus 
we can also discuss children’s acquisition of NPIs in questions within the same framework. Interrogatives 
have long been a thorn in the side of the DE account, because although they license weak NPIs like any and 
ever, they are not strictly speaking DE. Polar questions (root or embedded) (29)-(30) and the nucleus of ma-
trix wh-questions (31) license weak NPIs such as any and ever:31 
(29) Has Nicholas ever been to Paris?
(30) Sophie wonders whether Nicholas has any interest in visiting Paris.
(31) Who has ever been to Paris?
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30 One might think that such an overlap in surface form, if problematic for some, should also be problem-
atic for any, which has both NPI and FC uses. It is possible that the differential distribution of the two 
kinds of any is somehow easier to observe; if DEness and modals are the two major licensing contexts for 
any, then NPI and FC any are generally in complementary distribution. PPI some and epistemic indefinite 
some on the other hand overlap more in their distribution (e.g., the following are both fine: Lisa married 
someone / Lisa married some guy).   
31 Following Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) and others, the “nucleus” refers to the material following the wh-
phrase. 
Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) observe that weak NPIs like any and ever are licensed only in certain interroga-
tive environments. For example, any is acceptable in wh-questions embedded under wonder (32a), and for 
some speakers under know (32b), but not under realize or surprise (32c,d). 
(32) Embedded wh-questions
a. Sally wonders who brought any cake 
b. %Sally knows who brought any cake32
c. *Sally realized which students brought any cake 
d. *It surprised Sally which students brought any cake
Guerzoni and Sharvit propose that what licenses weak NPIs in questions is the property of strong exhaustiv-
ity. The strong/weak exhaustivity distinction is exemplified as follows:  
(33) Sally knows who brought cake.      
a. Weakly exhaustive reading: For every x, if x brought cake, Sally knows that x brought cake.
b. Strongly exhaustive reading: For every x, if x brought  cake, Sally knows that  x brought 
cake, and if x didn’t bring cake, Sally knows that x didn’t bring cake.             
The strongly exhaustive reading in (33) is available because it  is possible for Sally to know both of the x’s 
who brought  cake that they brought cake and of the x’s who didn’t  bring cake that  they didn’t  bring cake. 
While wonder provides a strongly exhaustive environment, know exhibits inter-speaker variation (the 
authors report that  those who can access the strongly exhaustive reading accept the NPI licensing in (32b)), 
and surprise does not  support  a strongly exhaustive reading.33 Polar questions are inherently strongly ex-
haustive, so the NPIs in the polar questions in (29) and (30) are also correctly predicted to be acceptable. 
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32 Following Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007), % indicates inter-speaker variation in judgments.
33 Surprise can license NPIs in declaratives, and has been argued to be Strawson-DE (von Fintel, 1999). 
Wh-questions embedded under surprise however are neither strongly exhaustive nor Strawson-DE, and 
thus do not license NPIs.
 Nicolae (2013) provides an explanation of these facts (and of NPI licensing in questions more gener-
ally), extending Chierchia’s exhaustification-based approach. For her, question-embedding predicates se-
mantically subcategorize for either weakly or strongly exhaustive questions. Unlike weakly exhaustive ques-
tions, strongly exhaustive questions have a null only operator adjoined at  the level of the question nucleus, 
which associates with the trace of the wh-phrase. The result  is that NPIs are acceptable only in strongly ex-
haustive questions because in these cases the question nucleus creates a Strawson-DE environment.34  In 
other words, Nicolae’s is a unified approach to NPI licensing in declaratives and questions: in either case, 
licensing is satisfied via O-exhaustification. 
 Given that  there is a single NPI any that is licensed the same way in declaratives and questions (i.e. via 
exhaustification of subdomain alternatives), this analysis gives rise to the prediction that  once children ac-
quire the semantics of any, they should be able to use any in both declaratives and questions.35 Let us see if 
this prediction is borne out.
 There are, to my knowledge, only two previously reported acquisition studies of NPIs in questions, one 
of which we reviewed in Chapter 3. Thornton (1995) examined children’s comprehension of any in ques-
tions and found adult-like comprehension by the age of 3;06. In Tieu (2010), I examined children’s sponta-
neous production of any and provided evidence for the concurrent emergence of any in declaratives and 
questions. Of the 40 children I examined, four produced at least  15 instances of NPI any in questions and at 
least  15 instances of NPI any in declaratives. For these four children, there was no statistically significant 
chronological gap between the onset of any in one environment  and the onset  of any in the other (by Bino-
mial Test). The chronological gap between the onset of any in the two constructions is consistent with con-
current emergence, suggesting that once the children know how to use any in one environment (e.g., in de-
claratives), they also know how to use it in the other (e.g., in interrogatives). 
 One final thing to note is that  it  may not  be surprising that children catch onto licensing in questions; a 
look at samples of parental input reveals that children get  fairly robust evidence that  any can be licensed in 
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34 The licensing is therefore parallel to the case of NPIs licensed by the overt only in declaratives, as in 
Only John ate anything.
35 A prerequisite of course is that the children must also have interrogative structures and semantics in 
place.
questions. Besides sentential negation in declaratives, the next largest proportion of NPI any involves licens-
ing in questions:
Table 5. NPI any in the input
Corpus Total 
utterances
Total NPI any Licensing by 
sentential negation
Licensing in questions
Kuczaj (Abe’s father) 12,753 125
(=.98% of all 
utterances)
81 
(=64.8% of all NPI 
any)
38 
(=30.4% of all NPI 
any)
Lara (Lara’s mother) 78,701 423 
(=.54% of all 
utterances)
342 
(=80.85% of all NPI 
any)
69 
(=16.31% of all NPI 
any)
In sum, children’s acquisition of any is consistent  with a unified treatment of licensing in both declaratives 
and questions. 
6.  Conclusion 
This dissertation has examined the acquisition of a particular PSI, namely any. Chapter 2 began the disserta-
tion by identifying the target set of knowledge underlying any, including both structural and semantic kinds 
of information. Chapter 3 argued that  previous studies targeted only one half of the story. The experiments 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 presented the other half of the story: children in fact can be shown to demon-
strate incredibly sophisticated semantic knowledge of polarity sensitivity. The sophistication of their knowl-
edge is made all the more remarkable when we consider the (paucity of the) evidence that is available to 
them in the input. While children receive positive evidence for any’s restricted distribution, they do not  re-
ceive evidence for a number of semantic properties and mechanisms that are part  and parcel of the polarity 
sensitivity system: activation of subdomain alternatives, exhaustification of alternatives, and contrastive fo-
cus. Chapter 5 identified the starkness of the learning problem through an examination of parental speech 
samples, and then proposed one way that children could, despite absence of direct evidence for these seman-
tic mechanisms in the input, nevertheless arrive at the target grammar. By expanding our view beyond any 
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single PSI, to more generally consider polarity sensitivity as a complex system derivable from a finite set of 
lexical parameters, we can capture not  only variation within the polarity sensitivity system (as well as cross-
linguistic variation), I argue we can also explain the learnability of PSIs.
 More generally speaking, when considering the acquisition of semantics, one may have the perhaps na-
ïve impression that  in this domain (i.e. the domain of meaning, as opposed to syntax), children might be able 
to depend more heavily, or more exclusively on evidence in the input. After all, how can the child come to 
know the meaning of any word without  hearing it  in use, in appropriate contexts? But ultimately the data 
reviewed and presented in this dissertation lead us to the conclusion that in fact the context may not be suffi-
cient  at all, for many aspects of semantics. It  is my hope that I have provided some compelling evidence that 
the input is simply not  rich enough to derive all the semantic knowledge of polarity sensitivity that  children 
can be shown to have. Even in the acquisition of semantics, we need to assume some innate machinery, 
which can generate an accordingly constrained space of possible hypotheses for the learner to entertain. At 
the same time, as I have tried to elaborate on in Sections 3 and 4, there is learning involved, and much work 
needs to be done in order to better understand the process by which this learning takes place. In the case of 
polarity sensitivity, I have suggested that  the learner must be keyed to certain properties and distributional 
patterns in the input. It  is by identifying signature patterns of distribution in the input that  the learner can 
map a superficial string to an underlying category, given a sufficiently constrained hypothesis space. 
 To conclude, this dissertation has taken as its target  of study the acquisition of the semantics of a particu-
lar PSI, i.e. any, in a particular language, i.e. English. But  the proposal we have put  forth should be able to 
be extended to the development  and acquisition of other PSIs, in other languages, given the theoretical tools 
provided within an analysis such as Chierchia (2013). Although I have tried to be very precise in my object 
of study, what we have ultimately examined is how children acquire some very complex, sophisticated se-
mantic knowledge concerning a rather complex system. The polarity sensitivity system is one that blurs the 
line between grammar and logic, and in choosing to focus on the development  of a particular PSI, it is my 
hope that  this study has more generally furthered our understanding of how children acquire logic within the 
grammar. 
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